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“[N]ot only should all friendships be safeguarded with the
greatest devotion and good faith, but especially those which have
been restored to goodwill after enmity.”1
INTRODUCTION
On September 28, 2015, in his address before the United Nations
General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared, “a
new chapter has started in Iran’s relations with the world.”2 This
development emerges from the conclusion of over a year of
negotiating efforts concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear
program with the P5+1, which resulted in the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (“JCPOA”).3 By relaxing decades of trade and
investment sanctions in exchange for the imposition of strict
limitations on the development of Iran’s civil nuclear program, the
JCPOA, according to Rouhani, “showcased the potential for
constructive dialogue.”4
Within the United States, the terms and details of the JCPOA
have been—like the sanctions regime that preceded it—

1. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 476 (Stephen C. Neff ed., 2012)
(1625).
2. Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement at the General
Debate of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Sept. 28, 2015), http://gadebate.un.
org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_Iran_en.pdf [hereinafter Rouhani Statement at the
General Assembly].
3. The P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council—the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France—as well as Germany. In
European parlance, the P5+1 is alternatively called the EU+3. See Joshua Keating, You Say
P5+1, I Say E3+3, FOREIGN POL'Y (Sept. 30, 2009), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/30/yousay-p51-i-say-e33/; see also Michael R. Gordon & David E. Sanger, Deal Reached on Iran
Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lesson With Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-is-reached-after-longnegotiations.html; Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (providing a basic overview of the
JCPOA).
4. Rouhani Statement at the General Assembly, supra note 2; see also John Mecklin, The
Experts Assess the Iran Agreement of 2015, BULL. ATOMIC SCI. (July 14, 2015),
http://thebulletin.org/experts-assess-iran-agreement-20158507 (summarizing how the JCPOA
works).
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controversial.5 The days and months following the signing of the
JCPOA in Vienna on July 14, 2015 witnessed a deeply polarized
array of high-profile comments and criticisms, from a wide variety of
official and unofficial commentators.6 One way of explaining this
controversy is the sizeable diversity of JCPOA stakeholders, each
with uniquely situated interests and expectations concerning the
deal’s aftermath. For the Obama Administration, which purportedly
sought to halt Iran’s nuclear program in a way that would avoid
another US war in the Middle East, the JCPOA was envisioned as
bringing “extraordinary benefits to our national security and the peace
and security of the world.”7 For the State of Israel, which has long
considered Iran to be its most threatening regional rival, the JCPOA
consisted of a “very bad deal,” representing a victory for “death,
tyranny and the pursuit of jihad.”8
Lost in this simplistic dichotomy of “for the deal” or “against the
deal” are the contours of those various interests, and how their
architecture might influence, or be strategically used to influence, the
post-sanctions environment emerging with the JCPOA’s
implementation.9 The purpose of this Note is to explore the body of
interests that comprise one such stakeholder group: international
5. See Daniel R. DePetris, A Frustrating Iran Deal for Republicans, THE HILL (Sept. 24,
2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/254756-a-frustrating-iran-deal-forrepublicans (elucidating Republican opposition to the JCPOA); see also Peter Beinart et al., Is
There a Viable Alternative to the Iran Deal?, ATLANTIC (July 17, 2015), http://www.the
atlantic.com/international/archive/2015/07/iran-nuclear-deal-goldberg-frum-beinart/398816/
(debating the merits of the JCPOA).
6. See Beinart et al., supra note 5 (exploring differing opinions surrounding the JCPOA).
7. President Barak Obama, Statement by the President on the Adoption of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action at American University (Oct. 18, 2015), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/18/statement-president-adoption-jointcomprehensive-plan-action; see also Krishnadev Calamur, Obama on the Iran Deal: The
“Strongest Nonproliferation Agreement Ever Negotiated,” ATLANTIC (Aug. 5, 2015), http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/obama-and-the-iran-deal/400535/ (presenting
the White House’s logic behind the JCPOA).
8. Krishnadev Calamur, In Speech to Congress, Netanyahu Blasts “A Very Bad Deal”
with Iran, NPR (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/03/03/39025098
6/netanyahu-to-outline-iran-threats-in-much-anticipated-speech-to-congress; see also Michael
Herzog, Contextualizing Israeli Concerns about the Iran Nuclear Deal, WASH. INST. FOR
NEAR E. POL’Y (2015), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/
PolicyNote26_Herzog.pdf (“ . . . Israel views Iran as its most serious and direct strategic
threat. Specifically, Israel considers Iran a regional power that expresses its revolutionary
ideology—an ideology that negates Israel’s right to exist—in both nuclear and hegemonic
ambitions.”).
9. Cf. supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (sampling banal positions “for” and
“against” the JCPOA, in the absence of their functionalist meaning or usefulness).
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investors, particularly US investors, now theoretically posed to begin
operations in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Reduced to its simplest, the term “investment” can be defined as
“the commitment of resources by a physical or legal person to a
specific purpose in order to earn a profit or to gain a return.”10 Thus,
the primary interests of investors may be defined as those factors that
contribute toward their desire to enrich themselves, financially and
otherwise.11 Yet, as the historical investment experience in Iran itself
demonstrates, there are (or should be) subtler nuances inherent in the
calculi that drive international investor behavior.12 While even among
the international business community investors are not the only
players that will be influenced by the JCPOA, by its very nature
investment implies a set of increased stakes and long-term
commitments that will heighten the intensity of investor interaction
with the JCPOA.13 As such, the emerging legal and economic
horizons in Iran pose a lightly trodden territory, within which to
explore challenges and insights related to international investment law
generally.14 Key among these is not only the obvious tensions
between investors and host States, but also the complex relationship
10. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT:
NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 3
(2013).
11. See id.
12. Specifically, the returns generated by investors in pre-revolutionary Iran mattered
little in the face of eventual government expropriation following 1979. See generally Sebastian
Lopez Escarcena, Expropriations and Other Measures Affecting Property Rights in the Case
Law of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 31 WIS. INT’L L. J. 177 (2013) (overviewing
expropriation resulting from Iran’s 1979 revolution). Indeed, Iran’s larger economic backdrop
prior to the revolution helped facilitate the fall of the investment-friendly Pahlavi regime. See
Suzanne Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, in THE IRAN PRIMER: POWER, POLITICS, AND
U.S. POLICY 95 (Robin Wright ed., 2010) (“The Pahlavi economic program generated rapid
growth, but the reforms also alienated influential constituencies, including the clergy,
landlords and merchants or bazaaris . . . Economic grievances helped galvanize opposition to
the monarchy, and revolutionary leaders such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini appealed to
Iran’s poor and its increasingly squeezed middle class.”); Stephen McGlinchey, How the Shah
Entangled America, NAT’L INTEREST (Aug. 2, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/
how-the-shah-entangled-america-8821(“ . . . the disproportionate extent of the military
investment in the Shah’s regime is partially responsible for the tide of anti-American sentiment
that endures in Iran to this day.”).
13. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 23 (contrasting the differing stakes between
international investment and international trade); Raymond Vernon, International Investment
and International Trade in the Product Cycle, 80 Q. J. ECON. 190, 196-207 (1966) (theorizing
the decision-making process that encourages international investors to “take the risks of
pioneering with production in a new area”).
14. See infra notes 1118-28 and accompanying text.
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between investors and their own home States.15 In the case of Iran, the
United States has an interest in the way international investors
conduct their operations following the relaxation of sanctions.16
The JCPOA will be the primary framework within which all
parties operate going forward.17 Probably the most monumental
foreign policy achievement of the Obama presidency, the JCPOA is
also likely to retain ongoing political support throughout the
foreseeable future, at least among most US Democrats.18 The question
then becomes how the United States might use the deal, and
international investment, as a means of furthering US foreign policy
interests within both Iran and the wider Middle East region.19 From
nuclear non-proliferation to counterterrorism, human rights to reform
and/or regime change within the Islamic Republic, the JCPOA
elevates international investors to a position of heightened influence
over various longstanding US foreign policy goals.20
Although the Obama Administration has responded to this
development by limiting the new freedoms that would otherwise be
provided to US investors under the JCPOA, a wiser foreign policy
strategy would be to channel the powerful incentives born of
international investment as a means of furthering US-Iran relations

15. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 18-19 (articulating host country interests
in international investment), 22-23 (considering home country interests); see also Robert E.
Lipsey, Home- and Host-Country Effects of Foreign Direct Investment, in CHALLENGES TO
GLOBALIZATION: ANALYZING THE ECONOMICS 333-72 (Robert E. Baldwin & L. Alan
Winters eds., 2004) (surveying the effects of international investment on home and host
states).
16. See generally infra Part III.D (considering an array of US foreign policy interests as
they relate to post-sanctions Iran).
17. See Sunny Mann et al., Iran: Overview and Significance of the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS (Apr. 9, 2015), http://globalcompliancenews.
com/iran-overview-and-significance-of-the-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-20150409/;
John B. Bellinger III & Zachary Laub, How Binding Is the Iran Deal?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (July 23, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/iran/binding-iran-deal/p36828 (discussing
Congress’ review of JCPOA); see also infra Part II.A.
18. Cf. Tal Kopan, Senate Democrats Deliver Obama’s Iran Nuclear Deal Support,
CNN (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-richardblumenthal-ron-wyden-gary-peters-obama-democrats/; Jennifer Steinhauer, Democrats Hand
Victory to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html.
19. See infra Part III.D (illustrating how increased foreign investment in Iran could be
used to secure various US foreign policy interests).
20. See infra Part III.D.
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and wider regional US policy goals.21 In doing so, the United States
would have a strong partner in the international investment
community, and vice versa.22 If the United States believes that the
“new chapter” in Iran’s global relations evoked by President Rouhani
is a development it would like to see in the world, then international
investment will play a key role in securing this change.23 By
liberalizing Washington’s JCPOA guidance to the fullest extent
possible, the United States should seek to encourage US participation
in international investment in Iran, and play an active role in shaping
the interests and incentives that investment creates there.24
Structurally, this Note is comprised of three movements. Part I
traces the evolution of the sanctions regime, shedding light on the
historical experiences that will shape Iran’s future behavior as a host
State, as well as the consequences of past US sanctions policies. Part
II looks to Iran’s post-sanctions transition, emphasizing what the
JCPOA means for US investors, contrasted with international
investors more broadly. Furthermore, by looking to the opportunities,
risks, and legal frameworks concerning international investment in
Iran, Part II also demonstrates Iran’s current capacity for foreign
investment, and why dramatic capital inflows are likely to return to
Iran whether the United States likes it or not. Finally, Part III turns to
US foreign policy interests, and how these interests would be best
served by revising Washington’s policies in a manner that allows
broad economic engagement and greater US investment in Iran. By
taking a proactive role in facilitating the way that US investment
reaches Iran, the United States holds the potential to inspire important
innovations within international investment law as a whole.
I. IRAN UNDER THE SANCTIONS REGIME
In order to understand the significance of the JCPOA and what it
will mean for international investors, a larger understanding of Iran’s
21. See infra Part II.A.2 (analyzing remaining limitations on US investment in Iran);
infra Part III.D (demonstrating the potential positive impacts investment-based engagement on
an array of US foreign policy goals).
22. See infra Part III.
23. Rouhani Statement at the General Assembly, supra note 2. See generally infra Part
III.
24. See generally infra Part III. Throughout this Note, national capitals will be
interchangeably used—via synecdoche—to stand in for their respective States and/or
governments. Thus, one should read “Washington” here as referring to policymakers within
the US Government.
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history, as well as that of the sanctions regime, is required. By then
looking to the costs of the sanctions regime—both on Iran and other
stake-holding parties—one can finally appreciate the profundity of
Iran’s post-sanctions transition. For both US investors and US
policymakers, the history of the sanctions regime provides numerous
political and economic insights concerning the future of both Tehran
and Washington going forward. The focus of this Part is to provide
that contextual background.
A.

Background & Historical Overview

The United States and Iran share a contentious relationship.25
While this has not always been the case, the Islamic Republic has
held a great deal of negative US foreign policy attention since the
Islamic Revolution of 1979.26 Throughout this era, US-drafted
international trade and investment sanctions have played the central
role in guiding how the United States deals with Iran.27 While
sanctions as a distinct tool of foreign policy have existed at least since
the ancient Greek city-states, the US sanctions strategy toward Iran
has, since its inception, fallen under a two-track strategy, which
sought to influence Iranian behavior by imposing economic pressure
and simultaneously extending incentives for certain Iranian
concessions.28 The utility of these sanctions as a tool of US foreign
25. See generally JAMES G. BLIGHT ET AL., BECOMING ENEMIES: US-IRAN RELATIONS
WAR, 1979-1988 (2012) (tracing the evolution of US-Iran relations
throughout the Cold War); KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE PERSIAN PUZZLE: THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN IRAN AND AMERICA (2005) (recalling the antagonistic history of the United States
and Iran).
26. See McGlinchey, supra note 12 (outlining US-Iran relations before 1979); JOHN J.
MEARSHEIMER & STEPHEN M. WALT, THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 280-82
(2007) (introducing the “adversarial relationship” between Washington and Tehran since
1979). Throughout this Note, the “Islamic Revolution,” the “Iranian Revolution,” or simply the
“Revolution” are all used interchangeably to refer to the Iranian political upheaval of 1979.
27. See Raj Bhala, Fighting Iran with Trade Sanctions, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
251, 256 (2014) (“Simply put, for nearly forty years, America has had a sanctions-based trade
policy toward Iran.”); Patrick Clawson, U.S. Sanctions, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at
115 (“The United States has had sanctions on Iran for most of the period since the 1979
Islamic revolution. . . .”).
28. Thucydides’ description of the Megarian decrees represents trade sanctions that
directly contributed to the Peloponnesian War. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 68
(Martin Hammond trans., 2009) (“Above all, and in the clearest possible terms, they repeated
that there would be no war if the Athenians repealed the decree which had denied the
Megarians access to the ports in the Athenian empire and to the Athenian market itself.”); see
also Farshad Ghodoosi, Combatting Economic Sanctions: Investment Disputes in Times of
Political Hostility, a Case Study of Iran, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1731, 1765 (2014)
AND THE IRAN-IRAQ
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policy has been widely debated.29 However one categorizes it, the
JCPOA represents a landmark shift in how the United States deals
with Iran.30 By moving away from almost forty years of nearcontinuous sanctions policies, the JCPOA represents the end of an
era.31 The following Sections will examine this time period, and trace
the history of US-Iran relations up to the lifting of sanctions.32

(“International sanctions are a reality in international affairs and can be traced back to ancient
Greece.”). For the logic behind US-Iran sanctions, see SUZANNE MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION 429 (2015) (articulating Washington’s twotrack strategy); see also Suzanne Maloney & Ray Takeyh, The Self-Limiting Success of Iran
Sanctions, INT’L AFF. (Nov. 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/11/iransanctions-maloney-takeyh (further defining Washington’s two-track sanctions logic).
29. See Nicholas Colby Watson Wolfe, Nuclear Chain Reaction: Why Economic
Sanctions Are Not Worth the Public Costs, 27 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2015) (questioning the
efficacy of Washington’s sanctions regime); Clawson, supra note 27, at 115 (“U.S. sanctions
have been controversial on many scores, with vigorous debates about their impact and their
negative side effects.”). Many argue that decades of US economic coercion continuously
undermined sympathetic parties within Iran and further radicalized the Islamic Republic away
from international cooperation. See, e.g., Steve H. Hanke, On the Failure of the Iranian
Sanctions, GLOBE ASIA (Feb. 2013), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/failureiranian-sanctions (“[The sanctions regime] has ultimately failed to deter the Iranian regime
from developing nuclear capacity. Instead, it has generated a great deal of resentment.”); see
also Wolfe, supra, at 19 (claiming that US sanctions emboldened Iran’s “ultra-conservative
factions”). In contrast, supporters of the sanctions regime cite its importance as a nonviolent
policy tool in combating, or at least constraining, problematic Iranian policies. See, e.g.,
Suzanne Maloney, Why “Iran Style” Sanctions Worked Against Tehran (and Why They Might
Not Succeed with Moscow), BROOKINGS (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
markaz/posts/2014/03/21-iran-sanctions-russia-crimea-nuclear [hereinafter Why “Iran Style”
Sanctions Worked Against Tehran] (“Now that Iran has become the exemplar of successful
sanctions, the long experience in deploying economic pressure against the Islamic Republic
offers a wealth of lessons for those seeking to apply this model elsewhere.”); see also Wolfe,
supra, at 2-3 (asserting that US sanctions are often misattributed to Iran’s cooperation on
negotiating the JCPOA). Paradoxically, the JCPOA itself has been cited as supporting both
sides. Compare Jeffrey Goldberg, White House Official: Nuclear Deal is Best Way to Avoid
War with Iran, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2015/03/white-house-official-nuclear-deal-is-best-way-to-avoid-warwith-iran/386806/ (arguing that the JCPOA is the best way to avoid war with Iran), with Leslie
H. Gelb, The Real Reason Obama Did the Iran Deal, DAILY BEAST (July 14, 2015), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/14/the-iran-deal-s-missing-ingredient.html (“no
nation, including those far weaker economically than Iran, has ever capitulated after economic
sanctions.”).
30. Compare infra Parts I.A.1-4, with Part I.A.5.
31. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Parts I.A.1-5.
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1. Pre-Revolutionary Iran
Various contemporary trends within the investment climate of
Iran trace their roots to the period before the Islamic Republic, when
Persia was still ruled by the Pahlavi dynasty.33 This era set many
investment precedents, as well as popular Iranian attitudes concerning
both the United States and foreign investment that remain largely
unchanged today.34 The unique interplay between US investment and
Iran as it developed over the twentieth century traces back to the very
beginning of US-Iran relations, which essentially began with an
investment dispute: Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh’s
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (“AIOC”) in
1951.35 Initially, Persia’s brief experiment with democracy under
Mossadegh was of little concern to the United States, and Britain’s
monopoly on the post-war Iranian oil market gave Washington little
reason to care about nationalization.36 However, as Britain and
Persia’s relationship deteriorated over the nationalization of the
AIOC, economic turmoil and popular unrest sparked US fears that
Iran would fall into the global communist camp and become a Soviet
protectorate.37 These fears led to Washington’s intervention in Iran,
33. See infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
34. See McGlinchey, supra note 12 (explicating the enduring legacy of Washington’s
pre-revolutionary policies in Iran); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 53 (observing the impact of Western intervention on Iran’s
future attitude regarding foreign oil concessions).
35. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1735-39 (summarizing Mossadegh’s nationalization
of the AIOC); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 46-53 (recounting the Mossadegh affair). Although physical US presence in Iran extends
back to military operations in World War II, it was not until after the War, during a period of
British imperial decline and budding global Cold War tensions, that Washington took a direct
interest in the affairs of the country. See id. at 42 (mentioning the US and British military
intervention in Iran during World War II); id. at 49 (noting the diversion of Britain’s
mercantile interests in Iran and US fears of Soviet expansionism); see also IRENE L.
GENDZIER, NOTES FROM THE MINEFIELD: UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN LEBANON AND
THE MIDDLE EAST 1945-1958, 34-35 (2006) (highlighting budding Anglo-American tensions
as Britain’s colonial hegemony began to unravel).
36. Indeed, US firms actually benefited in the immediate wake of Mossadegh’s
nationalization policy. See GENDZIER, supra note 35, at 35 (“Not only did the State
Department disagree with British rejectionism, but U.S. international oil interests were among
the beneficiaries of the concessionary arrangements that followed nationalization.”); see also
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 49
(“Even late in the crisis, President Eisenhower pressed the British to accept Iranian terms and
briefly contemplated reviving direct assistance to a beleaguered Tehran.”).
37. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 52 (explaining the growing US fears that brought Washington onboard Britain’s
interventionist policy); A Short Account of 1953 Coup, IRAN CHAMBER SOCIETY,
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ousting the Prime Minister in the jointly orchestrated British-US coup
remembered today as Operation Ajax.38 In Mossadegh’s place,
Washington and London imposed the young Shah Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi as an autocrat, who would go on to rule the country until
1979.39
Having placed Shah Pahlavi on the throne, Washington
committed itself to ongoing patronage of the young monarch in the
form of investment and support for the Shah’s State-centered
development policies.40 Although much of the Iranian economy
remained locked up in centrally planned development strategies
throughout the Shah’s tenure, US investors found a welcome
destination for their capital in pre-Revolutionary Iran.41 By 1978, US
investment in Iran stood at approximately US$700 million, with
50,000 US expatriates living there.42 Within the energy sector, US oil
companies owned 40 percent of the consortium that purchased Iranian
oil.43 The surge in global oil prices after the Arab Oil Embargo in
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/coup53/coup53p1.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2016)
(portraying the US view that only an “economically sound and financially solvent” Iran would
be able to fend off Soviet expansion).
38. See A Short Account of 1953 Coup, supra note 37; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 52-53 (summarizing the AngloAmerican coup that ousted Mossadegh).
39. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 52-53; GENDZIER, supra note 35, at 35 (noting the reinstating of the Pahlavi dynasty
under the new shah).
40. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 52-53; McGlinchey, supra note 12 (addressing Washington’s economic and military
support for the Shah’s modernization programs). In terms of investment, The Iranian Majles
(parliament) adopted the Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment in 1955,
the same year that Iran and the United States formally signed a Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation (“FCN”) treaty. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1744 (identifying the Law for the
Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment); id. at 1757 (examining the Iran-US FCN);
see also Law of the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment of 1955 (Iran), https://
track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/LegalResources/Iran/Laws/Law%20of%20the%20Attraction%2
0and%20Protection%20of%20Foreign%20Investment%20(1956).pdf; Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 284 U.N.T.S. 93, http://
www.parstimes.com/law/iran_us_treaty.html.
41. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 53-54 (discussing the growing role of international oil consortiums by the 1960s);
MELANI CAMMETT ET AL., A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 251 (4th ed., 2015)
(reviewing Iran’s economy under the Shah).
42. See Kate Gillespie, US Corporations and Iran at the Hague, 44 MIDDLE EAST J. 18,
19 (1990).
43. Id. at 19; Khosrow Fatemi, The Iranian Revolution: Its Impact on Economic
Relations with the United States, 12 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 303, 303-04 (1980)
(highlighting US participation in Iran’s pre-revolutionary economy).
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1973 brought unprecedented revenues to the Pahlavi regime, with
lucrative investor profits being made in the process.44 A second prong
of Washington’s patronage involved massive military aid to Iran, in
hopes of creating a strong regional ally committed to the fight against
communism.45 In the wider region, intelligence sharing and military
cooperation between Iran, Turkey, and Israel—what became known
as the Trident Alliance—also had major US backing, committed to
the fight against both communism and Arab nationalist movements.46
Ironically, during this period, the United States also played a direct
role in facilitating the birth of Iran’s nuclear development program.47
2. The Islamic Revolution & Regional Turmoil
Decades of US-Iranian cooperation came to an abrupt end
following the Islamic Revolution of 1979.48 While foreign investors
and Iran’s political elite had made a fortune during the Pahlavi years,
this wealth was widely perceived as occurring at the expense of the

44. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 251 (“With the first great surge in petroleum
prices in 1973, the shah’s state had at its disposal a tremendous volume of rents.”); see also
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 66
(restating Iran’s embargo era opportunism); id. at 70 (“Culturally and financially jarring
foreign enclaves expanded like sponges, soaking up vast sums for the salaries of skilled
workers fro outside Iran.”).
45. By 1977, US military sales to Iran were approximately US$6 billion annually. See
Gillespie, supra note 42, at 19; McGlinchey, supra note 12 (considering US military aid to the
Pahlavi regime). The United States also played a leading role in the development the Shah’s
brutal intelligence agency, Sazeman-i Ettelaat va Amniyat-i Keshvar (“SAVAK”), or the
National Organization for Intelligence and Security. Used both to fight communism and
intimidate Iranian citizens out of voicing dissent, SAVAK became a notoriously feared and
hated source of domestic Iranian oppression. See Ministry of Security SAVAK,
GLOBALSECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/savak.htm (last visited
Apr. 9, 2016) [hereinafter Ministry of Security SAVAK] (providing an overview of SAVAK);
see also ROBERT FISK, THE GREAT WAR FOR CIVILISATION: THE CONQUEST OF THE MIDDLE
EAST 99 (2005) (illustrating SAVAK’s brutality).
46. See Yossi Alpher, Trident’s Forgotten Legacy: When Iran, Israel, and Turkey
Worked Together, FOREIGN AFF. (May 7, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
turkey/2015-05-07/trident-s-forgotten-legacy (outlining the Trident Alliance); see also FISK,
supra note 45, at 100 (acknowledging wide Iranian-Israeli cooperation before the revolution).
47. See Alexandra L. Anderson, Good Grief! Iran Sanctions and the Expansion of
American Corporate Liability for Non-U.S. Subsidiary Violations Under the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 125, 130 (2013)
[hereinafter Anderson, Good Grief!]; see also Michael Adler, Iran and the IAEA, in THE IRAN
PRIMER, supra note 12, at 89.
48. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (noting the reversal in US-Iran
relations following the storming of the US Embassy in November, 1979).
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Iranian people.49 The Shah’s form of State capitalism had troubling
effects on Iran’s traditional merchant class.50 While the national
coffers enriched, the Bezaari—Iran’s traditional merchant class—
remained confined to their small-scale operations, upsetting their
traditional balance of economic power.51 Furthermore, State revenues
were diverted to the exact foreign powers responsible for engineering
the overthrow of Mossadegh and reversing the people’s 1950s
nationalization efforts.52 Additionally, SAVAK’s increasingly brutal
surveillance and intimidation techniques infringed on the rights of all
Iranians: especially students, leftists, and those advocating for
increased political freedoms.53 The regular torture and disappearances
of Iranian citizens were unpopular among the citizens of Iran, and
these sentiments were left unconsoled as the Pahlavi elite held
decadent parties and lavish international galas.54
Along with economic modernization policies, the Shah’s social
development platform included initiatives antagonistic of the religious
and cultural practices of ordinary Iranians.55 By imposing Western
49. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 75 (presenting the “conviction among key political constituencies that the government
had betrayed the nation, squandered its resources, and subjugated the population to foreign
interests.”); see also CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 251 (noting the absence of the Iranian
private sector from the state’s economic advances).
50. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41; see also Kevan Harris, The Bazaar, in THE
IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 109 (explaining Bazaari—Iran’s traditional merchant class—
disenfranchisement under the Shah).
51. See Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50; see also FISK, supra note 45, at 110 (asserting
the role of the middle class in Iran’s revolution); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 62 (“The expansion of state banks and their
generous provision of credit to the nascent private sector effectively muscled out two of the
most important historical functions of the bazaar.”).
52. See FISK, supra note 45, at 98 (following Operation Ajax, “[t]he Shah would
henceforth always be seen as a tool of the United States and Britain.”); MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 81 (“In [Khomeini’s] telling,
the blame for Iran’s poverty and oppression fell at the feet of Washington and its allies.”); id.
at 82 (“This depiction of a foreign conspiracy centered on the exploitation of Iran’s resources,
both human and natural, in a way that echoed the Mosaddeq era debates and appealed to the
leftist and nationalist elements of the revolutionary coalition.”).
53. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 54 (positing SAVAK’s role in enforcing loyalty to the regime); FISK, supra note 45, at
99 (recounting SAVAK’s terrorizing methodologies).
54. See FISK, supra note 45, at 100-01 (contrasting the Shah’s lavish lifestyle with the
oppression faced by ordinary Iranians); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 73-75 (presenting an extended look at the regime’s
decadence).
55. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 70; FISK, supra note 45, at 100 (observing the cultural and religious alienation of the
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values on his subjects and marginalizing the nation’s traditional social
bases, the Shah drew open criticism from Iran’s Ulema—its religious
clerical class—which retained significant popular power through even
the most repressive years of the autocracy.56 In this light, the
explosion of State revenues following the 1973 oil crisis actually
undermined the Pahlavi regime.57 With increased resources to fuel
these unpopular modernization policies, the Shah expedited his own
demise.58
To call the 1979 Revolution in Iran an “Islamic Revolution” is
somewhat of a historical misnomer.59 However, the Revolution’s
various non-Islamist movements had been gutted internally by
decades of political repression and SAVAK’s operations.60 The
Ulema, by contrast, was both organized and well resourced, and had
earned a longstanding popular authority for its history of calling out
Iranian population); see also CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 73-74 (“ . . . one could argue
that the downfall of the shah in Iran in 1979 and the proclamation of the Islamic republic came
as the result of rapid and profound social change in Iran in the 1960s and 1970s”).
56. See FISK, supra note 45, at 100 (citing social alienation as a result of the Shah’s
reform efforts); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION,
supra note 28, at 85-86 (emphasizing the religious establishment’s retained authority in the
face of state autocracy).
57. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
58. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 69; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 251 (linking increased oil revenue with the
disastrous policies that ultimately mobilized the public against the Shah).
59. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 75-84 (distinguishing the ideological diversity of the Shah’s opposition); see also
CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 312 (“At the time of the revolution, the opposition to the
shah seems to have been as widespread as Polish opposition to Communist rule . . . the initial
coalition led by Khomeini was very broad indeed.”). In reality the events that began with
student demonstrations in 1977 and evolved into the eviction of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979
were both populist and representative of a wide spectrum of political ideologies. See id.; see
also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 7394 (portraying an overview of the revolution). In particular, Iran’s Marxists and communists
played an important role in bringing down the regime. See id. at 76 (identifying the importance
of the Marxist Sharikha-ye Fedayin-e Khalq and Mojahedin-e Khalq movements); Dr. Zayar,
The Iranian Revolution: Past, Present and Future, Chapter Three: The Communist Party of
Iran, IN DEFENSE OF MARXISM (July 9, 2006), http://www.marxist.com/the-iranianrevolution-past-present-future/page-5.htm (providing a wider synopsis of Marxism’s
contribution to the revolution).
60. SAVAK’s raison d’être, at least in the eyes of its benefactors in Washington, was
always the fight against communism. See FISK, supra note 45, at 99; Ministry of Security
SAVAK, supra note 45. While guerilla groups like Sharikha-ye Fedayin-e Khalq and
Mojahedin-e Khalq were important, Iran’s larger and traditional communist Tudeh Party had
been largely “incapacitated and sidelined by the 1970s.” MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 75.
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the Pahlavi government.61 Thus, while the Revolution was comprised
of diverse, often antithetical ideologies, it coalesced around the
charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.62 This
placed Khomeini and the Ulema in a unique, powerful position after
the Shah fled Iran and escaped to the United States.63 Only after the
Iranian Constitution formally adopted the structure of an Islamic
Republic did the theocratic aims of the Ulema become undeniable.64
For Washington’s part, the ousting of the Shah was not in itself a
game-changer.65 Recognizing the strategic importance of Iran, the
United States initially hoped that it could retain influence with the
Islamic Republic.66 Such hopes were reinforced by the fact that the
Iranian Revolution had not been a full social or economic revolution
of the Bolshevik type.67 State expropriations had not yet occurred and
many US investors adopted a wait-and-see attitude.68 That said, even
before expropriations began, the international investment community
in Iran faced significant disruptions to its operations, stemming from

61. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 85-86. See generally Nikki R. Keddie, The Roots of the Ulama’s Power in Modern Iran,
29 STUDIA ISLAMICA 31 (1969) (providing a pre-revolutionary account of the lasting power of
the Ulema—Iran’s clerical class—in Iran).
62. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 79-84 (describing Khomeini’s politically contrived appeal to broad opposition factions);
FISK, supra note 45, at 120-21 (characterizing initial revolutionary cooperation between the
Ulema and Iran’s leftists).
63. See FISK, supra note 45, at 120-21; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 99-107 (assessing the trends that facilitated Khomeini’s
consolidation of power). Indeed, some of Khomeini’s most formative post-Shah initiatives
were to clamp down on the left and eradicate his co-revolutionaries. See Iran After the Victory
of 1979’s Revolution, IRAN CHAMBER SOCIETY (Nov. 29, 2015), http://www.iranchamber.
com/history/islamic_revolution/revolution_and_iran_after1979_2.php [hereinafter Iran After
the Victory]; FISK, supra note 45, at 121-22 (showing Khomeini’s eventual turning on his corevolutionaries).
64. See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980]; see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, 129-35 (outlining the drafting processes and consequences
of the Islamic Republic’s constitution).
65. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
66. See Clawson, supra note 27, at 115; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 429 n.1 (“Iran’s non-oil exports to the U.S. actually
increased in the months immediately following the revolution.”).
67. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 113; FISK, supra note 45, at 110 (contrasting
the Iranian Revolution with other historical revolutionary models).
68. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 19 (“The immediate implications of the Iranian
Revolution for US corporations operating in Iran were unclear.”); Iran After the Victory, supra
note 63 (inferring gradual phases of state expropriation of property).
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the popular unrest of 1978 and 1979.69 Fifteen percent of the five
hundred US firms operating in Iran had already shut down, and US
banks found themselves exposed to the potential default of US$2.3
billion of previously negotiated loans to Iran.70 As a result, the US
Comptroller of the Currency began appraising Iranian assets held in
the United States in order to prepare.71 Perhaps sensing this financial
squeeze, the Islamic Republic enacted its first expropriation on June
8, 1979, nationalizing Iranian banks.72 This was followed by the June
25 nationalization of the insurance sector, and the first wave of mass
nationalization throughout the month of July.73 The Islamic Republic
justified these actions by claiming that “economic stagnation had
brought the nation to the brink of disaster and that broader State
involvement was necessary.”74 Still, the Islamic Republic made
promises to compensate foreign investors sometime in the future, and
many investors delayed taking action.75
For both US investors and the US government, the equation
changed with the storming of the US Embassy on November 4,
1979.76 The US Embassy seizure and subsequent hostage standoff
pressed President Carter to issue Executive Order 12170, which froze
over US$12 billion of Iranian government assets under US

69. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 19 (“US corporations had already experienced losses
due to the general disruptions of the revolution . . . ”); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 91 (“During the monarchy’s final
eighteen months, labor activism emerged as a major factor . . . with strikes shutting down most
major industries for months.”).
70. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 19-20 (citing US closures and bank exposure); see
also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 101
(“ . . . businesses and universities ground to a halt as a result of violence and lack of any real
authority.”).
71. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20 (noting the OCC’s assessment of Iranian assets);
Fatemi, supra note 43, at 310-11 (pointing out Iran’s eventual default on these loans on
November 23, 1979).
72. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 117 (mentioning the nationalization of Iranian banks).
73. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 117-18 (presenting post-revolutionary Iran’s first wave of
mass expropriations).
74. Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20.
75. See id. at 20 (noting Iran’s promises to compensate and investor inaction). But see
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 116
(arguing that many foreign firms had already exited).
76. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 256; Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20 (establishing the
impact of the Iran hostage crisis).
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jurisdiction.77 By the following April, President Carter had issued the
first round of US sanctions targeting Iran.78 Meanwhile, US investors
began a wave of contract breach and expropriation litigation within
the US court system.79 By the end of 1980, US economic pressure and
the depletion of spare parts in the Iranian economy (along with the
start of the Iran-Iraq War) finally brought Iran to the negotiating
table.80 The Algiers Accords of January 15, 1981 secured the freedom
of the United States Embassy hostages in exchange for the release of
Iran’s frozen assets and the lifting of Carter-era US sanctions.81
Additionally, the Algiers Accords facilitated the creation of the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal (“IUSCT”), set up to sort out
investment disputes resulting from Iran’s revolution.82
Following the Algiers Accords, the United States retained a
sizeable amount of trade with Iran.83 Still, this was not enough to
prevent a devastating post-Revolution decline in the Iranian economy,
77. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979); see also
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 126-27
(addressing the US response to the hostage crisis).
78. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20-21; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 429-32 (explaining the first round of US economic
measures).
79. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-69 (1981) (offering an
example of a domestic US claim against Iran that was later usurped by the Algiers Accords);
see also Gillespie, supra note 42, at 21 (highlighting the wave of US litigation preceding the
Algiers Accords).
80. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 21; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 433 (analyzing Iran’s cooperation in Algiers).
81. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 21-22; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 438 (introducing the Algiers Accords).
82. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 22; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 438 (presenting the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
(“IUSCT”)). While the IUSCT has often been criticized for its excruciatingly slow
proceedings, the Tribunal’s successes have left a significant mark on international investment
law. See John J. Chung, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Balancing of
Rights Between Individual Claimants and the Government of Iraq, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 141, 173-75 (2005) (critiquing the slow methodologies of the IUSCT); see also
Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1739 (noting the influence of the IUSCT on other arbitration
mechanisms). The IUSCT has influenced the arbitral proceedings of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), and by the 1990s, the experience of the
IUSCT led many US investors to consider bringing their investments back to Iran. See id.; see
also Gillespie, supra note 42, at 35-36 (rationalizing US investors’ renewed interest in Iran,
following the IUSCT).
83. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 439 (pointing out Iran’s US wheat imports following the release of the Embassy
hostages); see also Clawson, supra note 27, at 115 (mentioning the end of trade restrictions
upon the release of the hostages).
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which had been hit hard by stagflation, economic mismanagement,
and the regime’s injuries to international investor confidence.84 From
September 1980, Iran was also forced to cope with the Iran-Iraq War:
a bloody existential war for both States that resulted in more than a
million deaths, over 100 thousand civilian casualties, and the longest
conventional war of the twentieth-century.85 Few governments had
more cause for alarm over Iran’s 1979 Revolution than Saddam
Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq.86 Hussein’s Sunni dictatorship
over Iraq’s majority Shi’ite population made his government
especially vulnerable to Iranian promises to export its Revolution, and
with Iran still in the shambles of revolutionary transition, he launched
a full-scale invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980.87
The Iranian experience under the Iran-Iraq War left a lasting
impression on modern Iran—perhaps one more formative than the
Islamic Revolution itself.88 While this existential conflict also
inflicted deep social and political consequences, the war’s impact on
Iran’s economy left a lasting mark on the nation’s treatment of
foreign investment.89 Iran’s wartime economy was marked by internal
ideological tensions between socialism and conservatism.90 The
84. See Kamran M. Dadkhah, Iran and Global Financial Markets: Foreign Investment
vs. Borrowing, 19 MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE REP. 8, 9 (1996); MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 118-19, 439 (surveying the economic
consequences of Iran’s revolution).
85. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1744; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 141; Michael Eisenstadt, Iran and Iraq, in THE
IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 151 (assessing the magnitude of the Iran-Iraq War).
86. See Will D. Swearingen, Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War, 78
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 405, 414 (1988); MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 141 (citing Iran’s promise to export their revolution).
87. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 141; Swearingen, supra note 86, at 405-06 (summarizing the start of the Iran-Iraq War).
88. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 142 (“[w]henever the Islamic Republic’s obituary is written, the war will stand as its
most consequential chapter.”); Claudia Wright, Implications of the Iraq-Iran War, FOREIGN
AFF. (Winter 1980/81), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1980-12-01/implicationsiraq-iran-war (offering an early prediction of the war’s long term impact on Middle East
stability).
89. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
90. See Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 96; MALONEY, IRAN'S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 157-61 (addressing Iran’s
wartime economy). While the Revolution had promised to put Iran’s petroleum wealth in the
hands of the Iranian people, the total devotion of the economy to the war effort also
underscored a need for economic pragmatism. See id. This pragmatism extended well beyond
economics. The Iran-Contra Affair is just one example where tough times mandated some
level of cooperation with the “Great Satan” in Washington. See generally Robert Busby, The
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Revolution and subsequent war also had a decimating effect on Iran’s
national economy.91 Adding to these complications, US support for
Saddam Hussein, as well as direct military confrontation between the
United States and Iran in the 1987 Tanker War, evidenced
intensifying distrust between Washington and Tehran.92 The US State
Department’s recognition of Iran as a State sponsor of terrorism and
new US sanctions under President Ronald Reagan also had a
“catastrophic impact” on Iran’s war effort against Iraq.93 Yet, in what
would foreshadow a future trend throughout the sanctions regime,
Washington’s traditional allies refused to take part in US economic
coercion policies.94 Even after a particularly tough round of US

Scandal That Almost Destroyed Ronald Reagan, SALON (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.salon.com/2011/02/04/busby_iran_contra/; Stephen R. Shalom, The United States
and Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, IRAN CHAMBER SOCIETY, http://www.iranchamber.
com/history/articles/united_states_iran_iraq_war1.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (reviewing
the Iran-Contra scandal).
91. See Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 96; MALONEY, IRAN'S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 442 (assessing the impact of
the war on Iran’s economy). During this period, Iranian industrial goods fell from twenty-eight
percent of non-oil exports in 1976 to just 2.2% in 1985. See id.; HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI,
REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC TRANSITION: THE IRANIAN EXPERIENCE 226 (1990) (citing the
decline in industrial goods). Likewise, Iran’s foreign direct investment (“FDI”) stock made a
steady decline from US$2.99 billion in 1981 to US$2.04 billion in 1990. See MALONEY,
IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra, at 442 (stating the fall of Iran’s
FDI stock); see also Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra, at 96 (discussing wider
economic consequences of the Iran-Iraq War).
92. See Shane Harris & Matthew M. Aid, Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped
Saddam as He Gassed Iran, FOREIGN POL'Y (Aug. 26, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/
08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/ (examining US
support for Iraq); Shalom, supra note 90; see also James A. Green, The Oil Platforms Case:
An Error in Judgment?, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 357, 358 (2004); Elaine Sciolino, From
and Sea, Iran-Iraq “Tanker War” Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1987, http://www.nytimes.
com/1987/09/03/world/from-air-and-sea-iran-iraq-tanker-war-heats-up.html (addressing the
Tanker War). At the same time, Iran’s ties to regional terrorism, extending back to Imad
Munighyeh’s 1983 proto-Hezbollah attack on US Marine barracks in Lebanon, shortened
Washington’s patience with the Islamic Republic. See generally Matthew Levitt, The Origins
of Hezbollah, ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2013/10/the-origins-of-hezbollah/280809/; Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing Fast Facts, CNN
(Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/13/world/meast/beirut-marine-barracksbombing-fast-facts/ (detailing the 1983 Marine barracks bombing).
93. MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at
431.
94. See id. at 433-34; Johannes Reissner, Europe and Iran, in HONEY AND VINEGAR:
INCENTIVES, SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY 33, 41 (Richard N. Haass & Meghan L.
O’Sullivan eds., 2000) (noting Europe’s reluctance to join US sanctions, in particular).
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sanctions in 1987, Washington’s closest allies were more concerned
with facilitating an end to the Iran-Iraq War than joining sanctions.95
3. Reconstruction & Reform
The conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 marked a radical
shift in Iran, both in terms of the nation’s politics and its economy.96
The devastation unleashed by the war fueled pragmatic reconstruction
efforts, which increasingly looked to foreign investment to rebuild
Iran’s crippled economy.97 The election of Iranian President Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani in August 1989 unlocked the first phase of what
became known as Iran’s Reform Era.98 This first phase, almost
entirely concerned with the nation’s economic policies, led to
numerous economic reforms championed throughout Rafsanjani’s
two terms.99 Under his tenure, Iran abandoned the “Islamic
economics” marked by the war years, moved toward integration with
global economic institutions like the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), slashed the national deficit,
and reduced State interference with imports.100 Additionally, key

95. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 445 (identifying reasons that Washington’s allies failed to join US sanctions); Reissner,
supra note 94, at 36 (illustrating German diplomacy with Iran through the war years). Notably,
President Reagan’s successor, George H. W. Bush, did witness some initial improvements to
US-Iran relations. President Bush’s extension of “goodwill” to Iran represents one of the few
meaningful US attempts at engagement throughout the entirety of the sanctions regime. See
MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 446-47
(examining the policy shift under Bush); Richard N. Haass, The George H.W. Bush
Administration, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 136-37 (addressing the new president’s
goodwill policies toward Iran). In fact, with civil war raging in nearby Lebanon, this short
window of cooperation did yield some breakthroughs, such as the negotiated release of
Hezbollah’s Western hostages. See id. at 137; MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 447 (exploring Iran’s role in the release of the hostages).
96. See infra notes 97-141 and accompanying text.
97. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1744; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra
note 12, at 96; MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 386 (characterizing Iran’s post-war reconstruction needs).
98. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 192-93 (situating Rafsanjani’s reconstruction efforts against wider reformist social and
political trends); Shaul Bakhash, The Six Presidents, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at
16-17 (recounting Rafsanjani’s presidency).
99. See Bakhash, supra note 98; MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 194-96 (summarizing Rafsanjani’s reconstruction efforts
throughout his two terms).
100. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 194-96; Daniel Pipes & Patrick Clawson, Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors, FOREIGN
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changes were made within the Iranian energy sector.101 The
appointment of Bijan Namdar Zangeneh as Iran’s Energy Minister
facilitated the rise of various capable technocrats within the energy
industry, and created an effective bureaucracy to advocate for
economic liberalization.102 These economic shifts led to a twenty
percent increase in real per capita Iranian incomes between 1989 and
1992, along with other economic benefits to the Islamic Republic.103
Although Rafsanjani’s economic pragmatism managed to attract
much needed foreign investment from Europe and elsewhere,
politically, Iran’s resource wealth was still wrapped up in sensitive
notions of national sovereignty.104 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had
succeeded Khomeini as Iran’s Supreme Leader in 1989, became a
constant thorn in the side of Rafsanjani’s economic reform efforts.105
Whatever changes were made within Iran’s domestic economy, the
country sustained its confrontational foreign policy practices:
continuing to support regional Islamic revolutionaries and terrorist
movements, complicating the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and
rhetorically antagonizing Sunni neighbors in the Gulf.106 Additionally,
one downside of Rafsanjani’s economic platform was that—like other
nations affected by the global wave of liberalization in the 1990s—
privatization tended to concentrate economic power among those with
close ties to the political elite.107 This trend was manifest in Iran’s
energy sector, resulting in what became unpopularly known as the

AFF.
(1992),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/1993-02-01/ambitious-irantroubled-neighbors (considering Rafsanjani’s reform initiatives).
101. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
102. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 194-96, 400; Bakhash, supra note 98, at 16 (assessing Rafsanjani’s attempts at
liberalization).
103. See Pipes & Clawson, supra note 100, at 2-3; Maloney, The Revolutionary
Economy, supra note 12, at 97 (recalling the economic growth in Iran following liberalization).
104. See Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 97; Ghodoosi, supra
note 28, at 1734 (noting the rise of foreign investment); see also MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 193 (drawing connections between
economic livelihoods and the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy).
105. See Abbas Milani, The Green Movement, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 42
(citing Khamenei’s succession of Khomeini); see also Bakhash, supra note 98, at 17; Reissner,
supra note 94, at 38 (presenting Khamenei’s eventual opposition to Rafsanjani’s reforms).
106. See Bakhash, supra note 98, at 17 (noting the continuation of Iran’s antagonistic
foreign policy initiatives, from a US point of view); Pipes & Clawson, supra note 100, at 3-5.
107. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 116; Paul Starr, The Meaning of
Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL. REV. 6, 34-35 (1988) (highlighting privatization’s potential
for abuse).
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“Oil Mafia:” Rafsanjani elites perceived as privately usurping Iran’s
national wealth.108
President Rafsanjani’s economic reforms, while popular among
global investors, had not achieved a softening of the Islamic Republic,
nor anything close to an advancement of Washington’s various
regional policy interests.109 Adding to this, new forces were at work in
the United States that would push Washington further from any sort
of rapprochement with Tehran.110 Following the crushing multilateral
expulsion of Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait in 1990-91, there
was a growing belief in some policy circles that Iran remained the
greatest threat to US regional interests.111 Such viewpoints gained
strength in the early administration of President Bill Clinton, as
proposals began circulating from the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (“AIPAC”) advocating for Washington to adopt a
comprehensive and concurrent Middle East strategy that exerted
simultaneous pressure on both Iraq and Iran.112 Israeli in origin,
President Clinton’s “Dual Containment” strategy would go on to
govern Washington’s dealings with Iran for the next decade, until US
forces returned to Iraq to remove the Ba’ath Party from power in
2003.113

108. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 401-04; Fareed Mohamedi, The Oil and Gas Industry, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note
12, at 102 (explaining Iran’s “oil mafia”).
109. See Bakhash, supra note 98, at 17 (contending that economic reconstruction failed
to foster meaningful Iranian foreign policy changes); Pipes & Clawson, supra note 100, at 5.
110. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
111. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 286 (examining the rise of Iran as
Washington’s primary perceived foreign policy threat); Pipes & Clawson, supra note 100, at 2.
112. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 286-87; Leon T. Hadar, Pax
Americana’s Four Pillars of Folly, 27 J. PALESTINE STUD. 49, 52-53 (1998) (identifying
AIPAC’s role in the Clinton administration’s Iran policies). Dual Containment as a strategy
made sense for Israel, which had witnessed great benefits from its two greatest regional rivals
being preoccupied with each other throughout the Iran-Iraq War. See Tritia Parsi,
TREACHEROUS ALLIANCE: THE SECRET DEALINGS OF ISRAEL, IRAN, AND THE UNITED
STATES 112 (2008) (addressing Israel’s interest in an Iran-Iraq stalemate); Sasan
Fayazmanesh, On the US Policy of Dual Containment of Iran and Iraq, PAYVAND IRAN NEWS
(Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.payvand.com/news/08/mar/1200.html.
113. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 449 (summarizing Dual Containment); see also F. Gregory Gause III, The Illogic of
AFF.
(Mar./Apr.
1994),
https://www.
Dual
Containment,
FOREIGN
foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1994-03-01/illogic-dual-containment (detailing the flaws of
Dual Containment, including the exact flaw that manifested upon the removal of Saddam
Hussein in 2003).

2016]

POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN

861

Dual Containment imposed real complications on the United
States’ international business community.114 By 1994, partially as a
result of Rafsanjani’s reform efforts, roughly twenty-five percent of
Iran’s exports were being purchased by US firms.115 But that same
year, the US State Department intervened in a proposed sale of
Boeing 747s to Iran, foreshadowing a new era of US policy on Iran.116
The economic frustrations of Dual Containment were most severe for
the US oil industry, which soon found operations restricted from two
of the most oil-rich States in the entire world.117
The clash between international investment and Dual
Containment is poignantly illustrated in the 1995 Conoco episode.118
In March of that year, the Iranian energy sector awarded its first US
upstream oil deal to the US firm Conoco, in the form of a USD$1
billion contract to develop the Sirri oil fields.119 Facing outrage from
AIPAC and members of Congress, President Clinton signed
114. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
115. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 450; Iran’s Central Bank Says U.S. Imported $1B in Iran Goods, DOW JONES NEWS
SERVICE (Jan. 12, 1994) (describing US imports of Iranian goods at the time).
116. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 450 (recounting the blocked Boeing sale); James A. Phillips, Containing Iran,
FOUNDATION
(Mar.
19,
1994),
HERITAGE
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1994/03/containing-iran. This deal eventually went to
Airbus. See also MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra
note 28, at 464 (“Washington undermined Iranian efforts to reschedule debts, blocked loans by
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, reversed Japanese plans for a several
hundred million dollar aid project in southern Iran, swayed Moscow to restrict its arms sales to
defensive weaponry, and otherwise increased the costs and inconveniences to the Iranian
economy at a time when Iran was still struggling to recover from the war and the aftereffects
of revolutionary turmoil and mismanagement.”).
117. In 1997, then-Halliburton CEO Dick Cheney inveighed against the “sanctionhappy” US government, noting that “the good Lord didn’t see fit to always put oil and gas
resources where there are democratic governments.” Peter Waldman, Pipeline Project in
Myanmar Puts Cheney in the Spotlight, WALL STREET J., Oct. 27, 2000, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB972608941928577211; see also Stephen M. Walt, Accentuate the Positive: Why
Undervaluing the Potential Upsides to a Deal with Iran is Just Bad Business, FOREIGN POL'Y
(Jan. 21, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/accentuate-the-positive/ (also quoting
Cheney’s comments).
118. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
119. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 288; Clawson, supra note 27, at
116; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 452
(recalling the Conoco debacle); cf. Charles Breckinridge, Note, Sanctions First, Ask Questions
Later: The Shortsighted Treatment of Iran Under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 88
GEO. L. J. 2439, 2444 (2000); see also M. McCary, End Run on Sanctions (A Case Study on
Contemporary Energy Investment in Iran), 12 FLA. J. INT’L L. 263, 265 (1998) (describing the
loss of “lucrative profits”).
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Executive Order 12957 on March 15, 1995, blocking the Conoco deal
and prohibiting US investors from investing in the Iranian oil
sector.120 Two months later, Clinton followed up with Executive
Order 12959, sanctioning all investment and exports of goods and
services to Iran by US firms and their subsidiaries.121 In Conoco’s
place, the French firm Total S.A. was awarded the Iranian contract.122
The Clinton executive orders marked the beginning of an
increasingly complex, increasingly encompassing sanctions regime.123
Yet, concerned with the President’s discretionary waiver authority
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”),
upon which the Clinton orders were based, both AIPAC and Congress
pushed for a more permanent resolution in the form of the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act (“ILSA”), which passed by unanimous consent in both
the House and the Senate in 1996.124
Meanwhile, Rafsanjani’s Iran continued to strike deals with
Europe, often leading to rhetorical flare-ups between Washington and
its European allies.125 Although European enthusiasm for its ongoing
“Critical Dialogue” with Iran waned following the 1997 verdict of the
Mykonos Trial, it soon picked up again with the Iranian election of

120. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 17, 1995); MALONEY,
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 452 (citing Clinton’s
signing of Executive Order 12957). For the role of the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (“AIPAC”) in this process, see MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 288.
121. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 9, 1995); MALONEY,
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 452 (explaining
Executive Order 12959).
122. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 391; Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2444 (noting Total’s inheritance of the blocked
Conoco deal).
123. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
124. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 288-89 (explaining the legislative
pressures that produced the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (“ILSA”)); see also Iran and Lybya
Sanctions Act of 1996, infra note 236; infra notes 236-44 and accompanying text.
125. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 289; Reissner, supra note 94, at 41
(addressing Iran-based tensions between the US and Europe). As just one example, the passing
of the ILSA in 1996 caused the EU to prepare a formal World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
complaint against the United States, which was staved off only via direct US-EU negotiations.
See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, THE IRAN-LIBYA SANCTIONS
ACT (ILSA) 3 (2006), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/66441.pdf; ROBERT J.
GRAVES, JONES DAY, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 13,
http://www.jonesday.com/files/News/2df0b605-1cc3-4729-ae61-a0305551bbe5/Presentation/
NewsAttachment/742ac421-2ea3-4f3f-b275-a25219eb8eee/Foreign%20Bank%20Compliance
%20with%20PATRIOT%20Act.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
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President Mohammad Khatami later that year.126 Indeed, this period
witnessed approximately fifty Bilateral Trade Agreements (“BITs”)
between Iran and other States, as well as the passing of the Foreign
Investment Promotion and Protection Act (“FIPPA”) in the Majles
(parliament): the first Iranian investment-based legislation in almost
five decades.127
President Khatami’s tenure represented the second phase and
high water mark of Iran’s Reform Era.128 Elected on promises to
expand domestic civil and political liberties, his focus shifted national
attention from Iran’s economy to primarily social issues.129 This was
part of the President’s larger pragmatic reform strategy, which sought
to mobilize Iranian people-power to change the Islamic Republic,
without taking a direct shot at the regime’s—or Ayatollah
Khamenei’s—legitimacy.130 However, Khatami’s exclusive focus on
126. Critical Dialogue represented Europe’s (failed) 1990s strategy of economically
engaging Iran. See infra Part III.B. For the impact of the Mykonos Trial, see MALONEY,
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 454; Reissner, supra
note 94, at 34. The trial found Iran directly responsible for the political assassination of
dissident Kurds living in Berlin. See Roya Hakakian, Looking Back at the Mykonos Trial: The
End of the Dispensable Iranian, DER SPIEGEL (Apr. 10, 2007), http://www.
spiegel.de/international/looking-back-at-the-mykonos-trial-the-end-of-the-dispensable-iraniana-476369.html; Murder at Mykonos: Anatomy of a Political Assassination, IRAN HUM. RIGHTS
DOCUMENTATION CTR. (Mar. 2007), http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/reports/
3150-murder-at-mykonos-anatomy-of-a-political-assassination.html?p=4 (summarizing the
Mykonos assassination).
127. See Ardeshir Atai, Iranian Bilateral Investment Treaties: Substantive Principles
and Standards, 14 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 397, 398 (2013); Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at
1734 (commenting on Iranian treatification during this period); see also Ghodoosi, supra, at
1744-45 (discussing the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (“FIPPA”));
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002.
128. See Bakhash, supra note 98, at 17-18; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 258 (assessing Khatami’s place amongst Iran’s
Reform Movement).
129. See Bakhash, supra note 98, at 17; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 258 (“The president’s agenda was centered on a campaign
that advanced the concepts of moderation, tolerance, accountability, and the supremacy of
man-made law.”); see also id. at 263-66; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note
12, at 97 (indicating Khatami’s social, as opposed to economic, reform preferences). Initially,
Khatami’s efforts met with some success, notably within the areas of freedom of the press and
freedom of expression. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE
REVOLUTION, supra, at 261; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra, at 97 (identifying
Khatami’s early successes).
130. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 260-62; Ahmad Siddiqi, Khatami and the Search for Reform in Iran, 6 STANFORD J.
INT’L REL. (Winter 2005), https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.04_siddiqi.html (detailing
Khatami’s reform strategy).
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Iranian social issues posed serious credibility problems, as world oil
prices declined and Iran entered an economic recession.131 Not
helping the matter, US sanctions on Iran continued to intensify
throughout the late Clinton years.132
In spite of these US pressures, the traumatic events of September
11, 2001 inspired increased Iranian outreach toward President George
W. Bush, notably centered on common security interests.133 Indeed,
Iran played a major role in the early phases of the subsequent US war
in Afghanistan, even conducting joint military operations alongside
US Special Forces in the liberation of Herat.134 Even after Iran was
vilified in President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech on January 29,
2002, President Khatami pushed for normalization with Washington,
especially following the quick US overthrow of Saddam Hussein in
2003. 135 Signing onto a Swiss-brokered “Grand Bargain” that would
open direct negotiations with Washington on a comprehensive range
of topics—from Iran’s nuclear program to its support for Hezbollah
and Hamas—Khatami was spurned by a hubristic Bush

131. See Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 97; CAMMETT ET AL.,
supra note 41, at 312 (considering the declining economy during Khatami’s presidency).
132. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 457-58 (articulating the intensification of legislative sanctions against Iran); see also
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-178, 114 Stat. 38 (2000).
133. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 459; Stephen J. Hadley, The George W. Bush Administration, in THE IRAN PRIMER,
supra note 12, at 142-43 (noting post-9/11 cooperation between the United States and Iran).
While not lacking a sectarian dimension, the Iranians had been warning of the threat posed by
Sunni Wahhabi extremism since the time of Khomeini, and already Tehran had been playing
an active role supporting various elements of the Afghan Northern Alliance in their long civil
war against the Taliban government. See FISK, supra note 45, at 125 (highlighting Khomeini’s
warnings against Wahhabi extremism); Najat Fawzy Al-Saied, The War of Ideologies in the
Arab World, GATESTONE INST. (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3600/arabideologies (juxtaposing Khomeini’s views with various Sunni Salafist ideologies); see also
Barbara Slavin, Iran Helped Overthrow Taliban, Candidate Says, USA TODAY (June 9, 2005),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-06-09-iran-taliban_x.htm; Hadley, supra, at
142-43 (citing Iran’s role in ousting the Taliban).
134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (highlighting US-Iran cooperation
following 9/11).
135. For the Axis of Evil speech, see President George W. Bush, State of the Union
Address (Jan. 29, 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/
print/20020129-11.html. For Bush era efforts at US-Iran normalization, see Hadley, supra note
133, at 143 (“ . . . the speech did not prevent the subsequent constructive cooperation between
the United States and Iran on Afghanistan”); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 308-10 (discussing reconciliation potential under the late
Khatami administration).
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Administration at the height of its regional military power.136 As the
security situations deteriorated in both Iraq and Afghanistan, US
negotiating leverage from there only diminished.137
Increasing economic difficulties, the hardening US stance on
Iran, and internal political deadlock all contributed to widespread
disenchantment with President Khatami’s Reform Movement.138
Blocked at every turn, Khatami’s initiatives failed to maintain public
support.139 From ongoing US sanctions to policymaking on behalf of
special interests, the United States played a sizeable role in
undermining Khatami’s reform efforts. 140 In his place, from 2005-13,
Washington would be forced to contend with a very different type of
Iranian President in former Tehran Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.141
4. The Ahmadinejad Years
United States hostility to Iranian détente efforts helped fuel the
radicalization and populist impulses that brought Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad to power in 2005.142 Ahmadinejad’s presidential
campaign reflected broad populist promises concerning a return to
revolutionary economics and breaking up Rafsanjani’s surviving Oil
136. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 460; Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1769 (considering the Swiss-brokered Grand Bargain);
see also Meir Javedanfar, The Grand Bargain with Tehran, GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2009),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/mar/03/iran-nuclear-weapons (noting Vice
President Cheney’s distaste for dialogue with Iran: “We don’t talk to evil.”).
137. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1769; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 326 (showing Washington’s obsolescing
bargaining power as the Iraq War devolved into a quagmire).
138. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 262; Bakhash, supra note 98, at 18 (extrapolating the popular disenfranchisement under
Khatami that empowered his hardliner opponents).
139. See Bakhash, supra note 98, at 18; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra
note 12, at 97 (citing the hardliner obstructionism that eroded popular belief in Khatami).
140. For the Israeli lobbying role in blocking US-Iran détente, see MEARSHEIMER &
WALT, supra note 26, at 282, 286. For the influence of Iran’s economy on disenchantment
with Khatami, see The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 97; see also Simon Tisdall,
US Targets “Rogue Nation” Iran, GUARDIAN (May 10, 2001), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2001/may/10/iran (correctly predicting the danger of US sanctions empowering Iranian
hardliners).
141. See infra Part I.A.4.
142. See Hossein Mousavian, How to Engage Iran: What Went Wrong Last Time – And
How to Fix It, FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/
2012-02-09/how-engage-iran (pointing out the role of US policies on the election of
Ahmadinejad); Bakhash, supra note 98, at 18 (exploring the populism that fostered
Ahmadinejad’s election).
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Mafia—initiatives popular among the poor and regime hardliners.143
In both form and substance, Ahmadinejad was the polar opposite of
his immediate predecessor.144 Controversial from the start, one of
President Ahmadinejad’s first moves was to resume the nation’s
dormant nuclear program, breaking the UN seals on its uranium
enrichment facilities at Isfahan and Natanz in early August of 2005.145
This move encouraged Washington to apply many of its new postSeptember 11 expanded executive powers to Iran for the first time,
including the antiterrorism provisions under Executive Order
13224.146 The result was an effective financial innovation that would
be used throughout the later sanctions regime: extraterritorially
closing the loophole of U-turn transactions, and using the unique
global power of the US dollar to force third parties to choose between
conducting business with Iran or conducting business with the United
States.147
143. See Mousavian, How to Engage Iran, supra note 142; MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 316; Maloney, The
Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 97 (further assessing Ahmadinejad’s populist
appeal).
144. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 315 (“Khatami, a genteel and literary cleric who valued dignity, respect, and rule of law,
found himself replaced by a provocateur from the security forces, who reveled in political
strife.”); Bakhash, supra note 98, at 18-19 (asserting Ahmadinejad’s political style).
145. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 460; Ian Traynor, EU Warns Iran: No Talks if Nuclear Freeze Ends, GUARDIAN (Aug.
2, 2005), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/aug/03/eu.iran; SaraBeth Egle, The
Learning Curve of Sanctions—Have Three Decades of Sanctions Reform Taught Us
Anything?, 19 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L. J. 34, 42 (2011) (examining the restart Iran’s
nuclear program).
146. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001); see also MALONEY,
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 461 (explaining
Executive Order 13224). Essentially targeting terrorist financial support channels, the Office
of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) within the US Treasury added Bank-e Saderat and Iran’s
Quds Force to Executive Order 13224’s list of institutions funding terrorism in September
2006. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra; see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra, at 461 (specifying the impact of OFAC’s designations).
147. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 462; Matthew Levitt, Financial Sanctions, in THE IRAN Primer, supra note 12, at 124
[hereinafter Levitt, Financial Sanctions] (outlining U-turn transactions, and US efforts to
prevent them); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION,
supra, at 462 (acknowledging Washington’s success at closing the U-turn transaction
loophole). U-turn transactions involve the transfer of funds between two non-US parties,
which are nonetheless momentarily serviced by a US financial institution, primarily by the
means of correspondent banking. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY FINANCIAL
CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FEASIBILITY OF A CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFER REPORTING SYSTEM UNDER THE BANK SECRECY ACT, 67 (Oct. 2006),
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Within Iran, the Ahmadinejad years were marked by gross
economic mismanagement and waste.148 Despite record State
revenues from skyrocketing international oil prices, Ahmadinejad
proved a spendthrift.149 He racked up massive budget deficits and
depleted key reserve funds set up by his predecessors to provide for
future government investment in the oil sector.150 These policies drew
https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/CBFTFS_Complete.pdf; Steven R. Weisman, U.S.
Puts the Squeeze on Financing in Iran and North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/16/world/americas/16iht-sanctions.3173938.html?_r=0
(“[s]uch a transaction permits, for example, Iran to sell oil to a German customer, who in turn
directs a European bank to deposit dollars obtained from an U.S. bank into an Iranian bank
account located in Europe. The phrase ‘U-turn’ applies because the funds are transferred to a
U.S. bank and instantly turned back as dollars to a European bank.”). For a closer examination
of subsequent loophole closing efforts, see the treatment of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”), infra notes 256-70. In addition to
this administrative action, Washington also launched an informal public relations campaign
against investment in Iran and shifted toward increased enforcement efforts against sanctions
violators. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra, at
461-62; Adam J. Szubin, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, US Department of
Treasury, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
(Sept. 12, 2006), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp92.aspx
(reviewing Washington’s informal efforts against investment in Iran); see also MALONEY,
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra, at 463 (explaining that Chinese
companies faced at least 62 enforcement actions for sanctions violations under the Bush
years).
148. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 330; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 98 (establishing the
economic waste under Ahmadinejad).
149. See Afshin Molavi, Iran and the Gulf States, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at
161; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 313 (citing the explosion of oil prices under
Ahmadinejad’s tenure); see also Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 98;
Hashem Kalantari, Iran’s Unemployment Falls to 10.3 Pct –Minister, REUTERS (Mar. 31,
2008),
http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-unemployment-idINDAH13987520080331
(acknowledging the reckless spending under Ahmadinejad).
150. See Interview by Bernard Gwertzman with Farideh Farhi, Adjunct Professor,
University of Hawaii (Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/iran/farhi-new-iranian-majliscritical-ahmadinejad-domestic-issues/p15747 [hereinafter Gwertzman interview with Farhi];
Muhammad Sahimi, An Administration Plagued by Fraud and Corruption, FRONTLINE (Mar.
30, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/03/ahmadinejad-andhis-men-embodiments-of-fraud-and-corruption.html (surveying the economic mismanagement
under Ahmadinejad). The raiding of Iran’s oil fund for consumption purposes instead of
investment became especially problematic as more and more Iranian banks fell under the
umbrella of US financial sanctions, thereby lacking access to the foreign exchange needed for
capital expenditures within Iran’s aging oil fields. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 295-96; Ida A.
Mirzaie, Government Policy, Inflation, and Exchange Rates in the Era of Sanctions: The Case
of Contemporary Iran, HARV. ECON. REV. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://harvardecon.org/?p=3106
(explaining the impact of sanctions on accessing foreign currency); see also MALONEY,
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 413; Mohamedi,
supra note 108, at 102 (characterizing Iran’s old, capital-intensive oil infrastructure).
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sharp criticism from both pragmatists and Ahmadinejad’s own
conservative camp.151 To stymie such criticism, and to make good on
his campaign promises to break up the Oil Mafia, Ahmadinejad
replaced many of the nation’s qualified technocrats with his own
loyalists and sycophants.152 Throughout all of these disastrous
economic policies, the economic pressures of foreign-imposed
international sanctions provided President Ahmadinejad with a
convenient scapegoat to mask his own blatant mismanagement.153
However, two areas where Ahmadinejad made theoretical
improvements to Iran’s economy involved efforts aimed at
privatization and weaning the nation off crippling food and energy
subsidies.154 While both of these areas were in dire need of internal
reform, the specific initiatives pressed by President Ahmadinejad
were shaped by his populist, hardliner politics.155 Past efforts in
privatizing Iran’s expansive and inefficient State-owned enterprises
(“SOEs”) failed under Khatami, in the face of accusations of private
enrichment.156 Yet, Ahmadinejad managed to push the New
Privatization Act of 2008 through the Majles: a law that promised to
cede eighty percent of the share value of particular economic
activities to non-State actors by the end of Iran’s fourth five-year
development plan in 2009-10.157 Yet, much of the privatization that

151. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 330; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 98; Gwertzman interview
with Farhi, supra note 150 (pointing out domestic criticism for Ahmadinejad’s wasteful
policies).
152. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 404; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 98; Mohamedi, supra note
108, at 100 (specifying Ahmadinejad’s preference for loyalists over technocrats).
153. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 366; Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2457 (commenting on the foreign scapegoat
provided by US sanctions).
154. See infra notes 156-69 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 156-69 and accompanying text.
156. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 402; Shirzad Azad, The Politics of Privatization in Iran, RUBIN CTR. RES. INT’L AFF.
(Dec. 5, 2010), http://www.rubincenter.org/2010/12/azad-2010-12-05/ (assessing Khatami’s
failed efforts at privatization).
157. See Ardeshir Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, in BANKR.
L. CLIENT STRATEGIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA 1, 3 (2011); MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 333 (overviewing
Ahmadinejad’s privatization program). Basically, these targeted economic sectors represented
the category of economic activities allowed to the private sector under Article 44 of Iran’s
Constitution. See infra notes 626-30 and accompanying text; see also Atai, supra, at 3; PRS
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occurred under Ahmadinejad transferred SOEs to State-affiliated
parties and quasi-State entities via noncompetitive no-bid contracting
processes.158
Another result of Ahmadinejad’s privatization was a dangerous
concentration of the State’s economy within the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”)—the 125,000-member branch
of Iran’s armed forces under the direct control of the Supreme Leader
and tasked with protecting the Islamic system of government.159
Composed of some of Iran’s most pitched hardliners, the IRGC was
awarded major operations within Iran’s energy, construction,
telecommunications, and automobile sectors.160 Analysts estimate that
by 2015, the IRGC had acquired control of up to thirty percent of
Iran’s total economy.161
President Ahmadinejad’s attempts to reform Iran’s subsidy
system, while populist-oriented, had a more positive outcome.162 Born
of the sensitive interplay between Iran’s oil reserves and notions of
national sovereignty, the Iranian Revolution fostered numerous
policies aimed at bringing Iran’s natural resource wealth to the tables
of ordinary Iranian citizens.163 Indeed, the subsidies paid by the

GROUP, IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST 20 (Mar. 31, 2014) (on file with author) (further exploring
the New Privatization Act).
158. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 20-21; MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 342 (characterizing
privatization under Ahmadinejad). Privatization in Iran has often been compared to the rise of
post-Soviet oligarchies in Russia. See Yaldaz Sadakova, The Promise and Peril of Iranian
Stocks, 37 BENEFITS CAN. 31 (Oct. 19, 2015); Najmeh Bozorgmehr, “State” Bodies Stymie
Iran Privatisations, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 30, 2012), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/1a092ed4-aa38-11e1-8b9d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3usB0orCL (noting Iranian
privatization’s resulting in an oligarchy).
159. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 21; MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 342; Maloney, The
Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 98 (documenting privatization’s empowerment of
the IRGC).
160. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 405-06 (highlighting IRGC involvement in the energy sector); Sadakova, supra note 158
(identifying IRGC involvement in the telecomm and automotive sectors).
161. See BUSINESS MONITOR INTERNATIONAL, IRAN: COUNTRY RISK REPORT 10 (Q2
2015); Elliott Abrams et al., The JCPOA’s Economic Benefits for Iran’s Revolutionary
Guards, IRAN TASK FORCE, 1 (Dec. 2015), http://taskforceoniran.org/pdf/The_JCPOA
%E2%80%99s_Economic_Benefits_for_Iran%E2%80%99s_Revolutionary_Guards.pdf
(estimating the extent of the IRGC’s grip on Iran’s economy).
162. See infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
163. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 368-69; Semira N. Nikou, The Subsidies Conundrum, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note
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Islamic Republic on domestic food and energy consumption evolved
to become a cornerstone of Iranian economic life and the regime’s
long-term legitimacy.164 Such programs, however, resulted in massive
structural inefficiencies.165 Paying little attention to energy costs, the
moral hazards of the State’s subsidy program turned Iran into one of
the most energy inefficient economies in the entire world.166 With
limited oil production and even more limited refining capacity, Iran
was consistently forced to rely on imports to satisfy the nation’s
massive energy consumption, despite its own resources.167
Representing the first real reforms of the subsidy program, President
Ahmadinejad implemented a phased, partial rationalization of these
commodity prices, in exchange for cash payment “justice shares”
being issued to poor Iranians dependent on such artificially low

12, at 104 (considering the interplay between resource wealth, social justice, and the regime’s
legitimacy).
164. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 503 (“[b]y creating expectations of economic windfalls, greater egalitarianism, and an
improvement in the plight of mostazafan, Iranian leaders effectively undercut the theocratic
basis of their authority and bolstered a competing rationale based on delivery of a better life.”);
Nikou, supra note 163, at 104 (“[p]oliticians in both the executive and the legislative branches
have been reluctant to make badly-needed reforms for fear of political backlash.”).
165. As late as 2010, Iranians paid approximately US$0.38 per gallon of gasoline, a fact
that led to both illegal gas smuggling to neighboring countries and unchecked, runaway
domestic consumption. See Nikou, supra note 163, at 105; Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101
(noting the costs of subsidized goods paid by Iranian consumers); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 421 (pointing out Iran’s
smuggling problem); id. at 393 (dealing with the impact of subsidies on Iranian consumption
behavior); Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101 (restating Iran’s wasteful consumption).
166. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 419; Nikou, supra note 163, at 105; Saeed Moshiri, Energy Price Reform and Energy
Efficiency in Iran, INT’L ASSOC. ENERGY ECON. 33, 34 (2013), http://www.iaee.org/en/
publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=197 (assessing Iran’s dismal energy efficiency).
167. See Moshiri, supra note 166, at 34; Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101 (stating
Iran’s reliance on energy imports). In 2010, these imports reflected forty percent of Iran’s
refined oil needs, comprising approximately twenty percent of Iran’s whole GDP. See id.;
Djavad Salehi-Ishfahani, Iran: Subsidy Reform amid Regional Turmoil, BROOKINGS (Mar. 3,
2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/03/03-iran-salehi-isfahani (showing
the extent of Iran’s GDP diverted to subsidies). In this light, whatever the actual military
intentions of Iran’s long-desired nuclear program, the economic logic behind civil nuclear
power generation actually made a lot of theoretical sense. See id. Such trends were also
mirrored in Iran’s food subsidy programs, with roughly thirty percent of subsidized bread
being thrown away or smuggled to neighboring states. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 350 (citing the above waste figures);
Soazic Heslot, Iran’s Food Security, FUTURE DIRECTIONS INT’L (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/food-and-water-crises/1858-iran-s-foodsecurity.html (further emphasizing Iranian food waste).
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prices.168 Although subsidy reform continues to rank high on the
Islamic Republic’s agenda, early signs indicated that Ahmadinejad’s
reforms represented a silver lining to an otherwise disastrous overall
economic policy.169
In the United States, meanwhile, the 2008 election of President
Barack Obama was notable in Obama’s campaign promises to
negotiate with Iran over its ongoing nuclear program.170 However,
Iran’s own presidential elections in 2009 provided Obama little
political space to try such initiatives.171 The contested and allegedly
fraudulent reelection of Ahmadinejad over his reformist rival MirHossein Mousavi ushered a crisis of legitimacy for the Islamic
Republic, consisting of street demonstrations and the rise of Iran’s
short-lived Green Movement.172 The State’s brutal crackdown on
protestors, along with subsequent arrests and human rights abuses,
provided renewed vigor to Washington’s sanctions regime.173 The
passing of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”) intensified targeted sanctions
against Iran’s energy sector and oil-refining capacity, and broadened
the trade embargo against Iran by closing prior exceptions for Iranian
caviar, carpets, and pistachios.174 Against the backdrop of CISADA, a
168. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 351; COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN: 2015 COUNTRY REVIEW 329 (Denise Youngblood
Coleman, ed., 2015); IMF, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, 2
(Apr. 2014) (explaining Ahmadinejad’s subsidy reforms).
169. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 352; IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 17 (emphasizing the initial
promise of Ahmadinejad’s subsidy reforms).
170. See David E. Sanger et al., Election 2008 – On the Issues: Iran, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 2012, http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/iran.html; Michael R. Gordon &
Jeff Zeleny, Obama Envisions New Iran Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/11/02/us/politics/02obama.html?hp&_r=0 (presenting Obama’s 2008 Iran
campaign platform).
171. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
172. See Milani, The Green Movement, supra note 105, at 41; Hooman Majd, Think
Again: Iran’s Green Movement, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 6, 2010), http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/
01/06/think-again-irans-green-movement/ (overviewing Iran’s Green Movement).
173. See Ahmed Shaheed (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Seventieth Session of the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/70/411 (Oct. 6, 2015); Hamid Dabashi, What Happened to the
Green Movement in Iran?, AL JAZEERA (June 12, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
opinion/2013/05/201351661225981675.html (illustrating the state’s crackdown on Green
Movement protestors).
174. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 466 (evaluating CISADA); see also Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010).
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wider shift in Iran’s access to international investment was also
evident.175 The regime’s crackdown on protesters following the
reelection of Ahmadinejad in 2009 sparked new concerns over the
state of human rights in Iran, both in Europe and throughout the
world, helping to intensify the successes of multilateral sanctions.176
With the world signed on to sanctions policies, Ahmadinejad’s second
term was marked by a gradual strengthening of the sanctions regime
and the ramping up of pressure against the Iranian economy.177
5. Climax of Sanctions: Rouhani, Obama, & the JCPOA
By the end of President Ahmadinejad’s second term, the
international sanctions regime had reached its apex.178 This, combined
with Ahmadinejad’s disastrous economic policies (including a wave
of massive corruption scandals in which the President was personally
implicated) led Supreme Leader Khamenei to step in and sideline
Ahmadinejad during the last two years of his presidency, usurping his
control over Iran’s economy.179 The election of President Hassan
Rouhani in 2013 was premised on a platform promising better
relations with the world and the reintegration of Iran into the global
economy.180 This allowed for renewed international negotiations with

175. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
176. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 349; Jon Lee Anderson, After the Crackdown, NEW YORKER, Aug. 16, 2010
(commenting on sanctioning efforts in the wake of the Green Movement).
177. See infra notes 266-93 and accompanying text (tracing the intensification of the
sanctions regime during the Ahmadinejad presidency). Concerted efforts between
Washington’s furtherance of unilateral sanctions—culminating in the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (“ITRSHRA”) and the Iran Freedom CounterProliferation Act of 2012 (“IFCA”)—along with the UN Security Council’s own wave of
multilateral sanctions resolutions brought increased devastation to Iran’s national economy.
See IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 7; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 264-73 (describing the impact of the
late sanctions regime); see also Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,
infra note 275; Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126
Stat. 2,004 (2012).
178. See infra Part II.B (tracing the cumulative advancement of the sanctions regime).
179. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 362; Geneive Abdo, Iran: Ahmadinejad vs Khamenei, AL JAZEERA (July 6, 2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/06/201162994514399969.html (discussing the
Supreme Leader’s marginalization of Ahmadinejad).
180. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 492-93; Hamidreza Gholamzadeh, The Rouhani Metre: a Mix of Broken Promises and
JAZEERA
(Nov.
11,
2013),
http://www.aljazeera.
Hope,
AL
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Iran, including the dialogue with the Islamic Republic initially
promised by President Obama during his campaign.181 Starting in
February 2013, secret negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 were
conducted in Oman, which eventually resulted in the preliminary and
non-binding Joint Plan of Action (“JPA”) of November 24, 2013.182
The deal promised a six-month pause in the development of Iran’s
nuclear program, in exchange for limited sanctions relief and the
release of unspecified frozen assets.183 During this six-month window,
both sides made a further voluntary commitment to resume
negotiation efforts in hopes of reaching a final nuclear deal.184 After
numerous deadline extensions, Iran and the P5+1 finally reached a
framework agreement in Lausanne on April 2, 2015, which was
finalized in the JCPOA on July 14, 2015.185 Six days later, the UN
com/indepth/opinion/2013/11/rouhani-metere-mix-broken-promises-hope201311412256389452.html (exploring Rouhani’s campaign platform).
181. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (referencing Obama’s 2008 outreach
promises); see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, United States and Six Other
States Reach Interim Agreement on Iranian Nuclear Program, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 109
(2014); Dan Roberts & Julian Borger, Obama Holds Historic Phone Call with Rouhani and
Hints at End to Sanctions, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/sep/27/obama-phone-call-iranian-president-rouhani (marking the opening of direct
dialogue between Washington and Tehran). These negotiations were needed internally for
Iran: President Rouhani had inherited an economic catastrophe, with the near eradication of all
international investment and Iranian trade largely reduced to the barter system. See Golnaz
Esfandiari, Former Iranian Minister Says New President to Inherit Economic Challenges,
RADIO FREE EUROPE (July 10, 2013); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 475 (evaluating Iran’s economy at the outset of Rouhani’s
presidency). Iran’s reliance on barter stemmed from the nation’s inability to access foreign
currency transactions, including energy commodity sales denoted in petrodollars. Such barter
transactions had painful destabilizing consequences, such as the sudden influx of cheap
Chinese goods into Iran’s economy. See id. at 359; Christopher Harmer, Iranian Efforts to
Bypass Oil Sanctions, INST. STUD OF WAR (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.
understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_IranSanctions.pdf (surveying the costs
of Iranian barter transactions).
182. See Joint Plan of Action, Iran-P5+1, Nov. 24, 2013, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/
spi/iran/jcpoa/index.htm [hereinafter JPA]; see also Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181,
at 109; Arshad Mohammed & Parisa Hafezi, U.S., Iran Held Secret Talks on March to Nuclear
Deal, REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-bilateral-id
USBRE9AN0FB20131124 (describing the negotiating process up to the JPA).
183. See JPA, supra note 182; see also Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 110
(summarizing the JPA).
184. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
185. See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran-P5+1, July 14, 2015, https://assets.
documentcloud.org/documents/2165399/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf
[hereinafter
JCPOA]; see also Kelsey Davenport, Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran, ARMS
CONTROL ASSOC. (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-ofNuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran (providing a helpful timeline of the JCPOA negotiating
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Security Council unanimously approved Security Council Resolution
2231, making the JCPOA binding international law and—at least
officially—drawing a conclusion to the international sanctions regime
targeting Iran’s nuclear program.186
The above traces a broad trajectory of the sanctions regime’s
development, from the era preceding it through its unwinding with the
formation of JCPOA.187 In such broad brushstrokes, this history
mirrors that of wider US-Iran relations.188 Upon closer inspection, it
becomes clear that as a matter of policy, US sanctions targeting Iran
were often misaligned with the economic and political developments
within domestic Iranian history.189 Whatever might be said for missed
opportunities, this history set the operating parameters that steered the
behavior of the United States, Iran, and a broad class of international
investors.190
For international investors in particular, however, the rules and
regulations that made up the sanctions regime were of equal
importance to these historical trends.191 To truly understand today’s
international investment landscape in Iran, one should look also to the
evolution of the legal framework that actually comprised the
sanctions regime.192 This legal framework is the focus of the next
Part.193
B.

Legal Framework of the Iran Sanctions Regime

The sanctions regime targeting Iran has been described as
“arguably the most complex the United States and the international
process); Jonathan Tirone et al., Iran Nuclear Talks on Verge of Another Missed Deadline,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July 6, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-06/
iran-nuclear-talks-on-verge-of-another-missed-deadline-in-vienna (noting the JPA’s series of
deadline extensions).
186. See S.C. Res. 2231 (July 20, 2015); see also IRAN: 2015 COUNTRY REV., supra note
168, at 308; Colum Lynch & John Hudson, Obama Turns to U.N. to Outmaneuver Congress,
FOREIGN POL'Y (July 15, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/15/obama-turns-to-u-n-tooutmaneuver-congress-iran-nuclear-deal/ (explaining how Security Council adoption makes
the deal binding).
187. See supra notes 33-186 and accompanying text (summarizing the history of the
sanctions regime, and wider US-Iran relations).
188. See id.
189. Cf. id.
190. See id.
191. See infra Part I.B.
192. See id.
193. See id.
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community have ever imposed on a rogue State.”194 Because the
gradual expansion of these restrictions was comprised of a cumulative
network of laws, executive orders, and other administrative actions,
spanning over nearly four decades, a comprehensive review of the
entire sanctions regime is not realistic, nor especially helpful.
However, a limited review of key sanctions developments in both the
United States and the international community provides a sufficient
glimpse at how the sanctions regime advanced through the decades.
In examining the expansive restrictions faced by investors seeking to
operate in Iran over time, the magnitude of changes represented by
the JCPOA becomes evident.195
1. The US Sanctions Regime Targeting Iran
For the majority of the sanctions regime, the United States was
essentially alone in placing trade and investment restrictions against
the Islamic Republic of Iran.196 First adopted by President Carter as a
direct response to the US Embassy hostage crisis, the proliferation of
the US sanctions regime has progressed through phases of various
justifications.197 Given this diversity of rationale, it is no surprise that
the application of US sanctions has been at times inconsistent.198 Such
inconsistencies, combined with the cumulative nature of US unilateral

194. DIANNE RENNACK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43311, IRAN: US ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS AND THE AUTHORITY TO LIFT RESTRICTIONS 1 (2015); cf. Bhala, supra note 27, at
254 (“ . . . American trade rules against Iran are complex. Navigating them is not for the fainthearted, but doing so is essential in the everyday practice of international trade law around the
globe. The sanctions cover not only trade in goods and services, but also foreign direct
investment, transportation, banking, securities, and insurance”).
195. See infra Parts I.B.1-2.
196. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing US disagreements with allies
over Iran sanctions).
197. See RENNACK, supra note 194, at Summary (“ . . . in an effort to change the
government of that country’s support of acts of international terrorism, poor human rights
record, weapons and missile development and acquisition, role in regional instability, and
development of a nuclear program”); Clawson, supra note 27, at 116-17 (listing the various
rationales for sanctions).
198. See Clawson, supra note 27, at 115 (“ . . . analysts and policymakers do not agree
about how to use unilateral U.S. sanctions to help achieve [US] goals”); Bhala, supra note 27,
at 255-56 (“ . . . they were not systematic or seamless from inception. Instead, they were a
confusing array of haphazard measures, mostly targeted at the Iranian energy sector, but with
plenty of gaps that later needed plugging”).
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efforts, make disentangling the US sanctions regime especially
difficult.199
To start, the primary bulk of US sanctions against Iran are
domestically authorized under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act of 1977.200 Under the IEEPA, the President is given broad
economic coercive powers to deal with “any unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States, if the President declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat.”201 The President delegates
IEEPA authority to the Office of Foreign Asset Controls (“OFAC”) to
administer these decisions.202 As a subdivision of the US Department
of the Treasury, OFAC is “entrusted with considerable policy,
enforcement, and regulatory operational responsibilities.”203 By
working with other branches of US foreign policy agencies, as well as
with federal law enforcement, OFAC is the primary developer,

199. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 264 (“[i]n reviewing [US sanctions], it is important to
note, as a practical matter, that all the sanctions apply. That is, the evolution is cumulative: one
set of sanctions does not substitute another, but rather supplements all previous sanctions.”);
Kenneth Katzman, Easing US Sanctions on Iran, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 1-8 (June 2014),
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Easing_US_Sanctions_on_Iran.pdf
[hereinafter Katzman, Easing US Sanctions] (parsing out the sanctions regime’s complex
interplay between legislative and executive authority).
200. See generally International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 17011708 (2012). As a matter of background, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(“IEEPA”) was an attempt to reinstate some of the executive coercive powers that had been
originally contained in the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (“TWEA”), but later stripped
by the National Emergency Act of 1976. See Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§
1-44 (2012); National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2015); see also Kian Arash
Meshkat, The Burden of Economic Sanctions on Iranian-Americans, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 915,
918-22 (2013) (providing an overview of the history of US sanctioning authority). An
additional source of sanctioning authority exists under the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (“ISDCA”), under more specific criteria. See
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012);
see also Meshkat, supra, at 922 (discussing the ISDCA as a basis for sanctions).
201. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012). For the sanctioning powers granted to the President,
see § 1702; see also Kristie Xian, Note, The Price of Justice: Deferred Prosecution
Agreements in the Context of Iranian Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
631, 637-38 (2014) (explaining how the IEEPA works); United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d
564, 576 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding these IEEPA powers to be constitutional).
202. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
203. Meshkat, supra note 200, at 926; see also Basic Information on OFAC and
Sanctions, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_general.aspx#basic (last visited
Apr. 9, 2016) (stating OFAC’s role in the administration and enforcement of sanctions).
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implementer, administrator, and enforcer of US sanctions policy.204
One of OFAC’s main roles is to update and administer the Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (“the SDN list”),
which contains the names of individuals and entities subject to
sanctions.205 The SDN list provides an important tool for private
sector actors to ensure that they do not engage in transactions with
Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”), which would violate
sanctions.206
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
President’s IEEPA powers were expanded by a series of
developments that provided additional tools to OFAC’s arsenal.207
First, Executive Order 13224, originally meant to target Al Qaeda,
applied to any actors “who commit, threaten to commit, or support
terrorism,” effectively declaring such terrorist movements to be an
ongoing “unusual and extraordinary threat” subject to IEEPA
sanctions.208 This provided streamlined authority to classify these
entities as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists” (“SDGTs”), a
sub-branch of SDNs subject to immediate blocking and asset
seizure.209 Importantly, the SDGT designation also immediately
blocks or freezes any US-based assets that engage with such
designated entities, and may attach civil or criminal liability for any

204. See Basic Information on OFAC and Sanctions, supra note 203; Meshkat, supra
note 200, at 927-30 (providing an overview on OFAC’s role within US sanctions policy).
205. See Barry E. Carter & Ryan Farha, Overview and Operation of U.S. Financial
Sanctions, Including the Example of Iran, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 903, 905 (2013) (explaining
OFAC’s responsibilities concerning the SDN list).
206. See id.
207. See id. at 903; see also infra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
208. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra note 146; see also MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 459 (explaining the
evolution of Executive Order 13224’s application toward Al Qaeda to its application toward
nation-states like Iran).
209. See Kindhearts v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 866 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (“The
[USA PATRIOT Act] permitted the Treasury Secretary to impose all the blocking effects of a
designation, including freezing an organization’s assets indefinitely and criminalizing all its
transactions, without designating the organization a SDGT. The Treasury only needs to assert
that it is investigating whether the entity should be designated.”); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 459 (looking at the impact of
Executive Order 13224 and the USA PATRIOT Act); Foreign Terrorist Organization
Designation, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2010/09/146554.htm (explaining the significance of SDGT designation).
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transactions that violate these automatic prohibitions.210 This would
later be used in 2005 as the model for Executive Order 13382, which
applied the same treatment to proliferators of weapons of mass
destruction and their supporters.211
The other powerful tool provided to OFAC following 9/11
arrived with the passing of the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”).212 Title III of the
USA PATRIOT Act contains a number of instruments to enhance US
anti-money laundering (“AML”) and counter terrorist financing
(“CTF”) efforts.213 Specifically, Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT
Act authorizes the US Secretary of the Treasury to designate specific
entities or jurisdictions as “primary money laundering concerns.”214
Such classification subjects entities to potentially severe penalties:
“the institution may be prohibited from maintaining correspondent
accounts with U.S. financial institutions, thereby cutting off access to
U.S. dollar payment systems and business in the United States
generally.”215 Furthermore, Section 319 (a) of the USA PATRIOT
Act also contains an enhanced jurisdictional mechanism, which
effectively extends US seizure power over non-US financial
institutions holding any assets under US jurisdiction.216 By employing
a legal fiction that deems funds deposited in a non-US account to be
pooled with funds in US accounts, authorities are empowered to seize
210. See Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation, supra note 209; MALONEY,
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 459-61 (assessing the
consequences of SDGT designation).
211. See Exec. Order No. 13,382, 3 C.F.R 38,567 (2005); Ari Kattan, Fact Sheet: Iran
Sanctions, CTR. FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION (Mar. 19, 2013), http://arms
controlcenter.org/fact-sheet-iran-sanctions/ (summarizing Executive Order 13382).
212. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of the United States Code); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 459; Levitt, Financial
Sanctions, supra note 147, at 126 (clarifying OFAC’s post-9/11 authority).
213. See USA PATRIOT Act §§ 301-77.
214. See USA PATRIOT Act § 311; see also Carter & Farha, supra note 205, at 910;
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Fact Sheet: Overview of Section 311 of the USA
PATRIOT Act (Feb. 10, 2011), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tg1056.aspx (providing an overview of section 311).
215. Carter & Farha, supra note 205, at 910.
216. See GRAVES, supra note 125, at 9; Michael Gruson, The U.S. Jurisdiction Over
Transfers of U.S. Dollars Between Foreigners and Ownership of U.S. Dollar Accounts in
Foreign Banks, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 721, 747-48 (2004) (explaining section 319(a) of
the USA PATRIOT Act).
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an entity’s assets in the United States, even if such assets are entirely
unrelated to those suspected of violating US sanctions policy
overseas.217
As the US-Iran sanctions regime evolved over time, this
extraterritorial dimension of OFAC’s sanctioning policies grew
considerable teeth against the Islamic Republic.218 By specifically
targeting international financial institutions, OFAC essentially forced
the global banking system to choose between conducting transactions
with the United States or with Iran.219 Because the mere causation of a
prohibited transaction was all that was required to trigger sanctions,
an institution beyond US jurisdiction could be subject to penalties for
transactions as mundane as “dollar clearing” within US jurisdiction.220
This authorized OFAC to freeze such currency exchanges and seize
whatever assets might be however remotely entangled within US
jurisdiction.221 Such financial sanctions had the effect of closing the
so-called “U-turn transaction” loophole, which had previously
allowed foreign firms engaging in prohibited transactions to indirectly
reach US clearing banks and payable-through accounts, via thirdparty banks or financial institutions, without triggering sanctions.222
217. See GRAVES, supra note 125, at 9; Gruson, supra note 216, at 747-48 (noting
section 319(a)’s reliance on a legal fiction).
218. See generally infra notes 219-85 and accompanying text.
219. See Xian, supra note 201, at 638 (“given the complexities of foreign financial
institutions, foreign banks that cause their U.S.-based branch to violate OFAC prohibitions are
subject to punishment.”); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION,
supra note 28, at 462 (“[o]ver time, the Bush measures began to achieve precisely what
previous authors of sanctions legislation had sought but largely failed to do: to present firms
from all over the world with a choice of trading with Iran or with the United States.”).
220. Dollar clearing involves overseas transactions in a foreign currency that
momentarily enter US jurisdiction (usually via correspondent banking) in order to facilitate
payments converted into US dollars. See generally Michael Gruson, supra note 216, at 724-31;
Andrew Johnson, 5 Things on Dollar Clearing and BNP Paribas, WALL STREET J. BLOG
(June 30, 2014, 4:40 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/06/30/5-things-on-dollar-clearingand-bnp-paribas/.
221. See Xian, supra note 201, at 641-42 (discussing the extraterritoriality of OFAC’s
financial sanctions); id. at 638 (“[m]oreover, parties are not excluded from IEEPA just because
their co-conspirators do not fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. If at least
some physical component of their property, whether it is computer equipment or actual cash, is
stored in the United States, a defendant may still be liable for conspiring to defraud the United
States.”); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra
note 28, at 461. For an explanation of U-turn transactions, see supra note 147.
222. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 461 (“[OFAC’s revised prohibitions] extended to the exceptionally tangential contacts
that characterize the movement of capital in the modern international financial system,
including what are referred to as ‘U-turn’ transactions, which entail only indirect interaction
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Because of the global reach of the US financial system, the closing of
the U-turn loophole made it almost impossible for Iran to
internationally finance any activities OFAC deemed sanctionable.223
Finally, as one last background matter, both the US President
and OFAC are provided some degree of waiver power under the
foundational sanctioning authorities like the IEEPA.224 In the case of
US-Iran sanctions, this waiver authority is complicated by cumulative
waves of congressional legislation that have imposed additional
requirements upon the lifting of sanctions.225 These restrictions
operate by forcing the President or OFAC to report certain findings to
Congress, such as the determination that relaxing sanctions will be in
the national interest of the United States.226 While it is not yet
established whether Congress may legally oppose the President’s
determinations and stop the relaxation of sanctions, such
determination requirements are primarily focused on forcing political
pressure upon the executive branch.227 At the same time, much of
Congress’ Iran sanctions legislation is also populated with sunset
clauses, which, if not renewed, would eventually force the expiration
involving a third-party bank or financial institution.”); Levitt, Financial Sanctions, supra note
147, at 124 (“[The U-turn loophole previously] applied as long as no U.S. bank directly
debited or credited an account of an Iranian party.”).
223. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 461. This was particularly powerful given that oil—Iran’s primary revenue source—
trades on international markets in US-denominated petrodollars. See id.; Levitt, Financial
Sanctions, supra note 147, at 124 (emphasizing the efficacy of Washington’s financial
coercion).
224. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1706(a)(1) (2012) (“[IEEPA sanctions] may continue to be so
exercised to prohibit transactions involving that property if the President determines that the
continuation of such prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims
involving such country or its nationals.”) (emphasis added); see also RENNACK, supra note
194, at 4 (“[i]n the collection of laws that are the statutory basis for the U.S. economic
sanctions regime on Iran, the President retains, in varying degrees, the authority to tighten and
relax restrictions.”).
225. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text. See generally Katzman, Easing US
Sanctions, supra note 199 (clarifying legislative barriers to sanctions suspension/termination).
226. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-81, § 1245(d)(4)(D), 125 Stat. 1,298 (2012) (containing determination requirements for
waiving sanctions on financial institutions); see also Larry Hannauer, The Days After a Deal
With Iran: Congress’s Role in Implementing a Nuclear Agreement, RAND CORP. (2015),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE139.html.
227. See generally Hannauer, supra note 226; Katzman, Easing US Sanctions, supra
note 199 (exploring the balance between executive and legislative authority in lifting or
waiving Iran sanctions). For example, if the President wanted to lift sanctions against a
terrorist organization, being forced to justify this decision before Congress would likely prove
too politically controversial to carry out such an action. See Hannauer, supra, at 8.
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of sanctions.228 Likewise, there is the question of whether US
domestic courts would actually consent to review challenges related
to Presidential waiver actions, which theoretically might fall under the
Political Question Doctrine.229 Finally, OFAC is also authorized to
issue and monitor licenses that allow a firm’s engagement in
otherwise prohibited transactions, which could be used and renewed
indefinitely to circumvent sanctions.230
Turning more directly to US sanctions targeting Iran, President
Carter’s initial asset freeze following the US Embassy seizure in 1979
under Executive Order 12170 was the first example of any
presidential invocation of IEEPA powers.231 The start of the modern
sanctions regime under President Clinton’s Executive Orders 12957
and 12959 were also “pure” IEEPA actions.232 Since declaring a US
“state of emergency” vis-à-vis Iran under the IEEPA in Executive
Order 12957, Washington has annually renewed this emergency
classification.233 As a direct response to the Conoco debacle,
Executive Order 12957 prohibited US firms from participating in the
228. See Hannauer, supra note 226, at 5; KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 17 (2015) [hereinafter KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS] (evaluating
sanction sunset provisions).
229. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 274 (“[p]resumably, a court might decline jurisdiction
under the political question doctrine . . . ”); cf. Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in
U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 217, 255-57 (1999) (exploring
the Political Question Doctrine within the analogous subject matter of Presidential
certifications). The Political Question Doctrine refers to the refusal of US federal courts to
adjudicate political controversies that should be best left to the executive or legislative
branches. See generally JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43834, THE POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE: JUSTICIABILITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2014); Louis
Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
441 (2004). That said, in today’s polarized environment of partisan politics in every branch of
the United States Government, declining jurisdiction here seems especially unlikely.
230. See Meshkat, supra note 200, at 928 (explaining OFAC’s general and specific
licenses); Basic Information on OFAC and Sanctions, supra note 203 (further clarifying
OFAC’s licensing authority). Indeed, such OFAC licenses play an important role within the
schema of the JCPOA, presumably allowing the foreign subsidiaries of US firms to indirectly
access Iran. See infra note 438 and accompanying text.
231. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Jan. 19, 1981); Meshkat, supra
note 200, at 922-23 (pointing out that Executive Order 12170 was the first invocation of
IEEPA powers).
232. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, supra note 120; Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note
121; see also Meshkat, supra note 200, at 924 (recognizing the Clinton orders’ reliance on
IEEPA powers).
233. See Katzman, Easing US Sanctions, supra note 199, at 2 (“President Bill Clinton
declared a ‘state of emergency’ with respect to Iran in March 1995, and that declaration has
been renewed each year since.”); Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2443.

882

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:839

development or investment in Iranian projects related to the State’s
petroleum sector.234 This was reinforced by Executive Order 12959,
which placed a US trade embargo on Iran and further sought to
sanction foreign firms from facilitating sensitive US goods and
technologies to Iran.235
One of the most significant milestones of the sanctions regime
came with the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which marked a
shift from unadulterated IEEPA-based executive authority to the
legislative authority of Congress.236 The stated targets of the ILSA
were similar to the previous executive sanctions, seeking to target
investment in Iran’s petroleum sector and to block sensitive weapons
technologies from reaching the Islamic Republic.237 In effect, the
ILSA served as a baseline for various future legislative sanctions,
which tweaked US sanction levers by amending provisions and
adding additional layers to this original law.238 The ILSA was also
aspirationally multilateral, seeking to impose sanctions on “foreign
persons” investing more than US$40 million in Iran’s energy
sector.239
In terms of mechanics, the ILSA worked by forcing the
President to impose at least two options from a menu of six different
sanctioning methods upon entities that violated the ILSA’s triggering
thresholds.240 These options included: limitations on US ExportImport Bank assistance; export sanctions prohibiting the licensing or
granting of permission to export goods or services to any sanctioned
234. See Exec. Order 12,957, supra note 120; Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2443-44
(discussing Executive Order 12957 and the Conoco episode).
235. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note 121; Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2444
(elucidating on further measures under Executive Order 12959).
236. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541
(1996); see also Bhala, supra note 27, at 267 (describing the shift of sanctions policies from
the executive branch to the legislative branch).
237. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 268; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 453 (addressing the purpose of the ILSA).
238. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 265 (“Overall, Congress strengthened the baseline
1996 statute no fewer than six times. . . . ”); Clawson, supra note 27, at 166 (outlining the
subsequent modifications of the ILSA).
239. See Clawson, supra note 27, at 166; Bhala, supra note 27, at 269 (identifying the
multilateral ambitions of the ILSA). The law also required various presidential reporting
mechanisms related to the White House’s efforts to spread Iran sanctioning policies at the
international level. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, §§
10(a)(1) and 4(e), 110 Stat. 1541 (1996).
240. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(a); Bhala, supra note 27, at 272 (analyzing the
ILSA sanctioning “menu”).
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person; restrictions against non-humanitarian loans from US lenders;
blocking violators from dealing in US government debt instruments
or serving as a repository of US government funds; blocking violators
from contracting with the US government; and finally, any additional
sanctions under the original executive sanctioning authority of the
IEEPA.241 The ILSA also sought to partially constrain the President’s
waiver authority, requiring that waivers satisfy two criteria when
terminating Iran’s liability: the determination that Iran has ceased
efforts to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological, and missile
technologies; and the determination that Iran is no longer supporting
acts of international terrorism.242 Along similar lines, the ILSA also
provided incentivizing waivers for US allies and other third parties,
which allowed for sanction non-enforcement toward citizens of
governments that agreed to join Washington’s sanctioning efforts.243
The ILSA also contained a five-year sunset clause, which was
originally set to expire on August 5, 2001.244
By 1997, almost all US investment was banned from reaching
Iran, and Washington was often clashing with European allies who
continued to maintain significant business relationships with Iran
despite US sanctioning policy.245 During the height of Khatami’s
reform efforts, Congress pushed for further sanctions in the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which authorized the President to
impose additional sanctions on non-US persons identified as passing
various nuclear, missile, and dual-use goods or technologies to
Iran.246 This legislation also forced the President to provide written
justification for not applying measures to sanctionable entities, and

241. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act §§ 6(1)-(6) (listing sanctions options); Bhala,
supra note 27, at 272-74 (providing an overview of these different sanctions options).
242. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 8(a); Bhala, supra note 27, at 275 (observing
the ILSA’s waiver restrictions).
243. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 4(c)(1).
244. See id. § 13(b); Bhala, supra note 27, at 278 (noting the ILSA sunset clause).
245. See Anderson, Good Grief!, supra note 47, at 134 (discussing the end of US
investment in Iran); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra
note 28, at 454 (detailing the strain on US-European relationships in the aftermath of the
ILSA).
246. See Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-178, 114 Stat. 38 (2000).
More specifically, see id. § 2(a) (providing categories of transactions triggering sanctions); id.
§ 3(b) (listing sanctioning measures).
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aimed at targeting Russia for its role in proliferating sensitive
technologies to Iran.247
Before the expiration of the ILSA, Congress extended its
lifespan for another five years with the ILSA Extension Act of
2001.248 In addition to renewing the ILSA, this legislation also further
entrenched the US sanctions regime with both a reduced triggering
threshold (from US$40 million transactions to US$20 million
transactions), as well as more intensely amending the President’s
reporting obligations.249 In particular, the President was now required
to report to Congress the extent to which sanctions were achieving
their goals, the humanitarian impact of sanctions, and, most
interestingly, the impact of sanctions on other US national security,
economic, and foreign policy interests, “including relations with
countries friendly to the United States, and on the United States
economy.”250 In effect, within the intense lobbying environment that
fostered the sanctions regime, these stipulations on relations with
countries friendly to the United States “allowed for sanctions to be
evaluated according to Israeli and Gulf Arab interests,” even while
the effects of sanctions on Washington’s more strategic European
partnerships went disregarded by Congress.251 As highlighted above,
2001 also saw the President’s signing of Executive Order 13224,
which, although premised on post-9/11 counterterrorism efforts,
would later prove to be a powerful measure against the government of
Iran.252
The next significant intensification of the US sanctions regime
followed the reinstatement of Iran’s nuclear program, with the Iran
Freedom Support Act of 2006 (“IFSA”).253 Notably, the IFSA
247. See id. § 4 (detailing procedures for non-application of sanctions); id. § 6 (limiting
US participation in Russia’s space program unless Iran-related conditions are met).
248. See ILSA Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 115 Stat 199 (2001).
249. See id. § 2(a) (reducing the sanctionable triggering threshold); id. § 3 (updating the
President’s reporting requirements).
250. Id. § 3(b); see Bhala, supra note 27, at 278 (assessing the significance of this
statutory language).
251. Bhala, supra note 27, at 278-79; see supra note 125 (illustrating the US sanction
regime’s alienation of the United States’ European allies).
252. See supra note 208 and accompanying text; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 461 (stipulating the importance of
Bush’s post-9/11 expansions of executive sanctioning power).
253. See Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-293, 120 Stat. 1344 (2006);
see also Bhala, supra note 27, at 280-83 (providing an overview of the Iran Freedom Support
Act (“IFSA”)).
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dropped Libya from the ILSA, renaming it the Iran Sanctions Act,
and extended its provisions for another five years until 2011.254 The
IFSA also added heightened stipulations for the termination of
sanctions against Iran, requiring the President to report that Iran
“poses no significant threat to United States national security, interest,
or allies” in order for ILSA sanctions to be lifted.255
The sanctions regime entered a new chapter with the passing of
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010.256 Citing numerous Congressional findings—Iran’s
ongoing nuclear program, the threat to the safety of Israel, human
rights in Iran, and so on—CISADA attempted to aggressively expand
the sanctions originally imposed on Iran by the ILSA.257 In particular,
economic sanctions were broadened to resemble a complete embargo
on the US importation of Iranian goods, as well as the complete
prohibition of non-humanitarian US goods from even indirectly
reaching Iran.258 Similarly, sanctions on the development of Iran’s
petroleum sector were broadened to specifically target Iran’s access to
refined gasoline.259 Bans on transfers of goods, services, technologies,
or information that might contribute toward Iran’s ability to refine
petroleum included a lowered triggering threshold of just US$1

254. See Iran Freedom Support Act § 205 (dropping all ILSA Libya provisions); id. §
204 (extending the ILSA’s sunset provision to December 31, 2011).
255. See id. § 203(3). This provision provided further entanglement of US-Iran policy
vis-à-vis Israel. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 282-83 (“[i]n sum, the third criterion for
termination of sanctions added by IFSA nearly sub-contracted American policy on Iran to
Israel. As a practical matter, given the overwhelming influence of Israel through the American
Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) in Congress, it would be difficult to get sanctions
lifted without Israeli support—and that support looked well nigh impossible.”); Press Release,
AIPAC, AIPAC Applauds the House Passage of H.R. 282, The Iran Freedom Support Act
(Apr. 26, 2006), http://www.aipac.org/~/media/Publications/Policy%20and%20Politics/Press/
AIPAC%20Statements/2006/04/IFSA_House_Passage.pdf (AIPAC’s celebrating the passing
of IFSA).
256. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010).
257. See id. § 2 (listing Congressional findings justifying enhanced sanctions against
Iran); Bhala, supra note 27, at 285 (“CISADA ‘expanded significantly’ the original ILSA
sanctions.”).
258. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 103
(providing expanded economic sanctions); Bhala, supra note 27, at 286-87 (overviewing
CISADA’s trade intensifications).
259. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 102(a)(1)
(amending previous ILSA petroleum sanctions); Bhala, supra note 27, at 288-92 (detailing
measures to restrict Iran’s access to refined petroleum).
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million valued transactions.260 Meanwhile, restrictions were further
imposed against exporting refined petroleum to Iran, including
restrictions on shipping and insurance underwriting that might be
used in relation to Iran’s import of refined petroleum.261
CISADA also required US financial institutions to report to
OFAC any assets falling within the President’s freezing authority
under the IEEPA, specifically mentioning the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard as an entity possessing freezable assets.262 Likewise, non-US
financial institutions were cut off from accessing the US financial
industry if found to have engaged in prohibited transactions
concerning Iran.263 Any domestic financial institution maintaining a
US correspondent account or payable-through account on behalf of a
non-US financial institution was also subject to enhanced reporting
requirements involving transactions with Iran.264 The effects of
CISADA’s financial sanctions were dramatic, eventually persuading
more than 80 international financial institutions to cut ties with
Iran.265
Enacted in the aftermath of President Ahmadinejad’s contested
reelection of 2009, CISADA also included a new category of
sanctions related to human rights violators in Iran.266 Targeting
individual human rights violators, these sanctions allowed for new
categories of individualized sanctions, such as the blocking of visas to
260. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 102(a)(1)
(amending ILSA § 5(a) to include measures targeting Iran’s refining capabilities at § (a)(2));
see also Bhala, supra note 27, at 288-92 (outlining these changes).
261. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 102(a)(1)
(amending ILSA § 5(a) to include measures targeting Iran’s ability to import refined
petroleum, as well as sanctions upon shipping and insurance underwriting at § (a)(3)).
262. See id. § 103(b)(3); Bhala, supra note 27, at 292-93 (overviewing the updated
financial reporting requirements).
263. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 104
(targeting foreign financial institutions involved in Iran). For many banks, the loss of
correspondent banking and US dollar clearing services within the US banking system would
have meant an impossibility of conducting transactions in dollars. See Johnson, supra note
220; Cynthia O’Murchu et al., Standard Chartered: The Iranian Connection, CNBC (Sept.
21, 2015, 9:25 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/21/standard-chartered-the-iranian-connect
ion.html.
264. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 104(e)
(adding new reporting requirements).
265. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 466 (noting CISADA’s fallout on the world banking industry); cf. KATZMAN, IRAN
SANCTIONS, supra note 228, at 26-27 (stating CISADA’s impact on Iranian banks).
266. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 105
(adopting human rights sanctions).
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enter the United States.267 Finally, CISADA further expanded the
ILSA by adding three new measures to the “menu” of sanctions
discussed above, including: foreign exchange sanctions; banking
transaction sanctions; and property transaction sanctions.268 If a
sanctioned entity was found to have “any interest” in transactions
occurring in these categories, and such transactions were within US
jurisdiction, then the President could select these sanctions to block
them.269 Furthermore, whereas under previous legislation the
President was required to deal with violators by selecting two of the
six sanctions measures, CISADA now required the President to apply
at least three of the nine sanction options.270
With pressure mounting on Iran under the Obama
Administration and with multilateral sanctions also proliferating,
2012 brought three additional US congressional measures aimed at
perfecting the US sanctions regime.271 First, within the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (“2012 Defense
Act”), crippling additional sanctions were imposed on Iran’s financial
sector.272 Specifically, Congress designated Iran as a “primary money
laundering concern,” which allowed for special monitoring measures
and the triggering of money laundering provisions of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001.273 By including Iran’s Central Bank among
the institutions falling under US sanctions, the 2012 Defense Act
broadened sanctions against Iran’s energy sector to include basically
all sectors coming into contact with Iranian finance.274
267. See id. § 105(c) (describing sanctions against human rights violators).
268. See id. § 102(b)(2)(B) (amending the ILSA to include these new sanctions).
269. See id.; Bhala, supra note 27, at 295-97 (exploring these new sanction measures).
270. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act §
102(a)(2)(C); Bhala, supra note 27, at 294 (“the 2010 legislation expanded the ILSA list of
sanctions from six to nine and increased the number of sanctions the President had to impose
from at least two to three.”).
271. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
125 Stat. 1,298 (2012); Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1,214 (2012); Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 2,004 (2012).
272. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245.
273. See id. § 1245 (creating measures against such designated entities); 31 U.S.C. §
5318A (2012) (containing the USA PATRIOT Act’s § 311 money laundering provisions); see
also Bhala, supra note 27, at 300 (explaining the designation process); Levitt, Financial
Sanctions, supra note 147, at 126 (noting the impact of § 311 measures).
274. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 305 (“[o]f significance was that the prohibition vastly
expanded the architecture of measures against Iran from the energy sector to all sectors.
Whether payments were made in connection with petroleum or petroleum products did not
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In August of 2012, Congress further enacted the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (“ITRSHRA”),
which provided for enhanced enforcement and gap-filling measures to
address the shortcomings of the existing sanctions regime.275 In
addition to strengthening each of the various sanctions categories
discussed above, the ITRSHRA placed increased emphasis on the
human rights situation in Iran and the government’s censorship
efforts.276 The targeting of Iran’s financial sector was also
supplemented with sanctions against any party that knowingly
“purchases, subscribes to, or facilitates the issuance of” Iranian
sovereign debt.277 Additionally, the ITRSHRA created three more
options within the ILSA’s “menu” of sanctions, including: equity or
debt investment sanctions; corporate officer exclusion sanctions; and
principle executive officer sanctions.278 Under the equity or debt
investment sanctions, the US President was given the authority to
block any US person’s investment participation in a sanctioned entity,
such as an international bank determined to have violated US
restrictions.279 Likewise, the corporate officer sanction allowed the
President to block any officers of a sanctioned entity from entering
the United States, while the principal executive officers sanction
permitted the President to impose any of the approved sanctioning
measures on officers of a sanctioned entity.280 Like previous upshifts
in the US sanctions regime, the ITRSHRA also increased the number
of sanctions the President was required to impose on a violator,
jumping from three out of nine to five out of twelve measures.281
matter . . . ”); Levitt, Financial Sanctions, supra note 147, at 124 (indicating the power of
these financial measures).
275. See generally Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1,214 (2012); Bhala, supra note 27, at 312-13 (“[s]uccinctly put,
America dubbed more activities with Iran illegal, closed loopholes to behavior it previously
identified as unlawful, set additional sanctions for transgressions, and increased the difficulty
of obtaining a waiver of penalties.”).
276. See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act § 402 (imposing sanctions
based on the transfer of goods or technologies likely to be used to commit human rights
abuses); see also Bhala, supra note 27, at 332-34 (discussing ITRSHRA’s human rights
amendments to CISADA).
277. See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act § 213; Bhala, supra note
27, at 328-29 (commenting on ITRSHRA’s new sovereign debt restrictions).
278. See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act § 204(a)(2) (amending the
ILSA to include these three new measures).
279. See id. (implementing new presidential powers).
280. See id. (incorporating these new sanctions options).
281. See id. § 201(2)(A) (amending the previous sanctions menu).
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Finally, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012
(“IFCA”) represents the final substantive US sanctions development
before the conclusion of the interim Joint Plan of Action between Iran
and the P5+1.282 Another expansive revision buried in a defense
appropriations bill, IFCA went even further than the ITRSHRA in
stressing the importance of Iranian human rights, stating that Iran’s
human rights situation threatened US interests and incorporating
various human rights rationales within the very purpose of US
sanctions.283 IFCA also sought to plug holes in the existing sanctions
regime by horizontally expanding to new sectors that reinforced
already prohibited acts.284 Notably, IFCA placed restrictions on:
Iranian shipping and shipbuilding; Iran’s access to precious metals;
insurance and underwriting for prohibited activities; Iran’s State
media; and the use of Iranian ports.285
Representing the high water mark of the US sanctions regime,
IFCA was the last substantive sanctions action adopted before the
signing of the JPA and the moratorium on some sanctions.286
However, as negotiations intensified between Iran and world powers
on the eve of the JCPOA, Congress also managed to pass one last
legislative act aimed at increasing its reviewing powers over any final
nuclear deal.287 The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015
added new procedural requirements to the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, specifically concerning the lifting of sanctions that target
Iran.288 By requiring the President to report to Congress upon the
conclusion of any final nuclear deal and jump through other
282. See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126
Stat. 2,004 (2012); see also Katzman, Easing US Sanctions on Iran, supra note 199, at 12;
Bhala, supra note 27, at 339 (“[t]he Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 was
the final legislation against Iran before the November 2013 to January 2014 preliminary
nuclear agreement.”).
283. See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act §§ 1241-95. On the subject of
human rights in Iran, IFCA specifically cited government oppression, the people’s struggle for
democracy, access to information, and government censorship. See id. § 1243(a)-(b).
284. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
285. See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act § 1244 (adding restrictions on
Iranian shipping); § 1245 (precious metals); § 1246 (insurance and underwriting services); §
1248 (state broadcasting); § 1252 (Iranian ports).
286. See supra note 282.
287. See infra notes 288-93 and accompanying text.
288. See Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-17, 129 Stat. 201
(2015); see also The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954)
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (2012)). The Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act of 2015 added § 135 to the Atomic Energy Act.
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procedural hoops, Congress made clear its intent not to be sidestepped
in the lifting of sanctions.289 The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
devised a system where Congress would be given the final say on any
negotiated agreement modifying the statutory sanctions already
targeting Iran, while the failure to obtain Congressional approval
would trigger automatic legislation placing an immediate freeze on
“any action by the United States Government to facilitate the release
of funds or assets to Iran pursuant to such agreement, or provide any
further waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief pursuant to such
agreement.”290 Additionally, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
clarified that even in the event of a nuclear deal breakthrough,
“United States sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses,
and ballistic missiles will remain in place . . . .”291 In sum, the Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act, like much of the wider US statutory
sanctions regime, sought to create a tangled legal framework that
would limit the executive’s ability to terminate sanctions at will.292
However, because the review procedure devised by the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act still required a veto-proof majority in both
congressional chambers to actually block the JCPOA, the legislation
ultimately failed to obstruct the deal with Iran.293

289. In particular, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act notes, “because the sanctions
regime was imposed by Congress and only Congress can permanently modify or eliminate that
regime, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity, in an orderly and
deliberative manner, to consider and, as appropriate, take action affecting the statutory
sanctions regime imposed by Congress.” Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 135(c)(1)(E) (as
amended).
290. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 135(e)(2) (as amended) (containing Congress’
automatic legislation in the event of an agreement beyond its approval); see also id. §
135(c)(2) (creating Congress’ approval mechanism in the event of any negotiated nuclear
deal); RENNACK, supra note 194, at 3 (providing a broad overview of the Congressional
approval mechanism under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015).
291. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 135(d)(7)(A) (as amended).
292. See supra notes 196-291 and accompanying text (tracing the proliferation of the
Iran sanctions regime).
293. See Robert Satloff, Clarifying a “No” Vote on the Iran Nuclear Agreement, WASH.
INST. NEAR E. POL’Y (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
view/clarifying-a-no-vote-on-the-iran-nuclear-agreement; Jennifer Steinhauer, Democrats
Hand Victory to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2015, http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html?_r=0
(recalling
the
workings and failure of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act).
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2. International Sanctions: Multilateral Resolutions
There is no question that the United States was the world leader
in sanctioning Iran, spawning a rich unilateral sanctions regime that
existed in some form for the majority of four decades.294 However,
unilateral sanctions—even controversial extraterritorial unilateral
sanctions—packed little punch in comparison to comprehensive
multilateral sanctions.295 While even some of Washington’s closest
allies were hesitant to sanction Iran through much of the US sanctions
regime, European attitudes soured over the course of the
Ahmadinejad presidency, especially following the reignition of the
nation’s nuclear program and the deterioration of Iranian human
rights in the aftermath of Ahmadinejad’s contested reelection.296
The first truly multilateral resolution concerning Iran occurred as
a response to its resumption of uranium enrichment in 2005, related to
the government’s nuclear development program.297 UN Security
Council Resolution 1696 provided a basis for future rounds of
multilateral sanctions, promising that the Security Council would
adopt “appropriate measures” if Iran failed to cease its uranium
enrichment operations.298 Although Resolution 1696 included no
sanctions itself, it set a one-month deadline for Iran to comply or be
subject to further action.299 Such further action came in the form
Security Council Resolution 1737, passing unanimously in the
Security Council in late 2006.300 Resolution 1737 advised all UN
Member States to raise sanctions targeting the transfer of nuclearrelated materials to Iran, including ballistic missile technologies.301
Additionally, Resolution 1737 demanded Member States freeze the
294. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing US sanctions against Iran).
295. See generally Egle, supra note 145 (arguing the inefficacy of unilateral sanctions);
Clawson, supra note 27, at 116 (questioning whether unilateral sanctions were successful).
296. See Clawson, supra note 27, at 117; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 349 (asserting the global sanctions consensus by
late 2010).
297. See Jason Starr, The U.N. Resolutions, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 119;
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 463
(identifying the origins of multilateral sanctions against Iran).
298. See S.C. Res. 1696 (July 31, 2006); Starr, supra note 297, at 119 (overviewing
Resolution 1696).
299. See S.C. Res. 1696; Starr, supra note 297, at 119 (noting Resolution 1696’s onemonth compliance deadline).
300. See S.C. Res. 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (observing the
adoption of Resolution 1737).
301. See S.C. Res. 1737; Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (explaining Resolution 1737).
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assets of 22 entities involved in the Iranian nuclear program or the
IRGC, and urged Member States to limit the travel of anybody
connected to Iran’s nuclear program.302 Three months later, the
Security Council followed up with Resolution 1747, another
unanimous proposal that placed multilateral limitations upon Iran’s
access to military equipment and purchases.303 In addition to this
military angle, Security Council Resolution 1747 also targeted Iran’s
access to international financial institutions, suggesting that States
limit financial commitments involving Iran to mere humanitarianrelated transactions.304 Additional names and businesses with ties to
Iran’s nuclear program and/or the IRGC were included on Resolution
1747’s list of sanctionable entities, and the Resolution further
stipulated international reporting requirements when any individual
with ties to Iran’s nuclear program traveled or entered Member State
territory.305
Following this first round of multilateral sanctions, there were
some positive signs that Iran was beginning to comply with its
International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) obligations.306 Still,
encouraged by the United States and some European allies, the UN
Security Council further adopted Resolution 1803 in March 2008.307
While Resolution 1803 was comprised primarily of non-binding
recommendations, it strongly urged UN Member States to cease any
involvement with Iranian financial institutions suspected of serving
Iran’s nuclear program and/or overseas terrorism.308 Fifteen additional
302. See S.C. Res. 1737; Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (identifying Resolution 1737’s
sanction provisions).
303. See S.C. Res. 1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (introducing
Resolution 1747).
304. See S.C. Res. 1747; Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (highlighting the financial
sanctions within Resolution 1747).
305. See S.C. Res. 1747; Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (pointing out Resolution 1747’s
expanded list of sanctioned Iranian entities).
306. See Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (“ . . . several council members initially questions
the need for further sanctions against Iran. Libya, South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam were
especially hesitant to pursue new punitive measures, arguing that Iran had begun to cooperate
with IAEA inspections.”); Walter Isaacson, A Way Out for Iran’s Nuclear Impassse?, TIME,
Mar. 14, 2007, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1599725,00.html
(acknowledging initial hopes for Iranian nuclear compliance).
307. See S.C. Res. 1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); Starr, supra note 297, at 120-21 (presenting
Resolution 1803).
308. See S.C. Res. 1803; Starr, supra note 297, at 120-21; William Maclean & Andrew
Quinn, Analysis: Iran Sanctions Push is Test for West Diplomacy, REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions-analysis-idUSTRE80415Q20120105
(articulating the financial measures of Resolution 1803).
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entities were subjected to asset freezes, and Member States were
authorized to seize and inspect any cargo traveling to or from Iran if
there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that the cargo contained
previously-banned materials.309 Later that year, the Security Council
also adopted Resolution 1835, which simply reaffirmed the existing
multilateral sanctions in light of new evidence related to Iran’s
ongoing nuclear noncompliance.310 Although the Security Council
unanimously passed Resolution 1835, growing tensions between
Washington and Moscow related to further sanctions began to show
the limitations of the multilateral sanctions regime.311 At the same
time, however, Iran’s stark noncompliance in the face of both IAEA
and UN demands helped bring individual European States toward
adopting their own unilateral measures to target Iran.312
In response to another major negotiating impasse as well as the
discovery of Iran’s secret uranium enrichment site at Qom, the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 1929 in June 2010.313 The
Resolution demanded that States adopt measures to keep sensitive
technologies from reaching Iran.314 Likewise, it blocked all Iranian
commercial access to uranium mining operations and other nuclear
material production operations outside Iran.315 Further targeted
309. See S.C. Res. 1803. Importantly, the language of Resolution 1803 provided no
definition or guidance as to what constituted “reasonable grounds,” thereby leaving
enforcement to the discretion of individual member states. See id.; see also Starr, supra note
297, at 121 (further expounding on the suggestions under Resolution 1803).
310. See S.C. Res. 1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (explaining
Resolution 1835).
311. See Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (“[i]n its final U.N. measure on Iran before leaving
office, the Bush administration was forced to accept a compromise resolution after Russia
balked at more sanctions.”); Egle, supra note 145, at 45 (noting Russian and other nations’
resistance to Washington’s call for intensified sanctions).
312. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 463 (“the Bush administration began to reap the rewards of a new coordination with
Europe on Iran, in the form of incipient European and multilateral actions to penalize
Tehran.”); DINA ESFANDIARY, ASSESSING THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SANCTIONS POLICY:
IRAN AS A CASE STUDY, 34 EU NON-PROLIFERATION CONSORTIUM, 7-10 (December 2013),
http://www.nonproliferation.eu/web/documents/nonprolif
erationpapers/dinaesfandiary52b41ff5cbaf6.pdf (identifying European unilateral sanctions
against Iran).
313. See S.C. Res. 1929 (June 9, 2010); Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (introducing
Resolution 1929); see also Meshkat, supra note 200, at 44 (detailing Iran’s NPT
noncompliance on the eve of Resolution 1929).
314. See S.C. Res. 1929; Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (explaining Resolution 1929).
315. See S.C. Res. 1929; Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (detailing the further restrictions
of Resolution 1929).
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sanctions were aimed at the IRGC, as well as the Islamic Republic of
Iran Shipping Lines (“IRISL”), which was suspected of importing
goods related to Iran’s nuclear program.316 Perhaps most importantly,
in light of the simultaneous US efforts under CISADA, Security
Council Resolution 1929 adopted new sanctions on Iran’s finance
sector, calling on Member States to block the expansion of Iranian
banks into their jurisdiction and to require that a State’s domestic
banks cut all ties to Iran.317 The passage of Resolution 1929 along
with the United States’ diplomatic resurgence following the election
of President Obama allowed for even greater proliferation of
commonly focused unilateral sanctions, which had a major impact on
Iran’s international image and its domestic economy.318
In combination with US and other unilateral sanctioning efforts,
these UN Security Council measures contributed to the most complex
and aggressive international sanctions regime that the world has ever
witnessed.319 By the election of President Rouhani in 2013, the
Islamic Republic was drowning in international coercive pressures.320
The next Part of this Note will focus on what these pressures actually
looked like.
C. The Costs of Sanctioning Iran
The US and international sanctions regime targeting Iran
inflicted various costs on Iran and other parties, some of them
unanticipated.321 As a general matter, these costs may be broken down
into three categories: economic, political, and humanitarian.322

316. See S.C. Res. 1929; Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (noting Resolution 1929’s new
sanction targets).
317. See S.C. Res. 1929; Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (emphasizing the importance of
Resolution 1929’s financial measures).
318. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 465 (“in many ways those subsequent unilateral sanctions are far more significant than
the UN measure itself. Washington took other steps to encourage cooperation among ‘likeminded states’ in Europe and Asia, notably by utilizing sanctions policy to highlight human
rights abuses in Iran and to restrict the government’s access to technology used to control the
free flow of information.”); see also John R. Crook, Security Council Adopts Fourth Round of
Iranian Sanctions, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 518 (2010); ESFANDIARY, supra note 312
(documenting the proliferation of unilateral sanctions against Iran).
319. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
320. See infra Part I.C.
321. See infra Parts I.C.1-3.
322. See id.
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Examining these costs in greater detail provides a glimpse at the
effectiveness of the sanctions regime, along with its shortcomings.
1. Economic Costs
As intended, the sanctions regime wreaked havoc on Iran’s
national economy.323 The Iranian rial has never recovered its value
preceding the intensification of sanctions under President Clinton’s
1995 executive orders, and in total, some estimates suggest that the
overall Iranian economy is twenty-five percent smaller than it would
have been in the absence of the sanctions regime.324 This economic
loss has been most severe since the passing of CISADA in 2010 and
the intensification of multilateral sanctioning efforts, with the Iranian
State losing an estimated US$133 million daily in revenues
throughout 2012.325 This period witnessed negative economic growth
and inflation consistently upwards of thirty percent.326 The Iranian rial
also plummeted throughout 2012, approximately halving its value and
dropping as much as fifteen percent on October 1 of that year.327 The

323. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 353; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
supra note 28, at 467 (observing the economic damage imposed on Iran by
the sanctions regime).
324. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 452; INT’L CAMPAIGN FOR HUM. RTS. IN IRAN, A GROWING CRISIS: THE IMPACT OF
SANCTIONS AND REGIME POLICIES ON IRANIANS’ ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 54 (2013),
http://www.iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/A-Growing-Crisis.pdf [hereinafter A
GROWING CRISIS] (citing the failure of the Iranian rial to recover since Clinton-era sanctions);
see also COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN, supra note 168, at 316; Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Iran Reaps
Less Ready Cash From Eased Sanctions Than Predicted, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-25/iran-reaps-less-ready-cash-from-easedsanctions-than-predicted (citing the missing quarter of Iran’s economy due to sanctions).
325. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1767; A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324, at 9192 (addressing the particular intensity of the late sanctions regime); see also MALONEY,
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 470; Anthony
DiPaola & Isaac Arnsdorf, Iran Loses $133 Million a Day on Embargo, Buoying Obama,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-01/iran-loses133-million-a-day-from-sanctions-as-oil-buoys-obama (noting Iran’s daily revenue losses).
326. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 359; Sabrina M. Peterson, Iran’s Deteriorating Economy: An Analysis of the Economic
Impact of Western Sanctions, INT’L AFF. REV., http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/428 (last visited
Apr. 9, 2016) (evaluating Iran’s high inflation under sanctions). In fact, US estimates placed
Iran’s actual inflation rate at approximately 70 percent in 2013. See MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra, at 359; COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN, supra
note 168, at 316.
327. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 471; Steven Plaut, The Collapse of Iran’s Rial, GATESTONE INST. (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:00
THE REVOLUTION,
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additional layer of 2012 sanctions sunk Iran’s economy another ten
percent by March 2014, compounded by the already staggering harm
to the State oil sector.328 Whereas Iran had sold its oil to 21 different
markets prior to 2012, this last wave of sanctions left only six
international purchasers.329 Some measures show a decline in national
oil sales from US$100 billion in 2011 to just US$35 billion in 2013,
while others indicate oil losses of US$1 billion per day after
Washington’s 2012 sanctions.330
The sanctions regime also had a devastating impact on
development in Iran, including the opportunity costs of forsaken
foreign direct investment (“FDI”), as well as the very real costs of
international divestment, whereby mounting financial, legal, and
reputational hazards persuaded non-Iranian firms to exit Iran.331 Iran
was blacklisted from new World Bank loans since 2005, and was
denied the benefits of other international economic institutions.332 The
country’s exclusion from the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunications (“SWIFT”) international clearing
AM), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3597/iran-rial-collpase (explaining that this crash was
associated with Washington’s sanctioning of the Iranian Central Bank).
328. See Matthew Philips & Golnar Motevalli, Iran Gets Ready to Sell To Sell to the
World, BLOOMBERG (Sep 10, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0910/iran-gets-ready-to-sell-oil-to-the-world (establishing Iran’s ten percent decline over fiscal
year 2013); Iran’s Economy, By the Numbers, IRAN PRIMER (May 11, 2015),
http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/may/11/irans-economy-numbers (establishing Iran’s onetenth GDP decline between 2012 and 2014).
329. See Philips & Motevalli, supra note 328, at 21; Zachary Keck, Asia is Purchasing
Nearly all of Iran’s Oil, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 05, 2013) (emphasizing the decline of Iranian
petroleum importing nations).
330. COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN, supra note 168, at 316 (observing Iran’s shrinking oil
revenue). In volume terms, oil sales dropped from 2.5 to 1.0 million barrels per day during this
period. Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1767; see also Leah McGrath Goodman, Iran is (Almost)
Open for Business: When Sanctions End, Big Oil Will Pounce, NEWSWEEK, 12 (May 8, 2015)
(estimating Iran’s oil losses to approach US$1 billion daily).
331. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 1;
Najmeh Bozorgmehr & Monavar Khalaj, Businesses Eye Huge Opportunities in Iran,
FINANCIAL TIMES (July 14, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/654cbd28-2a2a-11e5-8613e7aedbb7bdb7.html#axzz3usB0orCL (mentioning missed FDI opportunities and
underinvestment under the sanctions regime); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 462; Levitt, Financial Sanctions, supra
note 147, at 125 (assessing international divestment from Iran).
332. See Egle, supra note 145, at 44; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 458; Clawson, supra note 27, at 115 (noting Iran’s being
cut off from the World Bank lending). Iran was also prevented from accessing International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”) loans and Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) guarantee dispersals. See Meshkat, supra note 200, at 44-45.
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system eviscerated Iran’s ability to issue bonds overseas or transfer
money in or out of the national economy, causing a severe credit
crunch.333 Meanwhile, Iran’s trade balance declined by approximately
30.1% from 2010 to 2014, and the State’s increasing reliance on
barter flooded domestic markets with cheap Chinese goods.334
Combined, these trends took a major toll on Iran’s private sector.335
Additionally, smuggling ran rampant throughout the late sanction
years, with US$25 billion of commodities and consumer goods
illegally entering the country in 2013, while State-subsidized gasoline
was illegally exported.336 There were also other problematic economic
distortions: from the concentration of wealth in the IRGC, to the
necessity-born development of an entire domestic weapons
industry.337

333. See Najmeh Bozorgmehr & Martin Arnold, French Banks Notably Absent From
Business Delegation to Iran, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/
0/45ac01a8-611c-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3swvAUDuL; Morteza
Ramezanpour, Iran’s Troubled Bond Market, AL-MONITOR (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/iran-bond-market.html; PRS GROUP, IRAN COUNTRY
UPDATE 6 (Aug. 27, 2014) (on file with author) (explaining Iran’s credit crunch). The Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (“SWIFT”) banking system is a
Belgium-based secure communication system used by banks to send and receive payment
requests. Although SWIFT does not technically provide clearing services, it is the primary
international communication mechanism to request transaction settlements via correspondent
banking or national payment systems. See Carter & Farha, supra note 205, at 907; Introduction
to SWIFT, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/about-us/discover-swift (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
334. See COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN, supra note 168, at 320; Iran Balance of Trade,
TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/balance-of-trade (last visited
Apr. 9, 2016) (documenting the massive decline in Iran’s balance of trade); see also
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 359;
China Floods Iran with Cheap Consumer Goods in Exchange for Oil, GUARDIAN (Feb. 20,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2013/feb/20/china-floods-iran-cheapconsumer-goods (considering the consequences of Iran’s resorting to barter).
335. Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 5; A
GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324, at 129-41 (elucidating the impact of sanctions on Iran’s
private sector).
336. See Correspondent in Tehran, Billion Dollar Smuggling Industry Drains Iran’s
Economy, AL-MONITOR (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/
iran-smuggling-trafficing.html; Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 110 (characterizing
Iran’s smuggling woes); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 421; Hamdan Albaloshi, Iran Sanctions Spur Boom for
Pakistani Diesel Smugglers, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/uspakistan-iran-smugglers-idUSBRE92U08X20130401 (explaining how sanctions compounded
Iran’s subsidy-driven, illicit diesel export problems).
337. For the sanction regime’s empowerment of the IRGC, see infra notes 359-64 and
accompanying text. For Iran’s domestic weapons industry, see MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 476; Iran: Defense Industry,
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Of course, the sanctions regime also incurred economic costs
beyond the borders of Iran. Within the United States, economic selfharm from sanctioning Iran totaled billions of dollars annually.338
Private US firms were required to develop various reporting
mechanisms and sanctions compliance systems irrespective of costs,
and the tangled web of the sanctions regime carried severe penalties
for noncompliance, with billions of dollars in fines accumulating from
sometimes-unintentional violators.339 Numerous business sectors also
faced cumbersome artificial costs, such as US airlines being required
to shell out millions a year for air traffic control services when flying
over Iran.340 Additionally, US firms racked up a growing list of
opportunity costs, sometimes bypassing deals valued in billions of
dollars and losing such projects to European competitors.341 Despite
the clear competitive advantage congressionally granted to Europe,
US companies routinely indicated their desire to open up shop and/or

GLOBALSECURITY,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/industry.htm
(last
visited Apr. 9, 2016).
338. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 10; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 484 (assessing the US costs of the sanctions regime).
339. See Anderson, Good Grief!, supra note 47, at 143-44; Alexei Monsaat,
Encouraging Public-Private Partnerships to Fight Financial Crime, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 8
(Oct.
2012),
https://risk.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/1210-Public-PrivatePartnership-Fin-Crime-TR-Atl-Council.pdf (noting reporting costs absorbed by US firms); see
also Eric Lorber & Elizabeth Rosenberg, Dollar Diplomacy in Tehran: How Promoting
Business in Iran Boosts the Nuclear Agreement, FOREIGN AFF. (July 15, 2015), https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-07-15/dollar-diplomacy-tehran; Xian, supra note 201, at
633-34 (addressing the civil liabilities and fines faced by US firms). For example, Lloyd’s
Banking Group was fined US$350 million in 2009, and Credit Suisse was charged US$536
million later that year. See Levitt, Financial Sanctions, supra note 147, at 125; BMI
RESEARCH, IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015 36 (2015). Even minor
transactions entailed steep punishment. In 2015, PayPal and OFAC reached a US$7.7 million
settlement for 131 transactions amounting to a value of US$7,091. See Roland L. Trope,
Surprise in the Package Deal with Iran, BUS. L. TODAY, 4 (Aug. 2015).
340. See Clawson, supra note 27, at 117; Regime Wants More Planes Flying Over Iran
(& Paying), INT’L IRAN TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), http://iran-times.com/regime-wants-moreplanes-flying-over-iran-paying/ (discussing sanctions’ impact on international airline costs).
Payments to Iran for air traffic control services were specifically allowed by OFAC. See
OFAC FAQs: Iran Sanctions, US DEP’T TREASURY, ¶ 417 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_iran.aspx#aviation.
341. See Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2460-63 (“Iran remains largely unaffected by
ILSA because the country’s investment needs are met by the myriad of non-American
companies eager to do business there. Meanwhile, American companies suffer the sanctions’
impact acutely.”). Conoco’s loss of its Sirri oil field contract to Total S.A. represents only one
major example. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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find a way to return to Iran.342 In the end, such proposals were usually
outweighed by the legality risks that sanctions implied.343 Finally,
beyond the United States, the sanctions regime inflicted broad and
obvious damage to global oil supplies as well as global free trade.344
2. Political Costs
The sanctions regime also carried numerous political costs, both
in Iran and elsewhere.345 First, at the outset, it merits recognition that
sanctions were never inevitable or preordained: rather, sanctioning
policy was always itself a political choice.346 Furthermore, for the
United States, adopting such policies often entailed a problematic
one-way road: while sanctions could be easily made, they could not
be easily unmade.347 Thus, in employing sanctions toward Iran, there
was always a real risk of Washington painting itself into a political
342. See Layla Nouraee, Reassessing US Policy Toward Iran: Stimulating Reform
Through Economic Means, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 535, 560 (2002) (arguing that
sanctions granted European nations a competitive advantage over US firms); see also
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 397-99
(pointing out Conoco’s continuing desire to enter Iran, after being blocked by the Clinton
administration). Indeed, Conoco made various unsuccessful lobbying attempts to ease
sanctions throughout the late 1990s, and was actually considering an expansion of Iranian
operations through a British subsidiary in 2001. See id. at 399.
343. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 399; see also supra notes 339-42 and accompanying text (highlighting the costs
associated with doing business in Iran).
344. See Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2459; McCary, supra note 119, at n.16
(exploring the sanctions regime’s impact on global oil supplies). However, this trend was
mitigated by rapid increases in US shale production throughout the late sanctions regime. See
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 463. See
also Breckinridge, supra, at 2445 (assessing the costs to global trade). These trends had a
major impact on developing economies in particular. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 279.
345. See infra notes 346-72 and accompanying text.
346. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 258-59 (“American officials tended to respond to the
worst of Iranian rhetoric . . . Rather than rising above the ugliness emanating from some
quarters in Tehran and Qom, the officials forged a trade sanctions policy in response to it.”);
cf. Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117 (“[a] striking feature of recent exchanges on
[the prospects of a nuclear deal with Iran] is the tendency for both sides to focus almost
entirely on various negative outcomes and to devote little attention to the potential upside of a
deal.”).
347. See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, SPIDER WEB: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF IRAN
SANCTIONS, MIDDLE EAST REPORT NO. 138 (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/m
edia/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Iran/138-spider-web-themaking-and-unmaking-of-iran-sanctions.pdf; Peter D. Feaver & Eric Lorber, Penalty Box:
How Sanctions Trap Policymakers, FOREIGN AFF. (June 6, 2014), https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-06-06/penalty-box (describing the difficulty of
unwinding sanctinos once they are imposed).
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corner, unable to shift course as circumstances changed.348 Sanctions
also often had an obfuscating effect on US foreign policy, resulting in
Washington’s allowing tactical economic pressure to stand in the
place of actual strategy—whether concerning Iran’s nuclear program
or other foreign policy issues.349 Such an absence of strategy often led
to confusing results.350 Thus, while sanctions toward the Islamic
Republic were usually premised on targeting the Iranian government
and helping the people of Iran, a Gallup poll from 2013 found that
forty-seven percent of Iranians blamed the United States for their
nation’s economic turmoil, against just ten percent who blamed the
regime in Tehran.351
Such polling is indicative of a wider political cost of the
sanctions regime: the “rally around the flag” mentality that resulted
from sanctions.352 With a history extending back to numerous preIslamic Persian empires, Iranians are often described as a “notoriously
proud” people.353 To think that they might have surrendered their
348. See Feaver & Lorber, supra note 347; see also SPIDER WEB: THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF IRAN SANCTIONS, supra note 347, at 4 (“[u]ltimately, sanctions as a tool of
coercive diplomacy are only as effective as the prospect of relieving them in exchange for
policy shifts is real; the measure of efficacy lies in what can be obtained when they are
removed, not what happens when they are imposed . . . in the Iranian case, the situation at best
is murky in this regard.”). While it amounts to mere speculation, one might question whether
Washington’s relationship with President Khatami could have been different, were it not for
the preexisting sanctions already in place against Iran.
349. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 471–72 (reporting on the cumbersome nature of sanctions); Clawson, supra note 27, at
115–16 (inferring the strategic confusion that resulted from US sanctions against Iran).
350. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
351. See Clawson, supra note 27, at 116-17; Wolfe, supra note 29, at 12 (explaining the
sanction’s regime intended purpose of targeting the regime, but not the population of Iran); see
also MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 483;
Mohamed Younis, Iranians Feel Bite of Sanctions, Blame U.S., Not Own Leaders, GALLUP
(Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160358/iranians-feel-bite-sanctions-blame-notown-leaders.aspx (assessing Iranian attitudes toward the sanctions regime).
352. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 356; see also SPIDER WEB: THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF IRAN SANCTIONS, supra note 347, at i (“the one thing considered more perilous
than suffering from sanctions is surrendering to them; persuaded the West is intent on toppling
the regime, the leadership views economic steps as just one in a panoply of measures designed
to destabilise it. Its strategy, rooted in the experience of diplomatic isolation and the war with
Iraq, can be summed up in two words: resist and survive, the former being the prerequisite to
the latter.”).
353. See Robin Wright, The Challenge of Iran, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at
5; see also Barbara Slavin, Iranian People Act More Resigned Than Revolutionary These
Days, AL-MONITOR (Sept. 2, 2012), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/almonitor/iran-beyond-the-slogans-a-nation.html# (“Iranians remain a proud people who bristle
at the negative stereotypes about them so often propagated in the West.”).
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sovereignty to the economic coercion of foreigners seems somewhat
disingenuous.354 Ayatollah Khamenei often met Washington’s threats
with his own nationalist retorts.355 Likewise, US sanctions were often
used as a scapegoat to undermine the regime’s own genuine
problems, such as the economic mismanagement under
Ahmadinejad.356 It is probably also true that sanctions left Iran feeling
threatened and cornered, a trend hardly constructive toward
dissuading it from seeking nuclear weapons.357 There is also ample
evidence to suggest that international coercion undermined moderates
like President Khatami within Iranian domestic politics.358
Another political consequence of the sanctions regime has been
the gradual empowerment of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which has
played an increasing role in Iran’s economy throughout the past
decade.359 With close ties to Khamenei and an important economic
player since Iran’s post-Iraq War reconstruction, the IRGC has been
strengthened by Washington’s sanction policies.360 Increased business
354. See Jim Walsh, Ten Days in Tehran: Nuclear Weapons, Policy, and Theory, MIT
SEC. STUD. PROGRAM SEMINAR (May 3, 2006), http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_
archives06spring/walsh.htm (“I believe that domestic political dynamics are critical in the
formulation of Iranian nuclear policy . . . national pride is the main driver in [Iran’s nuclear
ambitions].”); David J. Lynch, Nuclear program a source of Pride for Iranians, USA TODAY
(Aug. 28, 2006, 1:32 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-08-28-irancover_x.htm (contextualizing the role of national pride in the Iranian nuclear program).
355. MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28,
at 473–74 (“[t]oday the Iranian nation has achieved some capabilities which have caused those
who imposed sanctions on us to become agitated and worried about the Iranian nation
becoming the number one military power in the region. Well, this was the result of your
sanctions. These sanctions didn’t work to our detriment. We were able to create an opportunity
out of this threat. It’s the same today. We are not afraid of Western sanctions. With the
blessing of God, the Iranian nation, in the face of any sanction or economic embargo, will
demonstrate an effort which will double or increase its progress by many folds.”).
356. See Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2457; MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 366 (positing the regime’s tendency to
use sanctions as a scapegoat for internal problems).
357. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 479; Ray Takeyh, Time for Détente With Iran, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar/Apr, 2007), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2007-03-01/time-d-tente-iran (connecting Iran’s national
security fears to the desire for nuclear weapons).
358. See Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2457–58; MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 479 (evaluating the impact of sanctions
on Iran’s domestic politics).
359. See IRAN: COUNTRY RISK REPORT, supra note 161, at 10; MALONEY, IRAN'S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 342 (theorizing on the rise of
the IRGC).
360. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 479; Alireza Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at

902

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:839

costs for their local and foreign competitors resulting from sanctions
have presented the IRGC with a strong upper hand within the
domestic economy.361 At the same time, the award of massive energy
development contracts to the IRGC’s construction arm represent
projects that likely would have gone to international players, were it
not for the limitations of sanctions.362 While privatization efforts
benefiting the IRGC under President Ahmadinejad were in part
politically motivated, here too sanctions weighed heavy, as the
government later admitted that numerous spin-offs to IRGC-affiliated
firms were inspired out of the need to shore up confidence in the
nation’s sanctions-straddled economy.363 In this light, much of the
shadow economy awarded to the IRGC was a direct consequence of
Washington’s economic coercion.364

59; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 315 (establishing the link between sanctions and the
rise of the IRGC). The relationship between Khamenei and the IRGC extends back to his first
days as Supreme Leader and his need to establish a domestic powerbase following the death of
Khomeini. See Milani, The Green Movement, supra note 105, at 42; Ali Alfoneh, All the
Guard’s Men: Iran’s Silent Revolution, WORLD AFF. J. (Sept./Oct. 2010),
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/all-guards-men-irans-silent-revolution. For the
IRGC’s economic role in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, see Nader, The Revolutionary
Guards, supra, at 60.
361. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 315; Milani, The Green Movement, supra
note 105, at 42 (noting the competitive advantage within Iran possessed by the IRGC).
362. See, e.g., MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra
note 28, at 340 (“[i]n 2009, the fund reportedly disbursed $1 billion to [the IRGC] to help fund
projects that the IRGC’s construction wing had been awarded in the development of the South
Pars gas reservoir.”); see also CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 315 (“[g]overnment
contracts were preferentially allocated to such [IRGC] firms, especially after the US embargo
prevented foreign firms from operating in Iran.”); FREDERIC WEHREY ET AL., RAND
CORPORATION, THE RISE OF THE PASDARAN: ASSESSING THE DOMESTIC ROLES OF IRAN’S
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS 71 (2009), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf (“[a]s an economic organization more interested
in monopoly rather than open competition, the IRGC may wish to keep Iran’s economy closed
off and under its tight control. If this is the case, U.S. and international sanctions may not
weaken the IRGC, but instead enhance its formal and illicit economic capabilities”).
363. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 347 (classifying some high-profile contract awards as merely “for show”); Bijan
Khajehpour, Iran Shifts to Lower Gear in Privatization, AL-MONITOR (Oct. 8, 2013),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/iran-privatization-organization-newfocus.html# (“Assadollah Asgaroladi, a leading businessman, describes the privatization
performance in the Ahmadinejad era as a ‘farce’ and believes that the economy’s resources are
not at the disposal of the real private sector.”).
364. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 343; Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, supra note 360, at 59 (detailing the extent of the
IRGC’s role across Iran’s economy). It is also relevant that Iran’s various smuggling channels
were administered and operated by individual members of the IRGC, leading to corrupt private
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Additionally, the steady intensification of sanctions provided
significant alteration of Iran’s political ties over time.365 In some cases
this resulted in the direct empowerment of US adversaries like Russia
and China, with China in particular benefiting from the late sanctions
regime as European players were pressured to exit the country.366
Likewise, Iran’s turn to “alternative allies” in Africa and South
America represents an interesting new challenge for US foreign
policy.367 While such a development is not problematic in itself, the
zero-sum nature of sanctions provide for a conflict of influence,
whereby future US efforts to cooperate with these States will be
required to overcome the Iranian interests that such close friendships
have generated.368 Finally, perhaps one of the most destructive trends
of the sanctions regime, US economic coercion has indirectly
contributed to wider regional tensions between the Middle East’s
Sunni and Shi’ite communities.369 Although from Damascus to Sana’a
such conflicts are often couched in sectarian explanations, much of
the ongoing proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia can be
attributed to the shifting power dynamics and divergent oil politics of
these two massive petroleum-exporting governments.370 This
divergence itself has been spurned by international sanctions.371

enrichment. See Correspondent in Tehran, supra note 336; WEHREY ET AL., supra note 362, at
64–66 (suggesting the IRGC’s participation in Iran’s smuggling networks).
365. See infra notes 366–67 and accompanying text.
366. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 407–09; John W. Garver, China’s Iran Policies, Testimony before the US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission on China’s Current and Emerging Foreign Policy
Priorities (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/4.13.11Garver.pdf, 8–11
(reviewing China’s increased economic participation in Iran, following the exit of Europe).
367. See Steven Heydemann, Iran’s Alternative Allies, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note
12, at 193; Joseph Hammond, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s African Safari, DIPLOMAT (June 18,
2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/mahmoud-ahmadinejads-african-safari/; Ely Karmon,
Iran in Latin America: President Rouhani’s Era, INT’L INST. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM (Oct.
21, 2014), http://www.ict.org.il/Article/1234/Iran-in-Latin-America-President-Rouhanis-Era
(considering Iran’s refocus to non-traditional economic partners).
368. See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
369. See infra note 370–72 and accompanying text.
370. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 479; Molavi, supra note 149, at 161 (distinguishing the role of oil politics in tensions
between Iran and Saudi Arabia).
371. See Mohsen M. Milani, Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off: The Growing Rivalry
Between Tehran and Riyadh, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 11, 2011), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/middle-east/2011-10-11/iran-and-saudi-arabia-square (explaining how the relative
elevation of Saudi Arabia has spurned wide Iranian countermeasures); Reza Sanati, The Saudi
Oil War on Iran, NAT’L INTEREST (Mar. 13, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-
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Furthermore, the isolation of Iran from the international community
has both increased the stakes of these proxy conflicts and undermined
any possibility of a political solution in brutal crises like the current
civil war raging in Syria.372
3. Humanitarian Costs
Finally, the costs of sanctions on Iran have also involved a
troubling human dimension.373 At the academic level, sanctions often
entail unanticipated humanitarian costs, even when narrowly targeted
upon a problematic regime.374 Under any sanctions policy, access to
food, medicine, education, and the prosperity of a target-nation’s
middle class are all vulnerable grounds for collateral damage.375 In
fact, sanctions toward Iran have witnessed emergencies in each of
these categories.376 Iranian food security was on occasion
compromised by sanctions, particularly during periods of high
inflation, when the costs of chicken and other meat outpaced Iranians’
ability to afford these basic staples.377 Although approximately ninety
percent of Iranian pharmaceutical demand is manufactured
domestically, sanctions also restricted the importation of required
saudi-oil-war-iran-8214 (recounting Saudi Arabia’s history of strategic interference with Iran’s
oil capabilities).
372. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 480 (demonstrating the escalation of Saudi-Iranian tensions in Syria); Laurence Norman,
Saudi Arabia – Iran Talks Needed for Syria Breakthrough, Says United Nations Envoy, WALL
STREET J., Sept. 11, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-iran-talks-needed-forsyria-breakthrough-says-united-nations-envoy-1441900196 (citing the need for Iranian
cooperation in order to solve the Syria catastrophe).
373. See infra notes 374–89 and accompanying text.
374. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 12 (“[t]he chain reaction triggered by the imposition of
economic sanctions sends shockwaves throughout the target nation’s economy causing
undesired humanitarian costs. Sanctions are not effective unless they impose costs to the
targeted nation, but the effects on the public of the targeted nation are vast, extending far
beyond the intended harm.”); see also David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction:
Assessing Smart Sanctions: Lessons from the 1990s, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING
ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 13–14 (2002) (noting the humanitarian costs of even extremely
focused travel sanctions).
375. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 12–14; MANUEL BESSLER ET AL., SANCTIONS
ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, U.N. INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE 63 (2004) (assessing
the many ways that sanctions may jeopardize target nation civilians).
376. See infra notes 377-81 and accompanying text.
377. The “Chicken Crisis” of 2012 provides a glimpse at one such episode. See
MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 1–4
(illustrating the Chicken Crisis); cf. Wolfe, supra note 29, at 19 (contextualizing such
sanctions-related food shortages).
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medicinal ingredients, resulting in drug shortages.378 As wealthy
Iranians faced with market insecurity stockpiled medication, such
drug shortages were further compounded.379 Iranian students studying
abroad were particularly affected by Washington’s financial
sanctions, which created a firewall between them and their bank
accounts.380 Across the wider economy, shortfalls in the availability
of spare parts also harmed ordinary Iranian citizens, a trend especially
true within Iran’s airline industry.381
Another disturbing consequence of international sanctions has
been the disempowerment of Iran’s middle class.382 Considering the
historical role played by this demographic in mobilizing Iranian social
and political change, this consequence should strike Washington as
counterproductive.383 Periods of high inflation resulting from
sanctions fell especially hard on Iranian wage earners.384 At the same
time, lack of access to credit within Iran’s private sector emaciated
the ability of small firms to meet their ongoing business needs.385

378. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 20; A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324, at 143–51
(emphasizing the costs of sanctions on Iranian medicine).
379. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 20; Marcus George & Zahra Hosseinian, Sanctions,
Government Blamed for Iran’s Drugs Shortage, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-iran-medicine-idUSBRE8B40NM20121205 (noting the effects of medicine
stockpiling consumer behavior).
380. See generally Meshkat, supra note 200 (assessing the overall impact of sanctions on
Iranian-Americans and Iranians within the United States); see also Tara Bahrampour,
Sanctions Squeeze Iranian Students Abroad, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2013, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/sanctions-squeeze-iranian-students-abroad/2013/01/26/f40696045f1d-11e2-b05a-605528f6b712_story.html (considering the damage of sanctions on Iranian
international students).
381. Whereas Iran Air was rated the second-safest airline in the world before the
Revolution, approximately 1,700 Iranians have been killed in aviation disasters since 1979.
See Maysam Bizær, Even Without Sanctions, Iranian Aviation Faces Turbulent Future, ALMONITOR (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/iran-aviationrevival.html; Thomas Erdbrink, Iran’s Aging Airliner Fleet Seen as Faltering Under U.S.
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/14/world/middleeast/
irans-airliners-falter-under-sanctions.html (reviewing the death toll from Iranian aviation
crashes).
382. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 261; Wolfe, supra note 29, at 14 (asserting the
sanctions regime’s role in undermining Iran’s middle class); see also Harris, The Bazaar,
supra note 50, at 109 (examining Iran’s Bazaari class in particular).
383. See Anderson, Good Grief!, supra note 47, at 145–46; FISK, supra note 45, at 110
(distinguishing the role of Iran’s middle class in past movements for social change).
384. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 114; A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324,
at 99 (characterizing the impact of inflation on Iranian wages).
385. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 5;
Abigail Fielding-Smith, Iran’s credit crunch, NEWSTATESMAN (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.
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And, like in any economy, the idea that targeted sanctions might
eviscerate key revenue generating sectors without systemically
impacting aggregate demand represents shoddy economics and naïve
idealism.386 In this sense, removing sales from Iran’s petroleum sector
implied reduced domestic consumption across the economy; the same
consumption that comprises the income of ordinary Iranian smallbusinesses and shopkeepers.387 Finally, as noted above, the sanctions
regime has intensified regional conflict throughout the whole Middle
East.388 Considering the vast humanitarian destruction caused by these
regional conflicts, it is apparent that the human costs of sanctioning
Iran have extended well beyond the Persian Plateau.389
D. The JPA
Considering the costs of the sanctions regime highlighted in Part
I.C, it is not surprising that a moderate, perhaps even reform-minded
conservative like President Hassan Rouhani was looking for serious
change upon his election in 2013.390 Already in February of that year,
negotiations were taking place between the P5+1 and Iran, with secret
bilateral talks simultaneously occurring between the United States and
Iran.391 Upon Rouhani’s election in July, President Obama shared a
rare telephone conversation with the new Iranian President,
newstatesman.com/asia/2009/04/iran-credit-ahmadinejad-crisis (overviewing Iran’s credit
crunch).
386. See generally DAVID A. MOSS, A CONCISE GUIDE TO MACROECONOMICS 72–83
(2007); Aggregate Demand, EXPERIMENTAL ECON. CTR., http://www.econport.org/content/
handbook/ADandS/AD.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (explaining aggregate demand’s role
in a market’s wider economy).
387. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 13–14; Beheshteh Farshneshani, In Iran, Sanctions
Hurt the Wrong People, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2013/11/19/sanctions-successes-and-failures/in-iran-sanctions-hurt-the-wrong-people (arguing
that sanctions have devastated the livelihoods of ordinary Iranians).
388. See supra notes 369–71 and accompanying text (noting how sanctions increased
regional tensions).
389. See Islam’s Old Schism: Sunnis v Shias, Here and There, ECONOMIST (June 29,
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21580162-sectarian-rivalryreverberating-region-making-many-muslims; Charlotte Alfred, Explosions Hurt More
Civilians in Yemen than in Syria This Year, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/yemen-war-statistics_5605a0e1e4b0af3706dc4104 (assessing the
horrific casualties resulting from current sectarian tensions).
390. See supra Part I.C (assessing the costs of the sanctions regime).
391. See Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 109 (providing an overview of the
JPA’s foundations); see also Bradley Klapper et al., Secret US-Iran Talks Set Stage for Nuke
Deal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 24, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/secret-us-iran-talksset-stage-nuke-deal (detailing the secret negotiation process between Washington and Tehran).
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representing the first direct communication between leaders on both
sides since 1979.392
Eventually, the result of the ongoing negotiating efforts between
the P5+1 and Iran, and the separate bilateral talks between the United
States and Iran, was the Joint Plan of Action, signed on November 24,
2013.393 At its broadest level, the JPA promised a six-month freeze on
Iran’s nuclear development program, in exchange for limited
sanctions relief and voluntary commitments not to seek new sanctions
against Iran.394 Within this six-month window the parties envisioned
further negotiations in hopes of achieving a permanent, final-status
nuclear deal.395 Notably, everything agreed upon in the JPA consisted
of non-binding “voluntary measures,” which allowed for continued
good faith negotiations and flexibility in the event that a legal
technicality might prohibit a party from fulfilling its obligations under
the JPA.396
In total, the JPA consisted of approximately US$7 billion of
sanctions relief.397 However, the interim agreement also retained most
392. Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 109; President Barack Obama,
Statement by the President, The White House (Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2013/09/27/statement-president (detailing Obama’s phone conversation with
Rouhani).
393. See JPA, supra note 182.
394. See JPA, supra note 182; see also Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 110
(providing an overview of the JPA). For a detailed table highlighting the JPA’s agreed terms,
see Bhala, supra note 27, at 347–52.
395. See JPA, supra note 182; Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 110 (“The
goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution
that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful.”).
396. See JPA, supra note 182; Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 112 (“The
Joint Plan of Action does not appear to be binding as a matter of international law.”). Say, for
example, that the US State Department promises to lift all sanctions related to a particular
Iranian industry, but then finds that Congressional action has made the executive branch
unable to do so without legislative approval. The softness of the JPA’s nonbinding measures
seem to encourage ongoing negotiations, whereas a more rigid system might have resulted in a
deal-killing formal breach. See id.
397. Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 113. In regards to the sanctions regime,
the JPA requested that the P5+1 voluntarily undertake the following measures: to pause all
efforts to further reduce Iran’s crude oil sales; to suspend sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical
industry, precious metals and gold, and Iran’s auto industry; to license the supply and
installation of spare parts related to Iran’s civil aviation program; to promise against new
nuclear-related sanctions in either the EU or the UN Security Council; to promise against new
nuclear-related sanctions in the United States, “acting consistent with the respective roles of
the President and the Congress;” to establish a financial channel to allow for humanitarian
trade supporting Iran’s domestic needs, to be paid from Iranian frozen assets held abroad; and
finally, the unfreezing of an unspecified amount of Iranian oil revenues locked up overseas.
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of Washington’s unilateral sanctions, including its extraterritorial
financial sanctions, keeping approximately US$30 billion out of the
hands of the Islamic Republic over the course of its six-month
negotiating period.398 Still, in releasing some of the coercive power
that had been constructed throughout previous decades, the JPA
represented a major shift in the sanctions regime, indicating a new
possibility of the end of the sanctions era.399 After intense and
protracted ongoing negotiations, and various extensions of the JPA’s
initial negotiating deadline, Iran and the P5+1 finally reached a finalstatus deal on July 14, 2015.400 Following the signing of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action in Vienna, Iran would officially
transition into the post-sanctions era.401 The next Part of this Note will
explore this transition, and what it means for international investment
within the Islamic Republic of Iran.
II. IRAN’S POST-SANCTIONS TRANSITION
After almost forty years of increasingly limited international
investment in Iran under the sanctions regime, the signing of the
JCPOA in July 2015 opens a new horizon for parties seeking to invest
in Iran.402 To understand the magnitude of this change, one must look
first to the JCPOA itself and what it allows, and then to the emerging
investment environment in Iran.403 This Part of the Note will explore
these issues.

See JPA, supra note 182; see also Bhala, supra note 27, at 347 (cataloging the sanctions to be
lifted under the JPA).
398. David S. Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence,
Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Dec. 12,
2013),
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/12/20131212288869.html#
axzz2nO6bGXbS (noting the US$30 billion of sanctions still in effect within the JPA’s sixmonth negotiating period); Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 113.
399. Compare supra Part I.B, with supra notes 393–98.
400. See JCPOA, supra note 185; see also Ishaan Tharoor, The Historic Nuclear Deal
with Iran: How It Works, WASH. POST, July 14, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/2015/07/14/the-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran-how-it-works/ (summarizing
the JCPOA).
401. See JCPOA, supra note 185.
402. Compare supra Part I.B (examining the legal framework of the sanctions regime),
with infra Part II.A (summarizing the JCPOA).
403. See infra Parts II.A–B.
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The JCPOA

As noted above, the JCPOA has been nothing short of
controversial, in terms of what the deal means for stake-holding
parties concerned with Iran’s nuclear capabilities and its wider role in
the Middle East region.404 Although scrutiny of the JCPOA’s
restrictions on Iran’s nuclear development is not the focus of this
Note, the deal’s sanctions-lifting provisions are crucial to
understanding the opportunities and limitations of international
investment in post-sanctions Iran.405 This Part examines the contents
of the JCPOA.406
1. The Agreement
At its broadest level, the JCPOA, like the JPA preceding it, seeks
to impose restrictions upon Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for
international sanctions relief.407 In terms of structure, the JCPOA is
comprised of a short main body text and five more specific
annexes.408 Annex I deals with nuclear-related provisions, placing
monitoring and development restrictions upon Iran’s nuclear
program.409 Annex II deals with sanctions-related commitments,
detailing the specifics of the lifting of sanctions.410 Annex III involves
civil nuclear cooperation, providing measures related to ongoing
international involvement in Iran’s domestic nuclear program.411
Annex IV creates an institutional Joint Commission, which is tasked
with overseeing the deal’s implementation and ensuring ongoing
compliance.412 Finally, Annex V is procedural, dealing with the
JCPOA’s implementation plan and how different phases of the
agreement will be adopted and triggered.413
Under the JCPOA’s preamble and general provisions, the deal
promises to “produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security
Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions
404. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
405. See infra notes 407–45 and accompanying text.
406. Compare infra notes 408–27, and accompanying text, with supra Part I.D.
407. See generally JCPOA, supra note 185; Tharoor, The Historic Nuclear Deal with
Iran: How It Works, supra note 400 (summarizing the JCPOA).
408. See JCPOA, supra note 185.
409. See id. at Annex I.
410. See id. at Annex II.
411. See id. at Annex III.
412. See id. at Annex IV.
413. See id. at Annex V.
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related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in
areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.”414 As detailed in
Annex V, this process is to occur in separate phases.415 Of note,
“Adoption Day” is the date set ninety days after the JCPOA’s
endorsement by the UN Security Council, at which point all parties
“will make necessary arrangements and preparations for the
implementation of their JCPOA commitments.”416 Upon the IAEA’s
determination that Iran is complying with its nuclear commitments,
“Implementation Day” triggers the lifting of sanctions by the EU and
United States.417 Eight years after Adoption Day, or upon the IAEA’s
determination that all of Iran’s nuclear program remains exclusively
peaceful, “Transition Day” triggers further sanctions relief, requiring
the United States to “seek such legislative action as may be
appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of”
various military-related statutory sanctions, specified within Annex
II.418 Finally, ten years after Adoption Day, “Termination Day”
provides further EU sanctions relief, and sunsets the JCPOA thereby
freeing Iran and all parties from its provisions.419
The terms of the JCPOA were made binding via Security
Council ratification on July 20, 2015.420 In the event that any party
deviates from its commitments under the nuclear deal, the JCPOA
contains a dispute resolution procedure detailed in Paragraphs 36 and
37 of the main body.421 In the event that a dispute is not resolved, the
JCPOA triggers a “snapback procedure,” which forces the Security
Council to automatically re-impose the multilateral sanctions initially

414. Id. § v.
415. See infra note 416 and accompanying text.
416. JCPOA, supra note 185, § 34(ii). Adoption day occurred on October 18, 2015. See
Press Statement, John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action (Oct. 18, 2015), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/10/248311.htm.
417. JCPOA, supra note 185, § 34(iii); see id. at Annex V §§ 16-17. Implementation
Day officially occurred on January 16, 2016. See John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on
Implementation Day (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/01/
251336.htm; David E. Sanger, Iran Complies with Nuclear Deal; Sanctions Are Lifted, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/middleeast/iran-sanctionslifted-nuclear-deal.html.
418. JCPOA, supra note 185, § 34(iv), at Annex V § 21; see id. at Annex II §§ 4.1–.5,
.7, .9 (listing the US statutory sanctions that should be terminated under the deal).
419. See id. § 34(v).
420. See S.C. Res. 2231 (July 20, 2015).
421. See JCPOA, supra note 185, §§ 36–37.
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lifted by the JCPOA.422 This in effect enables any permanent member
of the Security Council to block sanctions relief without allowing
such members to veto the re-imposition of sanctions.423
For international investors that have long been eyeing Iran, the
JCPOA’s “comprehensive lifting” of sanctions language will likely
inspire enthusiasm.424 However, taking a closer look at what the
JCPOA actually accomplishes, for many investors such enthusiasm
remains premature.425 This is especially true for US investors, who
may find themselves uniquely bound by the remaining relics of
Washington’s four-decades unilateral sanctions regime, with no easy
escape route in sight.426 The JCPOA itself anticipates this inability for
the United States government to comprehensively lift sanctions,
detailing tailored US sanctions-lifting procedures.427
2. US Sanctions Lifting Under Section 4 of Annex II of the JCPOA:
The “Footnote Six” Issue
Washington’s JCPOA sanctions-lifting commitments are spelled
out in Section 4 of Annex II.428 In addition to the limited sanctions
relief previously provided under the JPA, the JCPOA mandates that
the United States waive specified nuclear-related sanctions
concerning Iran’s financial and banking sectors; insurance and
underwriting; Iran’s energy and petrochemicals sectors; shipping,
shipbuilding, and Iranian ports; gold and other precious metals;
software and metals; and Iran’s automotive sector.429 Additionally,
the United States is required to remove specified entities from its lists
of blocked persons, curtail extraordinary nuclear non-proliferation
measures targeting Iran, and commit itself to granting various trade

422. See id.; Tharoor, The Historic Nuclear Deal with Iran: How It Works, supra note
400 (“If Iran violates any terms of the deal, sanctions could be snapped back within 65 days.”).
423. See Michele Kelemen, A Look at How Sanctions Would ‘Snap Back’ If Iran
Violates Nuke Deal, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 21, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/20/
424571368/if-iran-violates-nuke-deal-a-look-at-how-sanctions-would-snap-back (explaining
the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism); Ankit Panda, How the Iran Deal’s ‘Snap Back’
Mechanism Will Keep Tehran Compliant, DIPLOMAT (July 15, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/
2015/07/how-the-iran-deals-snap-back-mechanism-will-keep-tehran-compliant/.
424. See infra Part II.B.
425. See infra Part II.A.2.
426. See infra Part II.A.2.
427. See JCPOA, supra note 185, at Annex II § 4.
428. See id.
429. See id. at Annex II §§ 4.1–.7.
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licenses for US-owned subsidiaries doing business in Iran.430
Furthermore, the JCPOA commits the United States to end its practice
of enforcing secondary nuclear-related sanctions, previously applied
to international entities that engage in or indirectly facilitate
prohibited transactions with the US sanction regime’s direct targets.431
Indeed, in OFAC’s initial guidance following the publication of the
JCPOA, the agency stated, “[United States] sanctions relief will be
provided through the suspension and eventual termination of nuclearrelated secondary sanctions, beginning once the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies that Iran has implemented key
nuclear-related measures described in the JCPOA (Implementation
Day).”432
Foremost, it is crucial for all international investors to realize
that the US sanctions being lifted apply only to those related to Iran’s
nuclear program, and not to sanctions involving Iran’s support for
terrorism, ballistic missile and conventional arms proliferation, or
Iranian human rights abuses.433 As highlighted above, parsing out the
sanctions regime into these distinct categories is a messy endeavor.434
But perhaps more crucially, investors in the United States need to
realize that even under the JCPOA’s nuclear-related sanction waivers,
US entities will remain bound to the existing US sanctions regime.
Buried deep within the JCPOA, footnote six of Annex II provides in
part:
430. See id. at Annex II § 4.8 (detailing the delisting of specified entities); id. at Annex II
§ 4.9 (noting nuclear proliferation-related measures); id. at Annex II § 5 (dealing with other
trade measures, including the US granting of trade licenses).
431. See id. at Annex II § 7; see also KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS, supra note 228, at 59
(“The U.S. sanctions that are to be suspended are primarily those that sanction foreign entities
and countries for conducting specified transactions with Iran (so-called ‘secondary
sanctions’).”).
432. Trope, supra note 339, at 2.
433. See Ellie Geranmayeh, Explainer: The Iran Nuclear Deal, EUR. COUNCIL FOREIGN
REL. (July 17, 2015), http://www.ecfr.eu/article/iran_explainer3070 (“US sanctions on Iran
targeting human rights, terrorism and missile activities remain.”); see also KATZMAN, IRAN
SANCTIONS, supra note 228, at 60 (“The JCPOA does not commit the United States to suspend
U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism or human rights abuses, and on proliferation-sensitive
technology.”).
434. See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text (overviewing the complexity and
overlapping rationales for the sanctions regime); see also Trope, supra note 339, at 3
(“However, the more one rereads the JCPOA (and multiple re-readings are a necessity), the
more one realizes that implementation of sanctions relief by the United States will be difficult
to map out and challenging to explain.”). Fortunately, experts and analysts have provided
helpful guidance on this task. See generally RENNACK, supra note 194; Katzman, Easing US
Sanctions on Iran, supra note 199 (exploring the unwinding of sanctions).
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The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply, and
subsequently terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination
of, pursuant to its commitment under Section 4 are those directed
towards non-U.S. persons . . . U.S. persons and U.S.- owned or
-controlled foreign entities will continue to be generally
prohibited from conducting transactions of the type permitted
pursuant to this JCPOA, unless authori[z]ed to do so by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC).435

Thus, footnote six discriminates between US and non-US
investors.436 The same exact rules and enforcement measures being
waived for international players are, under footnote six, still in full
force for US investors interested in exploring the investment
opportunities of post-sanctions Iran.437 Whereas US-owned or
controlled foreign subsidiaries are still provided an alternative path to
Iran via waivers in JCPOA Annex II Section 5, US firms lacking
foreign subsidiaries appear to remain barred from investing in Iran.438
435. See JCPOA, supra note 185, at Annex II § 4 n.6.
436. See id.; see also Trope, supra note 339, at 1 (“Lawyers who have closely analyzed
the JCPOA reacted, in many instances, with incredulity on seeing this distinction and
understanding its impact on U.S. businesses. Clients informed by counsel of the distinction
have responded, ‘You can’t be serious.’”).
437. See generally Trope, supra note 339.
438. See JCPOA, supra note 185, at Annex II § 5.1.2 (“[The United States commits to
[l]icense non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities
with Iran that are consistent with this JCPOA”); Trope, supra note 339, at 3–4 (noting OFAC’s
discrimination between US firms and foreign firms in regards to post-sanctions Iran). Indeed,
following Implementation Day, OFAC carried out part of this commitment in the form of
General License H, which carves a path for US-owned foreign subsidiaries to legally conduct
deals in Iran. See JOHN E. SMITH, IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS AND SANCTIONS REGULATIONS 31
C.F.R. § 560, GENERAL LICENSE H, OFAC (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran_glh.pdf. However, even for US-owned foreign
subsidiaries, General License H sets extremely limited parameters that will actually shield US
parents from sanctions. The license provides US parent companies with a one-time waiver to
conduct initial corporate decision-making aimed at directing a US corporation’s foreign
subsidiaries to set up shop in Iran. Beyond this initial period, General License H requires that
fully automated systems are in place between the parent and subsidiary, which do not involve
any interaction between US persons and ongoing Iran-related transactions. See id.; see also H
Stands for “Holy Moly!”: JCPOA Implementation Day and Breaking Down OFAC General
License H, ARENT FOX (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.arentfox.com/newsroom/alerts/h-stands%E2%80%9Choly-moly%E2%80%9D-jcpoa-implementation-day-and-breaking-down-ofacgeneral-license#.VtiVS5MrLdc; Will McAuliffe & Sarah Weber, Understanding the Changes
to the Iran Sanctions Regime: OFAC Issues Guidance, General Licenses on JCPOA
Implementation Day, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://www.paulweiss.com/media/3322106/20jan16alert.pdf (dissecting OFAC’s General
License H).
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The effect of footnote six is to situate OFAC as the primary
license-granting gatekeeper for any US-based investment seeking to
enter Iran.439 As an initial matter, this procedural construction is
logical.440 Considering the precarious navigation of somewhat
malleable executive sanctions and more rigid legislative sanctions that
any US investment in Iran would have to traverse, it makes sense for
OFAC to ensure that each business relationship being initiated
complies with its own rules as well as the rules beyond the
executive’s control to manipulate, on a case-by-case basis.441
Likewise, this license-granting mechanism for US-owned foreign
subsidiaries does in theory allow for some semblance of government
oversight, ensuring—at least at the contracting phase—that US
subsidiaries outside the US enter relationships in Iran consistent with
Washington’s wider foreign policy interests.442 However, by limiting
US participation in Iran only to multinational corporations with nonUS subsidiaries, footnote six bars the participation of a great deal of
US investors potentially capable of fostering better US-Iran relations
and wider advancements of US foreign policy goals.443 Whereas the
distinction between US entities and non-US entities (in a way that
includes US foreign subsidiaries) is artificial in terms of effect, this
distinction is bound to ensure the survival of both US reputational
hazards involved in Iranian investment, as well as the wider ethos of
mistrust existing between both nations and their populations.444
439. See supra note 230 (noting OFAC’s role in the licensing process). Compare
JCPOA, supra note 185, at Annex II § 4 n.6 (clarifying restrictions against US firms from
operating in Iran), with Annex II § 5.1.2 (indicating the licensing option that will allow the
foreign subsidiaries of US firms to access Iran).
440. See infra notes 441–42 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 224–29 and accompanying text (noting competing waiver authority
between the US executive and legislative branches).
442. On this note, OFAC’s decision to opt for a general license—as opposed to a specific
license—in the form of General License H seems counterproductive. See SMITH, supra note
438; see also H Stands for “Holy Moly!”, supra note 438 (“Because [General License] H is a
general license it does not require any application for a specific license. In other words, now
that [General License] H is in effect, US-owned or -controlled foreign entities can use it BUT
must comply with its terms and not engage in any prohibited transactions.”).
443. See infra Part III.
444. This point is best demonstrated by a hypothetical. If, for example, “US Corporation
X” really desires to serve Iranian consumers, nothing in the JCPOA schema prevents the
corporation from forming “Foreign Subsidiary Y” and seeking an OFAC license to do so.
Economically, there is no material difference between this corporate structure and US
Corporation X directly bringing operations to Iran. However assuming such a license is
granted, one might ask what is lost in Iranian consumers interacting and forming relationships
with this detached subsidiary, as opposed to its US parent company. Likewise, such a schema
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Whatever might be said for footnote six and the US sanctionslifting procedures of the JCPOA, European and other international
investors are now, since Implementation Day, largely freed to engage
with Iran.445 To understand the impact of this development, one must
first appreciate the investment opportunities present in post-sanctions
Iran. The following Part provides a survey of these opportunities.
B.

Investor Opportunities

Since the deal’s signing in Vienna, the international business
community has overwhelmingly welcomed the JCPOA.446 Despite the
fact that the JCPOA falls short of comprehensive sanctions relief, the
relaxation of UN and European sanctions, as well as the nonenforcement of US secondary sanctions toward non-US persons, is
certain to change the investment landscape of modern Iran.
International investors looking to enter the country will be met with a
rich panorama of investment opportunities.447 Indeed, the sanctions
regime itself has transformed Iran into a rare untapped investment
arena, entailing all the potential awards (and risks) of a frontier FDI
destination.448
At the macroeconomic level, Iran boasts an economy of
approximately US$406 billion, making it the second-largest economy
in the region and the twenty-ninth largest in the world.449 Regionally

seems to prohibit ongoing US regulation and oversight of Foreign Subsidiary Y’s operations,
beyond the contracting and license-granting phase, in that ongoing operations will be carried
out not by a US corporation but by a foreign subsidiary beyond the direct jurisdiction of US
regulators.
445. See supra notes 435–38 and accompanying text (dealing with the JCPOA’s
discrimination between US and other international investors).
446. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1732 (noting the international business
community’s positive reaction to the JCPOA); Everett Rosenfeld et al., Iran Deal: Corporate
Winners from the Nuclear Agreement, CNBC (July 14, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/
2015/07/14/iran-deal-corporate-winners-from-the-nuclear-agreement.html (“[W]hile U.S. and
Iranian leaders have heralded the deal as a victory, the real winners could be corporations
across the globe.”).
447. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.
448. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.
449. See Vivienne Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, FORTUNE (Aug. 24 2015)
(sizing Iran’s economy at US$406 billion); Iran Overview, WORLD BANK, http://www.
worldbank.org/en/country/iran/overview (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (noting Iran’s second
largest economy in the Middle East-North Africa region); Jana Marais, Iran: Opportunity
Beckons, FINWEEK, July 30, 2015, at 12; Iran to Work with WB at Own Pace, FIN. TRIB.,
(Aug. 16, 2015), http://financialtribune.com/archive/2015/09/13/articles/economy-business-
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ranking in size behind only Egypt, the country’s population of
seventy-eight million inhabitants is young, educated, cosmopolitan,
and has money to spend.450 Additionally there is “a sizeable middle
class” in Iran, which in spite of the sanctions regime has seen rising
per capita incomes and improved standards of living over previous
decades.451 The nation also poses geo-strategic advantages for
international investors looking to set up shop in Iran.452 Existing rail
and highway linkages to neighboring States provide potential for Iran
to become the “key transit point for East-West trade” on a global
scale.453 Both inflation and unemployment have fallen since the
signing of the JCPOA, and international trade is expected to rebound
in the absence of multilateral sanctions.454 As part of the JCPOA,
roughly US$120 billion of Iranian assets frozen overseas are in the
process of being repatriated.455 Although there are concerns that this
and-markets/23474/iran-work-wb-own-pace (ranking the Iranian economy as the 29th largest
in the world).
450. See Iran Overview, supra note 449; Wright, The Challenge of Iran, supra note 353,
at 6 (establishing the size of Iran’s population); see also Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to
Iran, supra note 449; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 95
(characterizing Iran’s population).
451. See Marais, supra note 449, at 12 (noting Iran’s “sizeable middle class”); Clara
Brandi & Max Büge, A Cartography of the New Middle Classes in Developing and Emerging
Countries 13 (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspoltik, Discussion Paper 35, 2014), https://
www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_35.2014.pdf (“Iran has had a higher share of middle-class
citizens than poor ones in its population since 2002”); see also IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO.
14/93, supra note 168, at 1; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 311 (recognizing the Iran’s
“dramatic improvements in a variety of human development indicators” since the 1979
Revolution).
452. See McCary, supra note 119, at 275–76; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 391 (characterizing Iran as a geostrategic regional
market); see also Wright, The Challenge of Iran, supra note 353, at 6 (emphasizing Iran’s
geostrategic location from the lens of international politics).
453. See IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 13; see also
IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 1–2 (further noting Iran’s geostrategic trade
significance).
454. See Bijan Khajehpour, How the Nuclear Deal Will Help Iran’s Economy, ALMONITOR (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/economicimpact-iran-nuclear-deal.html; With Sanctions Lifting, What’s in Store for Iran’s Economy?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Oct. 27, 2015), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/withsanctions-lifting-whats-in-store-for-irans-economy/ (predicting a sizeable post-sanctions boost
to Iranian trade).
455. See Gary Clark et al., Iran’s Golden Loophole, FOUND. FOR DEF. OF
DEMOCRACIES, 5 (May 13, 2013), http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/
documents/FDD_RGE_Iran_Gol_Report__May_2013_FINAL_2.pdf; Bijan Khajehpour,
What Will Happen Once Iran’s Asset’s Are Unfrozen?, AL-MONITOR (May 26, 2015), http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/iran-import-sanctions-investment-consumer-
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cash influx may crowd out some foreign investment, in reality Iran
will be best served by actively attracting international investment in
order to tap into foreign management and technology skill sets.456
Still, despite these promising economic trends, there are definite
problems in the Iranian economy. The World Bank notes that, “The
Iranian State continues to play a key role in the economy with large
public and quasi-public enterprises dominating to some extent the
manufacturing and commercial sectors.”457 However, the Rouhani
Administration appears to recognize these drawbacks, and has
directed State efforts at shoring up investor confidence in Iran,
notably by fighting internal corruption. 458
Taken as a whole, there are attractive opportunities in Iran for
both market seekers and raw material seekers.459 Generally speaking,
Iran’s years under sanctions have created an economy starving for
foreign investment, with certain sectors saturated with pent-up
demand.460 Well before Implementation Day, President Rouhani was
actively courting international investors.461 Although Washington
continues to talk tough about unilateral US sanctions remaining in
place, this is unlikely to prevent the flow of international investment
foreign-assets.html (valuing Iranian assets to be repatriated at US$120 billion). For
comparison, Iran’s total trade volume in 2014 was approximately US$160 billion. Id.
456. See Khajehpour, What Will Happen Once Iran’s Asset’s Are Unfrozen?, supra note
455, at 1; Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Prepares to Lure Foreign Investors After Nuclear Deal, N.Y.
TIMES , Aug. 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/22/world/middleeast/after-nucleardeal-with-west-iran-gears-up-to-cash-in.html?_r=0 (arguing Iran’s need for foreign
investment).
457. Iran Overview, supra note 449.
458. See Najmeh Bozrogmehr, Rouhani Confronts Iran’s Hardliners on Corruption, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5ae48de4-7edf-11e4-a828-00144
feabdc0.html#axzz3v995GkSv; Bijan Khajehpour, Will Iran’s Corruption Fight Attract
Private Investors?, AL-MONITOR (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2015/02/iran-escalates-fight-corruption.html (evaluating Rouhani’s anticorruption
efforts from the perspective of foreign investment attraction).
459. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 9; Deloitte on Africa: Resource-seeker or Markethttp://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/au/
seeker?, DELOITTE, 1-2 (2012),
Documents/international-specialist/deloitte-au-aas-resource-seeker-market-seeker-12.pdf
(introducing the investment concepts of market seekers and raw material seekers).
460. See IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 11; Walt, Picking
Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449 (pointing out Iran’s pent up demand).
461. Even before the signing of the JCPOA, Rouhani made a personal appearance at the
World Economic Forum at Davos following the striking of the initial JPA. See IRAN COUNTRY
FORECAST, supra note 157, at 14; Jill Treanor & Larry Elliott, Davos 2014: Iran Ready to
Engage with the World, Says Rouhani, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/jan/23/davos-iran-ready-engage-world-rouhani (considering Rouhani at
Davos).
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back to Iran, and will not preclude the interest of US firms seeking to
enter Iran via foreign subsidiaries.462 While footnote six of Annex II
of the JCPOA may restrict US participation in Iran’s emerging
investment landscape, the following key opportunity areas will prove
important to the wider international investment community.463
1. Key Investment Sectors: Oil, Natural Gas, and Automotive
Some of the most profound destinations for foreign investment
in Iran are likely to be among the nation’s traditionally dominant
economic sectors.464 These include Iran’s massive carbon-based
energy sector—both oil and natural gas—as well as the Iran’s large
automotive sector.465 Each of these industries stands to gain various
benefits from foreign investment, and each holds the potential to
reward investors with impressive returns.
Within the carbon-based energy sector, Iran is considered by
some accounts to contain the largest combined reserves of oil and
natural gas in the entire world.466 This sector forms the backbone of
the Iranian economy, driving an estimated thirty percent of Iran’s
GDP and eighty-five percent of government revenues.467 Yet from
1979 through the Iran-Iraq War through the intensification of the
sanctions regime, Iran’s energy sector has yet to recover its prerevolution output levels.468 Meanwhile, the Western exit from Iran’s
462. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1732, 1785; Ron Bousso & Timothy Gardner,
Exclusive: U.S. Warns Governments, Bankers Iran Sanctions Still in Place, REUTERS (Oct. 9,
2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-idUSKCN0S32O720151010
(repeating government warnings that sanctions are still in effect); Andrew Critchlow, Iran is a
Once in a Lifetime Opportunity for Brave Investors, TELEGRAPH (July 12, 2015), http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/11732669/Iran-is-a-once-in-a-lifetimeopportunity-for-brave-investors.html (anticipating wide investor return to Iran).
463. See infra Part II.B.
464. See infra notes 465–517 (highlighting opportunities in Iran’s oil, natural gas, and
automotive sectors).
465. See infra notes 466–82 (looking at Iran’s carbon-based energy sector as a whole);
infra notes 483–89 (oil); infra notes 490–506 (natural gas); infra notes 507–17 (automotive).
466. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1732; Mohsen M. Milani, Iran’s Persian Gulf
Policy in the Post-Saddam Era, in CONTEMPORARY IRAN: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, POLITICS 349
(Ali Gheissari ed., 2009) (exploring Iran’s combined oil and gas reserves).
467. COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN, supra note 168, at 315; IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra
note 157, at 1 (estimating the extent Iran relies on the state’s oil sector). Alternatively, other
sources cite figures of 10 percent and 65 percent, respectively. Mohamedi, supra note 108, at
100.
468. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 368; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 95 (noting that Iranian oil
output has yet to recover to its pre-revolution levels).
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energy sector through the late sanctions era has largely provided a
vacant market for firms considering reentry.469 With the signing of the
JCPOA, Iran is expected to be capable of rehabilitating approximately
400,000 barrels per day within the short term.470 Yet, Iran will require
approximately US$170 billion in development for its oil and gas
sectors to reach their output potentials.471 This investment has to come
from somewhere, and there are many reasons for Iran to prefer
outside capital.472 For example, Iran’s oil fields are some of the oldest
in the world, and the sector’s aging technology is limiting current
production capacity.473 FDI would conveniently allow Iran to leverage
international technology competencies.474
From the other side, investors too should view Iran’s energy
sector as an attractive location for FDI.475 Current forecasts indicate

469. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 412; Parisha Hafezi, Iran Invites Foreign Firms to Develop its Oil, Gas Industry,
(Oct.
1,
2015),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-usa-oilREUTERS
idUKKCN0RV4JL20151001 (recalling the exit of foreign firms under the late sanctions era).
But see Benoît Faucon & Bill Spindle, Western Oil Firms Will Find Tough Competition in
Iran, WALL STREET J., July 21, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/western-oil-firms-will-findtough-competition-in-iran-1437518798 (arguing that sanctions have resulted in a competent
domestic industry, at some phases of oil production).
470. See Khajehpour, How the Nuclear Deal Will Help Iran's Economy, supra note 454;
Sanctions Lift to Boost Iran’s Oil Sales by 400,000 bpd: IEA, TEHRAN TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014),
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=250846 (mentioning Iran’s short term
capacity to expand oil output).
471. Philips & Motevalli, supra note 328, at 21; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran
Nuclear Agreement and Iranian Energy Exports, the Iranian Economy, and World Energy
Markets, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://csis.org/publication/irannuclear-agreement-and-iranian-energy-exports-iranian-economy-and-world-energy-marke
(stating the need for US$170 billion for Iran’s oil and gas sectors to meet their output
potential).
472. See Philips & Motevalli, supra note 328, at 21 (explaining how reduced Iranian
domestic investment and capital shortfalls have resulted in the need to pursue FDI); Cyrus
Amir-Mokri & Hamdi Biglari, A Windfall for Iran?, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov.–Dec. 2015), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-10-20/windfall-iran (articulating Iran’s wider need
for foreign investment).
473. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 421; IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 12
(characterizing Iran’s old oil fields).
474. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 422; Laying Groundwork for FDI, FIN. TRIB. (Oct. 22, 2015), http://financialtribune
.com/articles/economy-business-and-markets/28579/laying-groundwork-fdi (evaluating the
role of FDI in infrastructure development).
475. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 1
(noting Iran’s potential for international energy companies); Anjli Raval, Iran Prepares to
Open up to Foreign Oil Companies, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/
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that Iranian energy consumption will outpace production capacity,
forcing Iran to import much of its refined gasoline needs.476 Such
inefficiencies have fostered a realized need for refinery expansion,
which will likely be best served by international investment.477
Furthermore, the fact that twenty-eight of Iran’s oil and gas fields are
shared with contiguous States highlights a real sense of urgency as
Iran’s immediate neighbors exploit these limited resources.478 Already
Iran has invited representatives from various international energy
firms to discuss future energy projects.479 Likewise, the industry’s
recently revised contractual framework—which allows for adjustable
rates of return for investors, as opposed to the fixed rates of Iran’s
previous buy-back model—serves as another incentive to attract
international companies.480 Furthermore, the reinstatement of Bijan
Namdar Zangeneh to Iran’s Oil Ministry will be a welcome signal for
firms that profited in Iran throughout Rafsanjani’s presidency.481 In
sum, although much of the sector is still tangled in State-owned
enterprises and their subsidiaries—many of which remain troublingly
connected with the IRGC—both privatization demands and a robust

0/df9f4ef0-71a2-11e5-9b9e-690fdae72044.html#axzz3v995GkSv (commenting that Iran is
especially attractive compared to its neighbors, in terms of political stability and risk).
476. See IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 30
(forecasting production); IRAN: COUNTRY RISK REPORT, supra note 161, at 17 (highlighting
Iran’s reliance on energy imports).
477. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 426; Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101 (emphasizing Iran’s need for refinery
expansion).
478. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 425; Dalga Khatinoglu, Iran’s Gulf Neighbors Devour Joint Fields, TREND NEWS
AGENCY (Jan. 28, 2013), http://en.trend.az/iran/2112759.html (comparing Iran’s extraction
rates with the nation’s neighbors).
479. See McGrath Goodman, supra note 330, at 14; Hafezi, supra note 469, (looking at
Iran’s outreach to international oil companies).
480. See Anthony Dipaola, Iran Sweetens Terms for Oil Investors Ahead of End of
(Nov.
25,
2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
Sanctions,
BLOOMBERG
articles/2015-11-25/iran-sweetens-terms-for-oil-investors-as-end-of-sanctions-looms; Farshad
Kashani, Iran has High Hopes for Slick New Oil Contract Model, AL-MONITOR (Nov. 25,
2015),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/iran-new-petroleum-contractupdating-buyback.html (discussing Iran’s revised contractual framework for oil deals).
481. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 423; Bijan Khajehpour, Iran’s Petroleum Industry Welcomes Zanganeh’s Return as
Minister, AL-MONITOR (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/
iran-petroleum-sector-veterans-zanganeh.html# (discussing the significance of Zanganeh’s
return).
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service-oriented private sector make Iran’s energy industry an
attractive location for foreign investment.482
Within Iran’s oil sector, the nation holds an estimated ten
percent of the world’s petroleum reserves.483 However, with one of
the world’s oldest oil sectors and declining developed reserves, Iran
will be increasingly forced to rely on undeveloped reserves.484
Reaching these resources will require massive investment.485 In fact,
Iranian officials will seek billions of dollars in investment in this
industry alone..486 With enough investment, Iran’s oil sector is
expected to finally outpace its pre-revolutionary output levels at six
million barrels per day; comparable, for example, to Saudi Arabia’s
capacity of roughly 10.5 million barrels per day.487 In the short term,
some estimates forecast Iranian exports to reach 1.8 million barrels

482. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 394; Marketa Hulpachova, How to Succeed in Iran: Lessons from Russia and China,
GUARDIAN (June 4, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/jun/04/iranprivate-businesses-linked-regime-organizations (detailing the state’s heavy involvement in
Iran’s energy sector); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 381 (noting the IRGC’s connection to Iran’s energy sector);
WEHREY ET AL., supra note 362, at 56 (covering the IRGC’s role in Iran’s energy sector);
Alireza Aslani & Bo Feng, Investment Prioritization in Renewable Energy Resources with
Consideration to the Investment Criteria in Iran, 29 DISTRIB. GENERATION & ALT. ENERGY J.
7, 8 (2014) (positing that despite state involvement, Iran’s energy sectors are not
monopolistic); Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 1
(stating Iran’s attractiveness for FDI).
483. See Wright, The Challenge of Iran, supra note 353, at 6; Clifford Krauss, A New
Stream of Oil for Iran, but Not Right Away, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/07/15/business/international/iran-nuclear-deal-oil-prices.html?_r=0 (placing Iran’s
proven reserves at 10 percent of the world’s total).
484. See Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101; Anthony H. Cordesman et al., U.S. and
Iranian Strategic Competition 30, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Oct. 6, 2011), http://csis.
org/files/publication/111006_Iran_Sanctions.pdf (highlighting Iran’s need to rely on proven
but undeveloped reserves).
485. See Cordesman et al., supra note 484; Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101 (stating
that Iran’s turn to undeveloped reserves will require massive investment).
486. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 422 (citing Iran’s need to raise massive amounts of capital to service their oil industry);
cf. Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449, at 7 (“Iranian officials say they
intend to invest billions in upgrading creaky oil and gas facilities, which could mean a windfall
for oil-services firms.”).
487. See McGrath Goodman, supra note 330, at 15 (noting Iranian output expectations
and comparing them against Saudi output); Umid Niayesh, Rising Iran oil Export to Push
Saudi Output Down, TREND NEWS AGENCY (June 17, 2015), http://en.trend.az/business/
energy/2407192.html (quoting an Iranian official who predicts that “Iran has ambitious
capacity build programs that will boost production close to pre-revolution levels”).
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per day by the end of 2016.488 Oil Minister Zangeneh has provided an
even more optimistic assessment, estimating exports of 3.8 million
barrels per day following the lifting of sanctions.489
Meanwhile, Iran’s natural gas sector is also expected to continue
along its impressive historical growth path.490 Iran possesses the
second-largest gas reserves in the world, behind only Russia.491
However, rising domestic consumption has had a dramatic impact on
Iran’s ability to export natural gas.492 This implies the important role
gas serves within the State’s wider economic strategy: by increasingly
using the nation’s gas supplies to power the country and meet Iran’s
domestic energy needs, the government seeks to free up Iranian crude
for export, boosting overall revenues.493 Additionally, natural gas will
be increasingly needed for reinjection into Iran’s aging oil fields.494
However, even as Iranian gas consumption rises internally, this sector
is posed to gain international importance throughout future

488. See Marais, supra note 449, at 13; Quarterly Oil Market Update – Q3 2015, SAUDIUS REL. INFO. SERV. (Oct. 20, 2015), http://susris.com/2015/10/20/quarterly-oil-marketupdate-q3-2015/ (forecasting Iran’s 2016 year end output at 1.8 mbpd). However, it is unclear
how the more recent world oil glut and rapid decline in petroleum prices might affect these
estimates. See John W. Schoen, Global Glut of Crude Oil is Forcing Prices to the Floor,
CNBC (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/12/global-glut-of-crude-oil-is-forcingprices-to-the-floor.html; The Oil Conundrum, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2016, http://www.
economist.com/news/briefing/21688919-plunging-prices-have-neither-halted-oil-productionnor-stimulated-surge-global-growth.
489. See Philips & Motevalli, supra note 328, at 21; Vadana Hari, Crude Rallies Past
$65/barrel, but Disconnected from Fundamentals, NATION (May 9, 2015), http://www.
nationmultimedia.com/business/Crude-rallies-past-$65barrel-but-disconnected-from-30259
672.html (citing Zanganeh’s estimates).
490. See generally MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION,
supra note 28, at 378 (highlighting Iran’s natural gas success story); McCary, supra note 119,
at 273–74.
491. See Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 102; Isis Almeida, Iran Is No Qatar, Even with
World’s Second-Biggest Gas Reserves, BLOOMBERG (July 14, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2015-07-14/iran-no-qatar-even-with-the-world-s-second-biggest-gasreserves (ranking Iran’s gas reserves as 2nd largest in the world).
492. See Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 102; Almeida, supra note 491; see also
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 419
(assessing pressures on Iranian gas exports stemming from domestic consumption).
493. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 419 (commenting on Iran’s domestic consumption shift to natural gas); Almeida, supra
note 491 (“[Iran’s] revenue from exporting gas would be lower than what the country gets
from injecting the fuel to maintain pressure at oil fields and from feeding its petrochemical
industry. . . .”).
494. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28,at 413; Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 102 (explaining Iran’s gas reinjection needs).
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decades.495 Despite rising consumption, Iran managed to achieve a
gas surplus in 2012, and more currently, one economic outlook report
has stated that the sector “remains underdeveloped despite significant
improvements in recent quarters, and there is considerable room to
maximize this source of revenue.”496 Indeed, with the needed
technology transfers, Iran’s gas production could nearly double by
2024.497 Here, too, urgency is required.498 An estimated forty-seven
percent of Iran’s recoverable gas reserves are located offshore in the
Gulf within the huge South Pars field, territorially shared with
Qatar.499 Sanctions have placed Iran at a severe disadvantage in
comparison to its tiny southern neighbor when it comes to extracting
wealth from South Pars.500 According to former head of the Majles
Energy Commission Hamidreza Katouzian, “Twenty years after
discovering this gas field, we are behind Qatar in projects,
investments, and exploitation . . . While Qatar has completed the
building of refineries and drilling, Iran has not even reached halfway

495. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 417 (citing Iranian forecasts that the nation’s resource rents will gradually shift from oil
to natural gas); cf. Gabriele Steinhauser & Laurence Norman, Iran Could Become Major
Supplier of Natural Gas to EU, WALL STREET J., Sept. 13, 2015,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-could-become-major-supplier-of-natural-gas-to-eu1442155324 (evaluating Iran’s potential to export natural gas to Europe).
496. IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 12; see
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 424;
David Ramin Jalilvand, Iran’s Gas Exports: Can Past Failure Become Future Success?,
OXFORD INST. ENERGY STUD. 2 n.1 (June 2013), http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wpcontent/uploads/2013/06/NG-78.pdf (explaining Iran’s 2012 gas surplus in spite of rising
domestic consumption).
497. See IRAN: COUNTRY RISK REPORT, supra note 161, at 25 (estimating Iran’s natural
gas expansion capacity by 2024); cf. Iran to Double Gas Output by 2017, LNG WORLD NEWS
(Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.lngworldnews.com/iran-to-double-gas-output-by-2017/ (citing
Iranian plans to double capacity by 2017).
498. See infra notes 499–501 and accompanying text.
499. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL GAS EXPORTS FROM IRAN 2 (Oct. 2012),
IRAN’S
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ngexports_iran/pdf/full.pdf;
MALONEY,
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 411 (placing Iran’s gas
reserves at South Pars at 47%); see id. at 378–79,425 (noting Iran’s offshore and shared
fields); Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 102 (noting competition with Qatar).
500. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 413 fig. 8.5; Andrew Critchlow, Iran to Trigger Natural Gas Race with Qatar in Persian
Gulf, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/
oilandgas/11920043/Andrew-Critchlow-Iran-to-trigger-natural-gas-race-with-Qatar-inPersian-Gulf.html (comparing Iran and Qatar’s extraction capacities).
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through its development projects. We are losing because whoever
exploits more will gain more.”501
In addition to the potential at South Pars and wider secular
growth trends, international investors will likely also be attracted to
the potential of developing liquid natural gas (“LNG”) and
compressed natural gas (“CNG”) projects in Iran.502 Before the
intensification of sanctions in 2010, Iran was on its way to developing
massive LNG export programs.503 However as FDI departed Iran,
these projects were shelved.504 Finally, Iran’s natural gas sector may
also become crucial for European consumers, who currently depend
on Russian gas exports.505 With recent events in Crimea and Eastern
Ukraine raising suspicions over Russia’s long-term intentions,
Europeans will welcome Iranian pipeline and floating liquid natural
gas (“FLNG”) projects seeking to reach EU markets.506
Beyond the Iranian energy sector, international investors are also
bound to find attractive options within Iran’s historically large

501. MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28,
at 412.
502. See Benoît Faucon, Iran Seeks Rapid Reboot for Natural Gas Exports, WALL
STREET J., Jan. 26, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-seeks-rapid-reboot-for-natural-gasexports-1453821547 (concerning efforts to get Iranian gas to market); see also infra note 503
and accompanying text.
503. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 416; Iran Eyes Resuming Huge LNG Project with Germany, NAT. GAS EUR. (May 7,
2015, 12:05 AM), http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/iran-eyes-resuming-huge-lng-projectwith-germany-23582 (pointing out Iran’s LNG projects that were set aside via the
intensification of sanctions).
504. See Iran Eyes Resuming Huge LNG Project with Germany, supra note 503; see also
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, 416–17
(“Without the technology and without firm contracts for purchase, there was little that Tehran
could do to advance these projects. A number of the foreign firms involved with the projects
had already withdrawn or signaled their disinterest in moving forward and wrote of tens of
millions in costs associated with the aborted projects.”)
505. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 1;
Steinhauser & Norman, supra note 495 (positing Iran’s ability to serve European gas markets).
506. See Doug Bandow, Europeans Watch Ukraine and Fear Russia: They Should Take
Over NATO and Europe’s Defense, FORBES (Mar. 10, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/dougbandow/2014/03/10/europeans-watch-ukraine-and-fear-russia-they-shouldtake-over-nato-and-europes-defense/; Jeffrey Rathke, Can NATO Deter Russia in View of the
Conventional Military Imbalance in the East?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Nov. 30,
2015), http://csis.org/publication/can-nato-deter-russia-view-conventional-military-imbalanceeast (explaining Europe’s fears of Russia); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 415; Dalga Khatinoglu, Iran’s Gas in EU by
2016?, NAT. GAS EUR. (July 6, 2015), http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/irans-gas-in-eu-by2016-24501 (detailing Iran’s plans to serve EU markets).
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automotive industry.507 The automobile manufacturing industry
represents Iran’s second-largest economic sector, following energy.508
In the years preceding the sanctions regime, Iran was ranked as the
eleventh largest automobile producer in the world.509 However under
sanctions, increased parts shortages and rising production costs placed
crippling restraints on Iranian automakers.510 With the lifting of
sanctions, Iranian firms will be enabled to serve a booming domestic
demand for cars, in a market with few remaining international auto
dealers.511 These conditions have resulted in incredible growth
forecasts for Iran’s auto sector, which expects approximately seventyfive percent annual growth through 2018.512
These trends will be reinforced by President Rouhani’s calls to
diversify the national economy and to increase the country’s non-oil
exports.513 In fact, President Rouhani has highlighted the automotive
507. See infra notes 508–17 and accompanying text.
508. See Farahmand Alipour, Iran Works to Get Auto Industry Back on the Road, ALMONITOR (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/iran-carindustry.html; Farahmand Alipour, Will Boycott Campaign Put the Brakes on Iran’s Auto
Industry?, AL-MONITOR (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/
iran-carmakers-boycott.html (noting the significance of Iran’s automotive sector).
509. See Alipour, Iran Works To Get Auto Industry Back on the Road, supra note 508;
Arash Karami, Why is Iran’s Health Minister Complaining About Domestic-Made Cars?, ALMONITOR (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/boycott-irancars.html# (citing Iran’s former status as the 11th largest automotive manufacturer in the
world).
510. See Alipour, Iran Works to Get Auto Industry Back on the Road, supra note 508;
Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Iran’s Automobile Sector Faces Slow Revival After Sanctions Lifted,
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014, 4:44 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/12c7e8b2-998e-11e391cd-00144feab7de.html#axzz3vSvjxrhx (assessing the impact of sanctions on Iran’s auto
industry).
511. See IRAN: COUNTRY RISK REPORT, supra note 161, at 41; Marketa Hulpachova,
Foreign Carmakers Jostle for Position in Iran, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2013, 10:35 AM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2013/dec/13/iran-carmakers-market (explaining the
huge Iranian consumer demand for new cars); see also Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to
Iran, supra note 449; Andy Sharman, Carmakers Eye Golden Iranian Opportunity in Wake of
Nuclear Deal, FIN. TIMES (July 15, 2015, 11:25 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
31087dae-2642-11e5-9c4e-a775d2b173ca.html#axzz3vSvjxrhx (detailing the virtual absence
of international auto dealers in Iran).
512. See IRAN: COUNTRY RISK REPORT, supra note 161, at 41–43; Steady Growth
Predicted for Auto Industry, FIN. TRIB. (Oct. 9, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://financialtribune.com/
archive/2014/12/08/articles/economy-business-and-markets/2209/steady-growth-predictedauto-industry (expecting roughly 75 percent year-over-year growth through 2018).
513. See Maysam Bizær, Amid Slump in Oil Prices, Iran Focuses on Mining, ALMONITOR (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/iran-miningindustry.html; Garrett Nada, Economic Trends, U.S. INST. OF PEACE: IRAN PRIMER (Feb. 25,
2015), http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/feb/25/economic-trends (citing Rouhani’s calls to
diversify Iran’s economy).
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sector as a strategic industry for economic revival, with a push to
produce three million cars per year by 2021 and hopes to eventually
serve neighboring markets.514 Beyond Iran’s own car manufacturing
sector, international carmakers are likely to find a promising market
for operations in Iran.515 Mercedes-Benz, Peugeot, Renault, and
others have all declared plans to serve Iran’s massive automobile
market, and are bound to find success there.516 For Peugeot
specifically, Iran represented the company’s largest market outside
France until 2011.517
2. Alternative Sectors: Aviation, Finance, Consumer Goods,
Tourism, and Renewable Energy
Beyond Iran’s traditionally dominant industrial sectors,
international investors will find unique opportunities across various
alternative industries.518 Domestic economic conditions, combined
with the long impact of sanctions, have fostered rare opportunities for
international investment.519 For example, the average commercial
aircraft in Iran is currently twenty-three years old, and airliners find
themselves in dire need of new fleets.520 Iran plans to spend
approximately US$20 billion on new aircraft purchases over the next
ten years.521 While established aircraft manufacturers will satisfy such
514. See Alipour, Iran Works to Get Auto Industry Back on the Road, supra note 508
(detailing Rouhani’s sector forecasts); Iran to Export 30% of Domestically Produced Cars,
IRAN DAILY (Sept. 28, 2015, 8:56 PM), http://www.iran-daily.com/News/127857.html
(explaining Iranian plans to export cars to neighboring states).
515. See infra notes 516–17 and accompanying text.
516. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Alipour, Iran Works
to Get Auto Industry Back on the Road, supra note 508; IRAN: COUNTRY RISK REPORT, supra
note 161, at 40 (listing international automakers looking to Iran).
517. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Alissa J. Rubin,
After Deal, Europeans Are Eager to Do Business in Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/world/europe/after-deal-europeans-are-eager-to-dobusiness-in-iran.html?_r=0 (presenting Peugeot’s ties to Iran before the intensification of
sanctions).
518. See infra notes 519–67 and accompanying text.
519. See infra notes 520–67 and accompanying text.
520. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Kieron Monks,
Iran’s Aviation Industry: Back in Business?, CNN (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/
09/09/travel/irans-aviation-industry/ (articulating Iran’s need for new airline fleets).
521. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Alwyn Scott &
Victoria Bryan, Iran Deal Could Unleash Big Pent-Up Commercial Demand, REUTERS (July
14,
2015,
12:27
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-airplanesidINL2N0ZU19020150714 (establishing the average Iranian commercial aircraft at 23 years
old); Monks, supra note 520 (overviewing Iran’s need for new fleets); Bizær, Even Without
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sales, these new fleets should open a new secondary-servicing market
rife with opportunities for foreign investors.522 Likewise, in the
absence of sanctions, pressures are likely to mount toward revising
domestic Iranian aviation’s inefficient and subsidized price models,
which should make passenger airlines operating in the country more
profitable.523
Another sector posed to rebound upon the lifting of sanctions is
Iran’s finance industry. As explained above, Iran’s banks were
crippled through the late sanctions regime.524 Additionally,
government-sponsored lending programs and poor lending practices
throughout the Ahmadinejad era distressed Iranian banks, leaving
them with poor asset portfolios and uncertain prospects through at
least 2017.525 At the same time, Iranian banks have also been rocked
with various high profile corruption scandals in recent years, while
some of the largest players have been active participants in Iran’s

Sanctions, Iranian Aviation Faces Turbulent Future, supra note 381 (estimating $20 billion in
purchases). Indeed, following Implementation Day, the first major international contract with
Iran consisted of their purchasing 114 Airbus Jetliners. See Clay Dillow, Iran’s First Big
Purchase: 114 Airbus Jetliners, FORTUNE (Jan. 19, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/01/19/iranto-purchase-airbus-jetliners/; Asa Fitch & Robert Wall, Iran Plans to Buy 114 Civilian Aircraft
from Airbus, WALL STREET J., Jan. 16, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-plans-to-buy114-civilian-aircraft-from-airbus-once-sanctions-removed-1452975657.
522. See Bizær, Even Without Sanctions, Iranian Aviation Faces Turbulent Future,
supra note 381 (proposing second-hand aircraft and leasing opportunities); Plane Speaking
After Iran’s Nuclear Deal, ECONOMIST, July 21, 2015, http://www.economist.com/
blogs/gulliver/2015/07/aviation-iran (characterizing the current “black market” conditions
faced within Iranian aircraft servicing).
523. See Ali Dadpay, Will Iran Airlines Take Off?, FIN. TRIB. (Aug. 27, 2015), http://
financialtribune.com/articles/24425/will-iran-airlines-take (critiquing the current price system
and calling for reform); Bizær, Even Without Sanctions, Iranian Aviation Faces Turbulent
Future, supra note 381 (citing pressures to reform Iranian airfare pricing); cf. Takeshi Kumon,
Nuclear Deal to Bring Winds of Change in Persian Gulf Aviation Market, NIKKEI ASIAN REV.
(July 24, 2015), http://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Trends/Nuclear-deal-to-bring-winds-ofchange-in-Persian-Gulf-aviation-market?page=2 (asserting that under sanctions, diminished
competition allowed foreign airliners serving Iran to exploit inflated airfare prices that Iran
itself was unable to capture).
524. See supra note 333 and accompanying text (illustrating Iran’s credit crunch under
sanctions).
525. See Iranian Banks on Shaky Ground, AL-MONITOR (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/iran-bank-deposits-inflation-sanctions.html (providing an
overview of the current challenges faced by Iranian banks); see also Ramezanpour, Iran’s
Troubled Bond Market, supra note 333 (foreshadowing an upcoming non-performing loan
crisis); IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 10; IRAN COMMERCIAL
BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 19.
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nuclear development program and regional terrorist financing.526 With
domestic banks still reeling from the Ahmadinejad era, foreign banks
could provide an important service to underserved Iranian
consumers.527 Furthermore, despite the current outlook of the local
banking scene, analysts predict various post-sanctions benefits to this
sector within the short term.528 President Rouhani has promised to
reform Iran’s broken finance sector, and there are expectations that
this area of the economy will liberalize in upcoming years.529
Additionally, the Tehran Stock Exchange (“TSE”) provides an
attractive equity market for international portfolio investors as Iran
climbs out of sanctions.530 International fund managers are already
526. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 363; Ben Brumfield & Shirzad Bozorgmehr, Epic Bank Scandal Investigation Hits
Ahmadinejad, CNN (Oct. 5, 2011, 2:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/05/world
/meast/iran-bank-scandal/ (detailing the Bank Arya scandal); see also IRAN COMMERCIAL
BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 35 (noting that Bank Melli Iran has been
“repeatedly accused . . . of being a secret financial channel for the Iranian government’s
nuclear weapons programme”); id. at 37 (stating that Bank Saderat has been “most often
singled out among Iranian banks by the US Treasury Department and the UK for alleged
involvement in the Iranian government’s nuclear programme and terrorist group financing”).
527. See IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 9; Iranian
Banks on Shaky Ground, supra note 525 (noting that Iran’s high domestic inflation will
continue to eat into banks’ deposit growth). Likewise, foreign banks that maintain
correspondent accounts in the United States will still need to ensure they comply with US
Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorist Financing, and other compliance requirements. See
generally Ian Allison, Iran Economic Explosion: Which Banks Will be First to Take the
Plunge?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 14, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iran-economicexplosion-which-banks-will-be-first-take-plunge-1510784 (providing various considerations
for international banks returning to Iran); Henry Balani, Iran Nuclear Agreement’s AML
Policy Implications, BANKING EXCH. (Sept. 4, 2015, 3:17 PM), http://www.bankingexchange.
com/compliance/bsa-aml/item/5726-iran-nuclear-agreement-s-aml-policy-implications.
Additionally, there may be constitutional prohibitions in place that limit any significant
participation of foreign banks in Iran. See infra Part II.D.1.
528. See IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 15; Shadia
Nasralla, Update 2- Iran Eyes Return to SWIFT System, Foreign Stakes in Privatisations After
Sanctions, REUTERS (July 24, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-economyidUSL5N10425C20150724 (highlighting the benefits that will likely occur as Iranian banks
reenter the SWIFT banking system).
529. See IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 9; Rachel
Williamson, Iranian Bankers Look to Rouhani Reforms to Save Industry, MIDDLE EAST
MONITOR (Oct. 3, 2013, 12:01 PM), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middleeast/7653-iranian-bankers-look-to-rouhani-reforms-to-save-industry (discussing Rouhani’s
liberalizing reforms to Iranian banking).
530. See generally Sadakova, supra note 158; Morteza Ramezanpour, Foreign Firms
Prepare to Dive into Iran’s Lucrative Private Equity Market, AL-MONITOR (July 28, 2015),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/iran-equity-market-deal.html
(summarizing Iran’s equity markets).
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surveying the TSE and will likely embody the first wave of foreign
investment to return to Iran.531 In fact, even before Implementation
Day, some international funds had already opened operations in the
nearby United Arab Emirates, hoping to get a head start upon the
lifting of sanctions.532 In July, 2015, the TSE traded at a
comparatively low average price-to-earnings ratio (‟P/E ratio”) of 5.3,
while less than three percent of TSE trading volume was conducted
by international investors.533 The TSE is forecast to reach new highs
as Iranian banks rejoin the SWIFT banking system.534 While not
without risks, the TSE could represent an attractive destination for
international investors and capital funds seeking to open up

531. See Sadakova, supra note 158 (detailing the international scoping out of Iranian
markets); Danielle Myles, Funds Will be the First to Enter Iran, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (Aug. 17
2015), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3475365/Funds-will-be-first-to-enter-Iran.html (noting that
institutional funds will be among the first to reenter Iran).
532. See Stephen Kalin, Iran Deal Stirs Wary Optimism in Dubai Trading Hub,
REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-uae-idUSL5N0JA39U
20131125 (describing the UAE’s role as a staging post for capital seeking to enter Iran).
533. Generally, a low P/E ratio is attractive to investors, as it indicates that a stock or
portfolio may be purchased for a low price in comparison to the asset’s earnings power, thus
indicating the asset is undervalued. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR
159–60 (2006); P/E Ratio: An In-Depth Guide, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
university/peratio/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (explaining the role of P/E ratios in portfolio
investing); see also Ramezanpour, Foreign Firms Prepare to Dive into Iran’s Lucrative
Private Equity Market, supra note 530 (listing Iran’s P/E ratio at 5.3); cf. Sadakova, supra note
158 (describing the TSE as “large, liquid and cheap” with less than 3% trading volume
stemming from international investors). For sake of comparison, the Saudi Arabian investment
company Aljazira Capital calculates the Saudi Tadawul All Shares Index (“TASI”) to trade at
an eight year average P/E ratio of 17.1. Exploiting Market Anomalies in the Saudi Stock
Market, AL JAZIRA CAPITAL (Sept. 2014), http://www.aljaziracapital.com.sa/report_file/ess/
SPE-176.pdf; cf. Judith Evans, Fund Managers on the Iranian Frontier, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 1,
2015),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7de6a358-b798-11e4-8807-00144feab7de.html#axzz
3vSvjxrhx (favorably comparing the TSE’s P/E ratio and dividends yield to the MSCI Frontier
Markets index).
534. See Ramezanpour, Foreign Firms Prepare to Dive into Iran’s Lucrative Private
Equity Market, supra note 530; Adrian Nizzola et al., Iran: Understanding the Nuclear Deal
and its Effect on Sanctions, SIMMONS & SIMMONS, http://www.simmons-simmons.com/~
/media/Files/Corporate/External%20publications%20pdfs/Iran%20%20Understanding%20
the%20nuclear%20deal%20and%20its%20effect%20on%20sanctions.pdf (last visited Apr. 9,
2016) (noting the positive influence rejoining SWIFT will have on the TSE). For a description
of the SWIFT banking system, see supra note 333. Iran began reconnecting to SWIFT in early
2016. See Andrew Torchia, Iranian Banks Reconnected to SWIFT Network After Four Year
Hiatus, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-banks-swift-idUSK
CN0VQ1FD; SWIFT Return to International Bank Transfers for Iran’s Banks, EURONEWS
(Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.euronews.com/2016/02/01/swift-return-to-international-banktransfers-for-iran-s-banks/.
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operations within Iran.535 Finally, the lifting of sanctions will open up
Iranian firms to various merger and acquisition opportunities likely to
be structured by international funds.536
Iran’s consumer goods sector is also suited to provide numerous
international investment opportunities following the lifting of
sanctions.537 As noted above, Iran’s population of seventy-eight
million is young, educated, and consumer friendly, providing an
attractive market for international corporations and retailers.538
Despite their government’s history of pariah-State policies, many
Iranians are culturally sophisticated and internationally aware, given
that “accessibility to international markets and media outlets such as
satellite television, and later the Internet, have buttressed consumerist
culture amongst urban Iranians.”539 Such consumerist culture has been
growing steadily since the 1990s.540 Iran is the seventh top consumer
of cosmetics in the world, and the nation with the highest per capita
number of rhinoplasty procedures.541 Even during the most restrictive
535. In particular, major risks include poor accounting transparency and archaic equity
custodianship methods, partly due to past sanctions and the lack of a global custodian capable
of securely managing transactions. However international banks reentering Iran could serve
this exact role. See Sadakova, supra note 158; Bill Spindle & Dan Keeler, Nuclear Deal Could
Drive Foreign Investors to Iranian Stocks, Wall Street J., Mar. 30, 2015, http://www.
wsj.com/articles/nuclear-deal-could-drive-foreign-investors-to-iran-stocks-1427750282. Other
risks include cumbersome bureaucratic hurdles, and ongoing legal/reputational risks from
equity transactions involving firms still designated by the United States as sponsors of
terrorism. See Sadakova, supra note 158; Myles, supra note 531 (assessing risks within the
Tehran Stock Exchange).
536. See Ramezanpour, Foreign Firms Prepare to Dive into Iran’s Lucrative Private
Equity Market, supra note 530; Golnar Motevalli & Matthew Martin, Iranian Investment Bank
Amin Introduces M&A Advisory Service, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-30/iranian-investment-bank-amin-plans-mergers-andacquisitions-unit (evaluating M&A trends in Iran).
537. See infra notes 538–44 and accompanying text.
538. See supra note 450 and accompanying text; see also Myles, supra note 531; Harris,
The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 109 (looking at the foundations underlying strong Iranian
consumerism).
539. Shima Houshyar & Behzad Sarmadi, A Fashionable Revolution: Veiling, Morality,
and Consumer Culture in Iran, AJAM MEDIA COLLECTIVE (Mar. 11, 2014),
http://ajammc.com/2014/03/11/a-fashionable-revolution/; see Harris, The Bazaar, supra note
50, at 110 (reinforcing the sophistication of Iran’s consumer culture).
540. See Houshyar & Sarmadi, supra note 539; Thomas Erdbrink, Lavish Malls
Sprouting up to Attract Iranian Elite, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/01/19/world/middleeast/lavish-malls-sprouting-up-to-attract-iranian-elite.html
(acknowledging the rise of consumerism in Iran).
541. See Correspondent in Tehran, Billion Dollar Smuggling Industry Drains Iran’s
Economy supra note 336; Mehrnaz Samimi, Cosmetics Boom in Iran, AL-MONITOR (Dec. 17,
2013),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/makeup-iran-women-boom-
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years of the sanctions regime, Iran was home to approximately 6.5
million banned, authentic iPhones.542 As in various other sectors,
Iranian consumer tastes for Western products have been largely
unsatisfied through the late sanctions era, resulting in unusual and
potentially lucrative pent-up demand.543 McDonald’s began seeking
local Iranian franchise partners in July 2015, exemplifying a symbolic
corporate giant recognizing this particularized demand.544
The Iranian tourism sector is also staged to attract significant
attention from international investors. Iran possesses natural
advantages well suited to a dynamic tourism industry, including
“natural, religious, cultural and historical attractions.”545 Iran has
nineteen current World Heritage Sites, with approximately fifty
further sites tentatively listed.546 Yet, in 2012, tourism accounted for a
mere two percent of Iran’s GDP.547 As such, tourism represents one of
counterfeit-plastic-surgery.html (ranking Iran’s cosmetics market at the seventh largest in the
world); Sadakova, supra note 158 (noting that Iran has the highest per capita number of
rhinoplasty); The Beauty Obsession Feeding Iran’s Voracious Cosmetic Surgery Industry,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2013/mar/01/beautyobsession-iran-cosmetic-surgery (noting Iran’s unparalleled practice of rhinoplasty).
542. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Dick Simon, The
Biggest Myths about Doing Business with Iran, CNBC (July 14, 2015, 1:25 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/14/the-biggest-myths-about-doing-business-with-iran.html
(pointing out Iran’s 6.5 million iPhones). Although these sorts of indicators are often
overblown in the West to stand in for everything from Iranian political attitudes to gendered
perceptions of Islam, at a more basic level such trends certainly bode well for international
businesses seeking to operate within Iran. See generally Houshyar & Sarmadi, supra note 539
(explaining the oppressive fallacies inherent in attempting to find social meaning in the
interpretation of these sorts of consumerist trends).
543. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Scott & Bryan,
supra note 521 (explaining wide Iranian pent-up demand).
544. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Heather Long, Will
Iran Get McDonald’s Now?, CNN MONEY (Jan. 19, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/18/
investing/iran-sanctions/ (citing McDonalds’ interest in serving Iran).
545. Ali Khaksari et al., Religious Perceptions and Hegemony on Tourism Development:
the Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 INT’L J. TOURISM RES. 97, 98 (2014); see
Farahmand Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, ALMONITOR (May 1, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/iran-hotelstourism-esfahan-shiraz.html (summarizing the state of Iran’s tourism industry).
546. See World Heritage Sites in Iran, WORLD HERITAGE SITE, http://www.
worldheritagesite.org/worldheritagelist.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2016); UNESCO Sites,
DESTINATION IRAN, http://www.destinationiran.com/unesco-list (last visited Apr. 9, 2016)
(listing Iran’s world heritage sites).
547. See Marais, supra note 449, at 14; Maria Sheahan & Victoria Bryan, Iran Tourism
Sector Aims to Rebuild as International Tensions Thaw, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2015, 1:20 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-tourism-idUSKBN0M220L20150306 (assessing Iran’s
dismal tourism levels).
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Iran’s most underdeveloped economic sectors, with some
optimistically noting its potential to bring in more revenue than the
State’s oil sector.548 While the Shah pushed for increased tourism
development before his ousting in 1979, the revolution and
subsequent Iran-Iraq War stalled further development.549 Today few
international hotels operate in Iran, and there is a shortage of hotel
rooms throughout the country.550 In fact, according to one Iranian
travel agent, in the past three decades, only two new hotels have been
constructed in the Iranian capital.551 Concerns over the cultural impact
of international tourism have historically prevented the Islamic
Republic from formally adopting tourism development as a serious
goal for Iran’s economy.552 However in recent years, there are some
signs that the regime’s attitude may be shifting.553 Plans are in place
to construct between 200 and 400 three- and four-star hotels in the
country.554 The government seeks to quadruple Iran’s tourist intake
from five million to twenty million visitors per year, translating to a
jump from US$6 billion in annual tourism revenue to between
US$25-30 billion.555 The Iranian government has also taken measures

548. See Khaksari et al., supra note 545, at 98 (noting the potential for Iranian tourism
revenue to outpace that of oil); cf. Tourism Can Help Iran Move Away From Oil, FIN. TRIB.
(Feb. 15, 2015), http://financialtribune.com/articles/travel/11133/tourism-can-help-iran-moveaway-oil (providing a wider assessment of Iran’s tourism potential).
549. See Khaksari et al., supra note 545, at 99–100; Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry
Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, supra note 545 (recalling the history of Iran’s tourism
industry).
550. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Alipour, Iran’s
Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, supra note 545 (addressing the
insufficient infrastructure comprising Iran’s contemporary tourism sector).
551. Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, supra note
545.
552. See Khaksari et al., supra note 545, at 99 (evaluating the regime’s attitude
concerning tourism development); cf. Steve Inskeep, ‘You Are Invited’: Isolated Iran Seeks
Foreign Tourists, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 18, 2015, 11:39 AM), http://www.npr.org/
sections/parallels/2015/02/18/387149018/you-are-invited-isolated-iran-seeks-foreign-tourists
(“Since Islamist clerics took power in 1979, they have limited the people’s contact with the
outside world. The government has controlled information and granted very few visas to
would-be visitors.”).
553. See infra notes 554–57 and accompanying text.
554. See Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, supra
note 545; COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN, supra note 168, at 14 (forecasting new hotel constructions
in Iran).
555. See Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch up with Demand, supra
note 545; Maria Gallucci, Iran Could See a ‘Tsunami’ of Tourists as Iran Nuclear Deal Takes
Hold, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2015, 6:06 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/iran-could-see-
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to open tourism offices abroad in China, Italy, Malaysia, Spain, and
Switzerland, with forty-four more offices slated to open in the
future.556 Already, international investors are breaking ground in Iran,
with the French hotel chain Accor having opened its first Iranian
branch in October, 2015.557
Finally, one last interesting frontier sector in post-sanctions Iran
could be the nation’s budding alternative energy industry.558 As noted
above, Iran faces real challenges related to domestic energy
consumption and the erosion of export revenues as both oil and gas
are diverted internally.559 With ninety-seven percent of Iran’s energy
use coming from carbon-based resources as recently as 2007, the
alternative energy space represents an especially strategic focal point
for Iran’s development goals.560 Indeed, the expansion of this space
could be the primary means of addressing Iran’s internal energy
consumption.561 While the State’s renewable energy development
goals remain unmet, the government has put incentives in place to
encourage investment within the renewable energy sector.562
tsunami-tourists-iran-nuclear-deal-takes-hold-ap-report-2145730 (citing future Iranian tourism
revenue targets).
556. See Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, supra
note 545; Iran to Establish 20 More Tourism Offices Overseas by March 2016, TEHRAN
TIMES (May 18, 2015), http://www.tehrantimes.com/PDF/12271/12271-5.pdf (looking to
Iran’s 44 slated international tourism offices).
557. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Foreign Investment
in Iran: France’s Accor Hotels Opens Two Hotels in Tehran, Novotel Ikia and Ibis Ikia,
PERSIANESQUE, (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.persianesquemagazine.com/2015/10/22/foreigninvestment-in-iran-accorhotels-opens-two-hotels-in-tehran-novotel-ikia-and-ibis-ikia/
(recognizing Accor’s new hotels in Iran).
558. See infra notes 559–67 and accompanying text.
559. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text (examining Iran’s subsidy policies
and domestic energy consumption).
560. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 7; Koen Groot, The Geopolitical Impact of
the Increasing Trade and Investment Relations between the National Oil Companies of China,
Iran and Russia 62 (July 19, 2010), http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=190628
(unpublished thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam) (noting that ninety-seven percent of Iran’s
energy consumption stems from carbon-based sources).
561. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 8; Bijan Khajehpour, Iran’s Renewable
Energy Sector Poised for Growth, AL-MONITOR (July 26, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2013/07/renewable-energy-iran-development.html# (suggesting renewable
energy development as a solution to Iran’s subsidy crisis).
562. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 8 (“only 38% the goals of Iran’s fourth
national development plan in RE have been achieved [as of 2014]”); see also Opportunities to
Construction Renewable Energy Power Plants in Iran, MINISTRY OF ENERGY: RENEWABLE
ENERGY ORG. IRAN (SUNA), http://www.suna.org.ir/en/opportunitiestoconstruction/
opportunities (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 14 tabl. 1
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Meanwhile, according to one study, conditions in Iran are suitably
aligned at every stage of renewable energy supply chains.563 In
particular, Iran’s vast surface area and sunny climate make the nation
an attractive location for solar power generation.564 Additionally,
there are various marketable models for off-plant solar use that could
help move Iranians away from internal gas consumption.565
Hydropower and wind energy present two other viable renewable
energy subsectors.566 International expertise from established
renewable energy players would help advance Iran’s goals in this
industry. In fact, German firms have already signed massive contracts
to develop ambitious solar and wind projects within Iran.567
C. Investor Risks in Iran
Considering the numerous opportunities that post-sanctions Iran
provides for international investors, it is important for foreign entrants
to remain cognizant of the many risks of investing in Iran.568 Broadly,
these risks fall within two categories: commercial risks, dealing with
economic and market forces that impact a firm’s ability to generate
(summarizing Iran’s renewable energy goals and measures currently in place to incentivize
renewable energy production).
563. These stages include the resource stage, the generation stage, the transmission
stage, distribution, and finally consumption. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 13; see also
Amory B. Lovins, Iran’s Invisible Opportunity, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Sept. 30, 2015),
http://thebulletin.org/iran%E2%80%99s-invisible-opportunity8774 (assessing Iran’s favorable
conditions for renewable energy).
564. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 9; Alok Jha, Tehran Looks to the Skies for
Cheap Power from the Sun, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2009, 5:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/blog/2009/jan/06/alternative-energy-solar-power (pointing out Iran’s natural
capacity for solar power).
565. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 10 (“In addition to power plant-based
functions of solar energy, off plant thermal functions are considered as hot water supply by
solar water heaters for washing and bathing, heating-cooling and solar air conditioning, solar
desalination, solar drier, solar ovens, and solar furnaces.”). See generally Solar Heating &
Cooling, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASSOC. (May 17, 2013), http://www.seia.org/sites/default/
files/Solar%20Heating%20and%20Cooling%206.18.13.pdf (providing an overview of solar
cooling and heating).
566. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 10–11; Lovins, supra note 563 (noting
Iran’s potential for wind and hydropower).
567. See Nicholas Brautlecht & Stefan Nicola, Iran’s Thirst for Energy Draws in Wind
Developers, BLOOMBERG (July 29, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-07-29/nuclear-deal-opens-market-as-big-as-france-for-iran-wind; German Firm Licensed
to Set up Solar Power Plants in Iran, FARS NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 30, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://
en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940909001551
(summarizing
German-Iranian
renewable energy deals).
568. See infra notes 569–619 (assessing risks to international investors in Iran).
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returns; and political risks, which involve the rights of investors and
the political forces that effect their investments.569 Generally
speaking, commercial risks faced by investors in Iran are likely to
involve conditions beyond the control or influence of the investment
community.570 Therefore, such risks will be best mitigated by sound
business judgment and prudent economic decisions.571 To the
contrary, while political risks might also exist beyond the direct
control of investors, their pitfalls may be mitigated through the
application of established international investment law.572
1. Commercial Risks
Throughout the foreseeable future, the Iranian economy will be
subject to numerous challenges likely to effect investor returns.573 The
early post-sanctions era will be marked by macroeconomic
uncertainties ranging from exchange rate uncertainty to inflation
uncertainty.574 Inflation in particular is a cause for concern.575
Likewise, the World Bank notes that high unemployment will also
continue to plague Iran’s economy, especially for young Iranians, for
whom unemployment is estimated at approximately thirty-five
569. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 12; Vladan S. Perišić et al., Foreign Direct
Investment and Non-Commercial Risks, 23 ANNALS ORADEA U. FASCICLE OF MGMT. &
TECH. ENGINEERING 93, 93-96 (Aug. 2014) (differentiating commercial risk and political
risk).
570. See infra Part II.C.1.
571. See infra Part II.C.1; see also SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 12 (defining commercial
risk).
572. See infra Part II.C.2; see also SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 12–13 (“A fundamental
purpose of investment treaties and political risk insurance . . . is to provide foreign investors
and their investments with a level of protection against political risks.”).
573. See infra notes 574–89 and accompanying text.
574. See generally Z. Rozeei et al., The Study of the Effective Factors on Investment in
Private Sector in Iran (With Emphasis on Uncertainty), 6 INT’L J. INDUS. MATHEMATICS 255,
256–57 (2014) (investigating the role of commercial uncertainty on investment in Iran);
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 506–07
(evaluating the economic adversity currently faced by Iran).
575. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 114; Alireza Ramezani, Is Iran on the Right
Track to Managing Inflation?, AL-MONITOR (June 11, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2015/06/iran-inflation-management-debt-banking.html# (addressing inflation
in Iran). Although inflation has fallen since the signing of the JCPOA it is forecast to remain
high, and is likely to be further fueled by the government’s ongoing subsidy reforms. See
Khajehpour, How the Nuclear Deal Will Help Iran’s Economy, supra note 454 (noting the fall
of inflation after the JCPOA, but also citing structural inflation concerns within Iran’s
economy); see also IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 27;
IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 6 (explaining the relationship between
inflation rates and the unwinding of Iran’s fuel/food subsidies.).
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percent.576 For investors, high unemployment limits the Iranian
population’s consumption potential, and further reduces the quality of
Iran’s labor pool as highly skilled Iranians leave the country to seek
employment abroad.577 Domestic labor laws that make it difficult to
terminate hired employees further compound these trends.578 At a
more structural level, an inefficient State sector and distortions from
government involvement in the economy will also continue to
undermine investor-led growth.579 The State’s subsidy programs
represent a major area of market distortion, and although these
concerns are being addressed, volatility remains likely in this space
throughout the immediate future.580 Additionally, the government
demands a burdensome registration and ownership process for firms
operating within Iran.581 Corporate tax rates, on the other hand, stand
at twenty-five percent, an improvement from the past tax rate of fiftyfour percent.582

576. See Iran Overview, supra note 449 (discussing unemployment in Iran); CAMMETT
supra note 41, at 315 (highlighting unemployment among the Iranian youth). Even
before the intensification of the sanctions regime, young Iranians searched for employment for
an average of three years before landing a job. Omid Memarian & Tara Nesvaderani, The
Youth, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at, 50.
577. See PRS GROUP, IRAN COUNTRY CONDITIONS 1 (Aug. 1, 2014) (on file with
author) (further exploring the New Privatization Act); Farshad Mohammadi, Can Iran
Convince its Brainiacs to Return?, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 17, 2014 8:06 AM), http://www.
aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/can-iran-convince-brain-drain-2014415115753960
687.html (noting Iran’s “brain drain” problem).
578. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1749 (“labor law in Iran, generally speaking, makes
it difficult for employers to lay-off employees.”); cf. ROUZNAMEH RASMI [LABOUR CODE]
Tehran [1990], §§ 21–33 (Iran), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBTEXT/21843/64830/
E90IRN01.htm.
579. See COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN, supra note 168, at 329; Iran Overview, supra note
449 (explaining the public sector’s burden on private sector-led growth).
580. See supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text; see also IMF COUNTRY REPORT
NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 17; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 475 (addressing the impact of subsidies on Iran’s economy).
581. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1749 (summarizing the “special process” involved
in foreign nationals owning real property in Iran). The most recent World Bank comparisons
rank Iran 118th out of 189 nations in ease of doing business. See Ease of Doing Business in
Iran, Islamic Rep., WORLD BANK GRP., http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/
iran/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
582. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1749; Iran Tax: Country Briefing, AM. INT’L GRP.,
http://www.aig.com/_2590_379141.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (placing Iran’s corporate
tax rate at 25 percent). Additionally, the Iranian government has ushered a series of tax
holidays, seeking to attract foreign investment. See A Review of the Iranian Tax System, ORG.
INV. ECON. & TECH. ASSISTANCE OF IRAN, http://www.investiniran.ir/en/whyiran1/tax (last
visited Mar. 24, 2016); Leila Piran, Iran Releases Plan to Attract Foreign Investment,
ET AL.,
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International investors should also remain wary of various
accountability risks scattered throughout the Iranian economy.583 The
past practices of Iran’s financial institutions leave much to be desired
for firms conducting monetary transactions within Iran, and the lack
of custodianship safeguards within the Tehran Stock Exchange raises
questions concerning wider Iranian accounting practices.584 Lax
intellectual property protections raise further concerns.585 Iran’s
massive bureaucracy provides ample threats of government
interference, and only recently has the depth of the previous
administration’s corruption been discovered.586 Past investors in Iran
have undertaken both financial and reputational damage from similar
corruption scandals.587 In light of these discouraging threats to foreign
investment, President Rouhani has initiated a major push to combat
these practices.588 Whether his reforms will be effective remains to be
seen.589
MUFTAH
(Sept.
25,
2014),
http://muftah.org/iran-releases-plan-attract-foreigninvestment/#.VoGvMBorJ-U.
583. See infra notes 584–89 and accompanying text.
584. See supra note 526 and accompanying text (discussing Iranian bank scandals); see
also supra note 535 (highlighting custodian issues in the Tehran Stock Exchange).
585. See IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 14; Benoît
Faucon, U.S. Firms Prepare for End to Iran Sanctions, WALL STREET J., Dec. 23, 2015, http://
www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-firms-prepare-for-end-to-iran-sanctions-1450896958 (noting Iran’s
lax intellectual property protection).
586. See Khajehpour, Will Iran’s Corruption Fight Attract Private Investors?, supra
note 458; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at
363 (discussing Iran’s recent corruption scandals).
587. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 388–89 (“The companies considered doing business in Iran’s contentious political
environment frustrating and several found themselves enmeshed in costly corruption scandals
that damaged both their profile within Iran as well as their international reputation.”); see, e.g.,
Guy Chazan, Total Agrees Penalty to Settle US Bribes Charge Over Iran Deal, FIN. TIMES
(May
29,
2013),
https://next.ft.com/content/c372b0d0-c878-11e2-acc6-00144feab7de
(recalling Total’s entanglement with Iranian corruption).
588. See supra note 458 and accompanying text (mentioning Rouhani’s current fight
against corruption in Iran).
589. See Khajehpour, Will Iran’s Corruption Fight Attract Private Investors?, supra
note 458 (“the real campaign against corruption will be the one that addresses legal, political
and structural issues so that future cases can be prevented. It remains to be seen if the Rouhani
administration will generate the political will to approach the issue from this perspective”);
IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 5–6 (“The new administration that took
office in August 2013 earned a strong mandate and has already made significant progress in
improving the external environment and confidence in the outlook. The administration’s 100day report confirmed how well aware the authorities are of the economic challenges ahead and
many of the reforms needed. But the task of advancing reforms ahead will be difficult, not
least due to a highly complex institutional set-up and a difficult socio-political context.”).
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2. Political Risks
Considering the history of international investment in Iran from
the 1979 Revolution throughout the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, the nation holds an intimate relationship with the subject of
political risk.590 However its political risk profile has seen dramatic
changes since 1979.591 In post-sanctions Iran, the primary political
risk entails the “snapback” provisions of the JCPOA, which are
cocked and loaded to reintroduce sanctions in the event of Iran’s (or
the P5+1’s) noncompliance.592 Such a development would have a
devastating impact on international investors within Iran,
complicating the lawfulness of such operations.593 Furthermore, the
weak “advisory” dispute resolution procedures under Section 36 of
the JCPOA facilitate the possibility of turning minor interpretive
differences into full-blown noncompliance.594 In the event that any
individual party to the JCPOA (except perhaps Germany) seeks the
deal’s termination, there seem to be no meaningful safeguards in
place to prevent the initiation of snapbacks.595
590. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (discussing the US investment
experience in Iran between the Revolution and the IUSCT).
591. See infra notes 592-619 (surveying today’s political risk profile in Iran).
592. See supra notes 422-423 and accompanying text; JCPOA, supra note 185, §§ 3637; see also Tharoor, The Historic Nuclear Deal with Iran: How It Works, supra note 400;
Sadakova, supra note 158 (detailing the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism).
593. While snapbacks would have no retroactive effect on the lawfulness of most
contracts signed within the timeframe of the JCPOA’s lifespan, which become grandfathered
in, they would raise numerous hurdles to a firm’s ability to conduct ongoing operations. See
JCPOA, supra note 185, § 37 (“[Snapback] provisions would not apply with retroactive effect
to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the
date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such
contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council
resolutions.”).
594. See JCPOA, supra note 185, § 36 (containing the JCPOA’s dispute resolution
procedures).
595. In fact, this is the very point of the snapback provisions. See JCPOA, supra note
185, §§ 36-37 (“If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their
commitments under this JCPOA Iran could [initiate dispute resolution procedures]; similarly,
if any of the E3/Eu+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA,
any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same.”) (emphasis added). Upon the exhaustion of these
dispute resolution mechanisms, snapbacks are triggered via a party’s referral to the UN
Security Council. The risk here is potentially greater than first meets the eye. Say, for example,
that Russia wishes to terminate the JCPOA, not because of actual Iranian noncompliance but
because its own national interests mandate such a decision. Moscow jumps through the dispute
resolution hoops of Section 36, then refers the claimed breach to the Security Council. The
default to sanctions under the snapback provisions of Section 37 would seemingly be
automatic (after 30 days), unless the Security Council votes otherwise. But in such a case,
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Considering this snapback vulnerability, there are significant
risks to foreign investors emanating from domestic politics within the
parties of the JCPOA.596 This is especially true in Iran, where the
Islamic Republic is subject to deep and enduring political
cleavages.597 Given the economic challenges highlighted above, both
the Rouhani Administration and likeminded reformists face an uphill
battle to meet the needs and demands of the Iranian people.598
Different segments of the population hold differing expectations of
post-sanctions conditions.599 Iran’s February 26, 2016 elections,
which produced gains for the moderate camp in both the Majles and
the Assembly of Experts, were certainly a positive step for
Rouhani.600 However, for this trend to continue, the Iranian
Russia’s permanent member veto in the Security Council would effectively block the blocking
of sanctions renewal. Thus, in this hypothetical, Russia has weaponized a mere bad faith
noncompliance accusation, and essentially hijacked the Security Council to unilaterally
recreate binding multilateral sanctions. While there is a vague potential escape hatch from such
abuse in Section 36’s requirement that states include a “description of the good-faith efforts
the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA” when
handing noncompliance issues over to the Security Council, this seems a flimsy line of defense
considering the costs such action could entail across the globe. States could alternatively just
refuse to implement the Security Council’s new sanctions, but in doing so would seem to
undermine the credibility of international law. Presumably, Germany is the one party that
would not be enabled to unilaterally trigger multilateral snapbacks, in light of their lack of a
veto. But see Jeremy Bender & Brett LoGiurato, The World is Already Weakening One of the
Key ‘Checks’ on the Iran Deal, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.
com/snap-back-sanctions-problems-in-iran-deal-2015-8; Jennifer Rubin, James Baker is
Wrong: The Iran Deal Can’t Be Fixed, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2015, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2015/04/17/james-baker-is-wrong-the-iran-deal-cantbe-fixed/ (arguing that even with a snapback, sanctions against Iran can never meaningfully be
reimposed).
596. See infra notes 597-603 and accompanying text.
597. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 312 (“The regime still rests on an uneasy
alliance of two very different sets of interests: populist lower and lower-middle classes and
prosperous clergy and business associates.”); IRAN: COUNTRY RISK REPORT, supra note 161,
at 11 (detailing the rifts between Iran’s youth and powerful clerics).
598. See Arash Karami, Iranians Look to Post-Deal Economic, Political Changes, ALMONITOR (July 6, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/contents/articles/originals/
2015/07/iran-economy-and-politics-after-nuclear-deal.html; Saeid Jafari, Rouhani Faces
Ballooning Expectations at Home in Post-Sanctions Era, AL-MONITOR (Aug. 28, 2015),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/rouhani-post-sanctions.html (examining
Iran’s post-sanctions expectations).
599. See Karami, Iranians Look to Post-Deal Economic, Political Changes, supra note
598; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at
499–501 (looking at how ideology shapes future Iranian outlooks).
600. See Thomas Erdbrink, Iranian President and Moderates Make Strong Gains in
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/world/
middleeast/iran-elections.html?_r=0; Ted Regencia, Moderates Dominate Council of Clerics in
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population will need to see ongoing benefits related to the lifting of
sanctions.601 Otherwise, Rouhani’s compliance with the JCPOA could
be undercut by a rightward shift in Tehran.602 Similarly, across the
Atlantic, the United States is not without its own partisan struggles.
US voters may also need to see some positive results from the nuclear
deal in order for the JCPOA to outlive the Obama Presidency’s
expiration in January 2017, regardless of which party inherits the
White House.603
Finally, both domestic and regional instability are each
significant components of Iran’s political risk profile.604 On the
domestic front, international policymakers have long predicted the
collapse of the Islamic Republic and subsequent regime change in
Iran.605 While such predictions have yet to materialize, events like the
2009-10 Green Revolution reveal there are at least cracks in the
regime’s grip on power.606 Although many Western governments and
investors alike would welcome regime change in Iran, any mass
Iran Elections, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/
moderates-dominate-council-clerics-iran-elections-160229091044340.html (assessing the
victory of moderates in Iran’s February 2016 elections); see also Akbar Ganji, Iran’s Moment
of Truth: Don’t Worry About the Nuclear Deal, Worry About the Elections, FOREIGN AFF.
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-09-24/irans-moment-truth;
Mehdi Khalaji, Iranian Moderates Face Tall Obstacles in 2016 Elections, WASH. INST. NEAR
E. POL. (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranianmoderates-face-tall-obstacles-in-2016-elections (highlighting what was at stake in Iran’s 2016
elections).
601. See Nader Habibi, After Sanctions, Rouhani’s Economic Agenda Faces Challenges
in Iran, WORLD POL. REV. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/
17861/after-sanctions-rouhani-s-economic-agenda-faces-challenges-in-iran; Ladane Nasseri &
Golnar Motevalli, Economy Remains No. 1 Focus for Rouhani Emboldened by Polls,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-28/economyremains-no-1-focus-for-rouhani-emboldened-by-iran-polls (detailing the reform challenges
ahead for Rouhani).
602. See Habibi, supra note 601.
603. See Peter D. Feaver & Eric Lorber, Long View on Iran: The Real Work Will Start
after the Nuclear Deal is Signed, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/middle-east/2014-11-24/long-view-iran; Gerald F. Seib, Iran Nuclear Deal Lands
in the Middle of 2016 Debate, WALL STREET J., Sept. 14, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
iran-nuclear-deal-lands-in-the-middle-of-2016-debate-1442245305 (exploring the JCPOA
within the context of the US presidential race).
604. See infra notes 605–14 and accompanying text.
605. See, e.g., Benjamin Weinthal, Analysis: Still Hope for Regime Change in Iran,
JERUSALEM POST (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/ANALYSIS-Stillhope-for-regime-change-in-Iran-417827; Ray Takeyh, Islamism: R.I.P., WASH. INST. NEAR E.
POL’Y (Spring 2001), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/islamism-r.i.p
(anticipating the collapse of the Islamic Republic).
606. See supra notes 172-73 (discussing Iran’s Green Movement).
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uprising would entail severe disruptions to business operations in the
country. In fact, even a more Western-friendly government in Tehran
would probably be pressured to rescind some contracts previously
granted by the outgoing regime.607 International investors should
ensure they have contingency plans in place to respond to these types
of scenarios.608 Furthermore, on the regional side, Iran faces
significant threats from its neighbors that could do irreparable damage
to the JCPOA.609 The intensification of proxy conflicts with Iran’s
Sunni rivals in places like Syria and Yemen holds the inherent
potential of escalating into outright war between these regional
powers, in some shape or form.610 Likewise, the Israeli Knesset has
made it clear that it is no fan of the nuclear deal.611 Three-quarters of
Jewish Israelis continue to view Iran as an existential threat following
the signing of the JCPOA, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu has made routine threats of unilateral military action
607. Periods of sudden political transition, even toward investment-friendly
governments, are still often forced to contend with the economic disturbances and the
instability of rapid political change. In the short term, such conditions can be bad for investors.
To take one recent example: the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution—which pivoted Kiev away from
Russia and toward the EU—was still witness to numerous contract breaches, some of which
were valued in billions of dollars. See Roman Olearchyk, Chevron Pulls Out of Shale Gas
Project in Ukraine, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), https://next.ft.com/content/76b41d9c-847e11e4-ba4f-00144feabdc0; Sergei Kuznetsov, Ukraine Crisis Unsettles Shell and Chevron, FIN.
TIMES (Jun. 24, 2014), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/06/24/ukraine-crisis-unsettlesshell-and-chevron/.
608. See, e.g. SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 245-73 (providing an overview of political
risk insurance, as one method of protecting against potential expropriation).
609. See infra notes 610–19 and accompanying text.
610. This is not to minimize the bloodshed of current Iran-Saudi proxy wars, such as
Syria (where Saudi Arabia is supporting Sunni insurgents against the Alawite, Iranian backed
regime) or Yemen (where Iranian support for Shia Houthi rebels has led Saudi Arabia to
conduct a direct military intervention on their own Arabian Peninsula). See Diana Alghoul,
Iran and Saudi Arabia Move Beyond Proxy Conflict, MIDDLE EAST MONITOR (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/21528-iran-and-saudi-arabia-movebeyond-proxy-conflict (noting the intensification of Iran and Saudi Arabia’s proxy conflicts);
Eric Ham, ISIS v. Iran v. Saudi Arabia: The Worst-Case Scenario, WASH. TIMES, July 28,
2015,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/
jul/28/isis-v-iran-v-saudi-arabia-worst-case-scenario/ (explaining ISIS’ opportunistic goading
of Saudi Arabia toward war with Iran).
611. See, e.g., Louis Charbonneau & Hugh Bronstein, Israel’s Netanyahu Launches AllOut Assault on Iran Deal at U.N., REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/10/01/us-un-assembly-israel-idUSKCN0RV57K20151001#8WXeDPKvRMBHrmsJ.97;
Joel B. Pollak, Israeli Opposition Puts Aside Hatred of Netanyahu to Oppose Iran Deal,
BREITBART (July 15, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/07/15/israeliopposition-puts-aside-hatred-of-netanyahu-to-oppose-iran-deal/
(emphasizing
Israel’s
opposition to the JCPOA).
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against Iran in the past.612 In fact, the likelihood of an Israeli strike
often makes its way into investment outlook reports concerning
Iran.613 Under such a scenario, Israeli action would “almost certainly
disintegrate” the JCPOA, representing a major blow to foreign
investors with going concerns in the country.614
In addition to these Iran-specific risks, investors should also be
mindful of all of the traditional risks of international investment, from
expropriation to regulatory hurdles that threaten the profitability of
business operations abroad.615 In light of the investor experience of
1979, the risks of expropriation and nationalization will be at the front
of the minds of many investors.616 However, such forms of political
risk are suited to mitigation through legal innovations and the
protections of law. Iran’s experience since the Islamic Revolution has
mandated a shift in attitudes concerning foreign investment, contrary
to the widespread suspicions and mistrust of 1979.617 In fact, Iran’s
dynamic participation in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
combined with the liberalizing forces of globalization, have resulted
in a level of Iranian sophistication concerning international
investment law.618 These processes have resulted in a sort of crosspollination, whereby many of the international norms of investment
law have managed to find their way into Iranian law at the national
612. See JTA, Most Israeli Jews Say Iran Deal ‘Existential Threat’, TIMES OF ISRAEL
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.timesofisrael.com/most-israeli-jews-say-iran-deal-existentialthreat-poll/; Majority of Jewish-Israelis Agree Iran Deal Poses ‘Existential Threat,’ Poll
Finds, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.jta.org/2015/09/10/
default/majority-of-jewish-israelis-agree-iran-deal-poses-existential-threat-poll-finds
(considering the Israeli view that Iran poses an existential threat); see also Israeli PM
Threatens to Strike Iran, AL JAZEERA (July 17, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
middleeast/2013/07/2013714214528446397.html; Jodi Rudoren, Netanyahu Says He’d Go It
Alone on Striking Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/
world/middleeast/netanyahu-uses-tough-tone-on-possible-iran-strike.html?_r=0
(illustrating
Netanyahu’s unilateral threats against Iran).
613. See, e.g., IRAN COUNTRY UPDATE, supra note 333, at 2; IRAN COMMERCIAL
BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 11 (addressing the risk of an Israeli strike
within Iran’s economic forecasts).
614. Feaver & Lorber, supra note 603; see Eric Pianin, After Obama’s Nuke Deal, What
Happens If Israel Attacks Iran?, FISCAL TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.thefiscaltimes.
com/2015/07/16/After-Obama-s-Nuke-Deal-What-Happens-If-Israel-Attacks-Iran
(contemplating the consequences of an Israeli strike against Iran).
615. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 12-13 (summarizing political risk).
616. See supra notes 68–82 and accompanying text (discussing expropriation in Iran
following the 1979 Revolution).
617. See infra Part II.D.
618. See, e.g., infra notes 642-67 (FIPPA).
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and international level.619 This legal framework is the focus of the
following Part.
D. Iranian Investment Law
The benefits of clear legal rules and procedures governing
international investment are that such innovations soften the inherent
uncertainties of investment beyond one’s own borders.620
International investment law allows for protections and safeguards in
the face of uncertainty, laying the groundwork and boundaries within
which investors and States may be expected to operate.621
International law scholar Jeswald W. Salacuse identifies three layers
of international investment law: law at the contractual level, governed
by the terms negotiated between parties; law at the national level,
ruled by the national legislation of host States; and law at the
international level, centered around the international treaties by
which, through ratification, a State party agrees to be bound.622 While
a review of Iranian investment contracts will be best left to ad hoc,
case-by-case analyses, Iranian investment law at the national and
international levels involves important protections with which
investors eyeing Iran should familiarize themselves.623
1. National Investment Law
Iran’s treatment of international investment is grounded
foremost in the Islamic Republic’s Constitution.624 Initially drafted in
the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, Iran’s Constitution
contains many restrictive provisions aimed at preventing the repeat of
the economic exploitation experienced under the Pahlavi regime.625
619. See infra notes 642–67.
620. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 25–28; Jason Webb Yackee, Political Risk and
International Investment Law, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 477, 491–92 (2014) (observing
the ability of international investment law to reduce investor uncertainty).
621. See Yackee, supra note 620, at 491–92.
622. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10 (explaining the three layers of international
investment law).
623. See infra Part II.D.1 (examining Iranian investment law at the national level) and
Part II.D.2 (overviewing Iranian investment law at the international level).
624. See infra notes 625-26.
625. For a background on the history and ideology behind Iran’s constitution, see Iran
After the Victory of 1979’s Revolution, supra note 63; Francis Fukuyama, Iran, Islam and the
Rule of Law, WALL STREET J., July 27, 2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529
70203946904574300374086282670.
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These constitutional underpinnings form a problematic starting point
for international investors seeking to enter Iran. Specifically, Article
44 of the Constitution divides the national economy between three
sectors: the State sector; the cooperative sector; and the private
sector.626 The State sector includes all State enterprises and an
expansive collection of industries presumably deemed to be within
Iran’s national security interests.627 The cooperative sector includes
“cooperative companies and enterprises concerned with production
and distribution, in urban and rural areas;” and finally, the private
sector broadly includes, “those activities concerned with agriculture,
animal husbandry, industry, trade, and services that supplement the
economic activities of the State and cooperative sectors.”628 These
provisions in Article 44 make clear that the Constitution envisions a
strong, centrally planned economy, where private participation works
in tandem with the State’s primary role in economic activities.629 This
places limits on both privatization efforts and foreign investment
encouragement, which, at least within Iran, seek to liberalize the
economy without directly challenging the Islamic Republic.630
Article 81 of Iran’s constitution also contains problematic
language, stating that: “The granting of concessions to foreigners or
the formation of companies or institutions dealing with commerce,
industry, agriculture, service, or mineral extraction, is absolutely

626. See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 44(1) (dividing Iran’s economy into three legal
categories).
627. See id. art. 44(2) (“The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother
industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams, and
large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services,
aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all these will be publicly owned and
administered by the State.”). That said, Article 44 was amended in 2004 in order to soften the
rigid divisions between the provision’s economic categories, thereby allowing, for example,
privately owned banks and other privatization efforts. See Public Information Notice, Int’l
Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2005 Article IV Consultation with the
Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 27, 2006); Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1747.
628. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 44 (3)–(4).
629. See supra notes 626–28 and accompanying text (assessing Article 44 of Iran’s
Constitution).
630. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1747; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 193 (demonstrating the character of Iranian
liberalization efforts); see also infra notes 635–41 and accompanying text (discussing
privatization in Iran); infra notes 642–67 and accompanying text (summarizing FDIencouraging national Iranian investment law).
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forbidden.”631 On its face such a provision appears especially stifling,
however subsequent legislation at the national level has narrowly read
“concessions” to mean “special rights, which place the Foreign
Investors in a monopolistic position.”632 Another constitutional
restriction occurs in Article 139, which seeks to create a State
gatekeeping procedure in all disputes involving investor-State
arbitration.633 In the case of a valid arbitration clause between
disputing parties, however, it seems unlikely that Article 139 would
be enforceable.634
Because these constitutional provisions have vested much of the
economy within Iran’s State sector, ongoing privatization legislation
at the national level is also important for international investors
exploring future opportunities within Iran.635 To this day, Iran’s
private sector is comprised predominately of small firms and familyrun operations.636 As previously discussed in this Note’s treatment of
Iranian history, past administrations under Khatami and Ahmadinejad
have made controversial attempts at further privatizing the
economy.637 The New Privatization Act of 2008 was notable in this
regard, as a robust attempt to bring various industries under Article 44
631. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 81.
632. Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 2(c) (Iran)
(narrowly defining “concessions”).
633. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 139 (“The settlement of claims relating to public and
state property or the referral thereof to arbitration is in every case dependent on the approval of
the Council of Ministers, and the Assembly must be informed of these matters. In cases where
one party to the dispute is a foreigner, as well as in important cases that are purely domestic,
the approval of the Assembly must also be obtained.”); see Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1748
(describing the gatekeeping procedure); id. at 1756–57 (questioning whether such a provision
is actually enforceable).
634. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1756–57 (“As long as there is an unambiguous
consent to arbitration, contrary domestic legal rules cannot constrain it. . . . Therefore, it does
not seem that the barrier of Iran’s Constitution can hinder the jurisdiction of the arbitration
body.”). Theoretically, even at the stage of enforcement, Iran’s ratification of the New York
Convention would seem to mandate domestic recognition of arbitration decisions. See
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; see also infra note 678 and accompanying text
(discussing Iran’s obligations under the New York Convention).
635. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 110–20. See generally Ravi Ramamurti, Why Are
Developing Countries Privatizing?, 23 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 225 (1992) (exploring
privatization’s role in attracting FDI).
636. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 4;
IRAN COUNTRY CONDITIONS, supra note 577, at 1 (characterizing Iran’s private sector).
637. See supra Parts I.A.3-4 (providing a history of the Reform and Ahmadinejad eras).
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of the Constitution under private control.638 Yet, to this day, a great
deal of this privatization has either fallen short or spun off into the
hands of State-affiliated parties like the IRGC.639 The IMF has noted
that the Rouhani Administration recognizes these failures, and is
committed to taking steps toward enhanced privatization.640 It remains
to be seen whether effective privatization will finally be implemented
under President Rouhani.641
More favorable to international investors, Iran’s principal
legislation governing international investment in the country is the
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 2002.642 FIPPA
evidences both economic pragmatism and a certain level of
sophistication among Iranian parties, who have perhaps learned from
decades of international investment disputes.643 Comprised of twentyfive articles, FIPPA sets the ground rules for all foreign investors in

638. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 20 (“Specifically, the decree set
a target of selling off 80% of state-owned assets (excluding firms in the upstream oil sector,
crucial infrastructure, and some banks) over a period of 10 years.”); Atai, Investor Protection
in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 3; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 333–37 (reflecting upon attempts at
privatization under Ahmadinejad).
639. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 20–21; MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 334 (evaluating the results of
the Ahmadinejad era privatization push).
640. See IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 23 (“[Government
authorities have] also explained that past privatizations failed to effectively transfer ownership
to the private sector and tighten budget constraints, and therefore, have taken steps to improve
the privatization process.”); cf. Privatization Shrouded in Controversy, FIN. TRIB. (Jan. 6,
2015),
http://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/8322/privitization-shroudedcontroversy (reinforcing the IMF’s assessment of Rouhani’s privatization goals).
641. Sam Wilkin, Iran Must Privatize Car Industry, President Says, REUTERS (Mar. 1,
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-autos-idUSKCN0W33K1; Rouhani Says
Privatization of Priority for Iran in Post-JCPOA Era, TREND NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 9, 2016),
http://en.trend.az/iran/politics/2492168.html.
642. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002; see also
Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1744–46; Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy
Approach, supra note 157, at 5-13 (discussing FIPPA and its significance to foreign
investment in Iran).
643. See Bizær, Amid Slump in Oil Prices, Iran Focuses on Mining, supra note 513
(“[FIPPA] gives foreigners 100% ownership rights, residence visas valid for three years and
the opportunity to transfer their profits out of the country in foreign currencies. It also offers a
number of tax exemptions that, in some conditions, can rise to 100% of an enterprise’s profits.
In an effort to reassure investors even further, the act guarantees that the government will pay
compensation for any investments in projects that are nationalized or expropriated.”); see also
The Set Up, BUS. YEAR, https://www.thebusinessyear.com/iran-2013/the-set-up/review (last
visited Mar. 25, 2016) (reviewing FIPPA’s protections).
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Iran.644 All international investment in Iran formally begins with an
application to The Organization for Investment, Economic, and
Technical Assistance of Iran, which is then reviewed by the Foreign
Investment Board.645 The Foreign Investment Board is allotted one
month to review the investment application, before it must submit a
final decision in writing.646 Presumably, this review process should be
based around FIPPA Article 2, which provides the scope, goals, and
requirements of foreign investment in Iran.647 More specifically, all
investment must: bring specified benefits to the Iranian economy; not
pose a threat to the State, population, environment, or economy; not
amount to a concession; and not result in more than twenty-five
percent of an economic sector or thirty-five percent of an economic
subsector falling under foreign control, measured at the start of the
investment seeking approval.648
Upon approval, international investors are presented a choice
concerning how they wish to structure their investment in Iran.649 The
first option, under Article 3(a), involves equity-based FDI within the
constitutionally approved private sectors.650 Because FIPPA places no
additional limitations on such equity forms, investors are free to
structure their FDI in a manner consistent with Iran’s Commercial
644. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002
(introducing the law’s general impact on foreign investors). A party’s status as a “Foreign
Investor” under FIPPA is defined by either citizenship or the use of “capital with foreign
origin.” See id. art. 1.
645. See id. arts. 5-6 (overviewing the application procedures for foreign investment in
Iran); Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 5.
Although an investor could hypothetically bypass this application process, such investments
will not be protected by FIPPA. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar.
10, 2002, art. 1 (defining “Foreign Investment” as the “Employment of Foreign Capital in a
new or existing economic enterprise after obtaining the Investment License.”).
646. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 6 n.1
(establishing the application review process).
647. See id. art. 2 (containing rules guiding foreign investment in Iran); see also
Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1745; Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach,
supra note 157, at 5-6 (further clarifying these rules).
648. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 2 (a)(d) (listing the obligations of foreign investment in Iran); see also Atai, Investor Protection in
Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 6 (“The ceiling on the percentage [within
FIPPA Article 2(d)] applies only at the time of the issuance of the investment license, and
thereafter no limitations are placed on foreign investors for their market shares.”).
649. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 3
(providing a basic choice concerning the structure of foreign investment in Iran).
650. See id. art. 3(a) (defining FIPPA’s equity-based FDI option); see also QANUNI
ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN]
1358 [1980], art. 44(4) (listing Iran’s investment-permitted economic sectors).
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Code, broadly including: the incorporation of a new company; the
purchase of shares in an existing Iranian company; the opening of an
Iran branch or representative office of a multilateral corporation; or
participation in a joint venture with an Iranian national.651 However,
other laws and regulations at the national level may place unexpected
hardships upon international investors, and should therefore be
reviewed and considered when deciding upon an FDI form.652 The
second option for structuring an investment in Iran concerns nonequity contracts, falling under FIPPA Article 3(b).653 Because the
“foreignness” of non-Iranian investment under FIPPA may be
measured by the source of capital, all private debt-investment to
Iranian firms falls under this subcategory.654 Additionally, Article
3(b) mentions three frameworks: Civil Partnerships; Buy-Backs; and
Build-Operate-Transfer (“BOT”) schemes.655 The lack of ownership
rights in these contract-based investment structures allows for
651. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 7
(“FIPPA guarantees investors the right to set up an Iranian company without any restriction as
to the percentages of shareholding. Therefore, investors with an investment license are
authorized to establish a company in Iran with majority ownership, management, and
control.”); Bizær, Amid Slump in Oil Prices, Iran Focuses on Mining, supra note 513
(“[FIPPA] gives foreigners 100% ownership rights”). See generally Atai, Investor Protection
in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 7-9 (walking through various equity
structures permitted under FIPPA Art. 3(a).).
652. See, e.g., Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1749 (mentioning restrictions upon a foreign
national’s ability to own real property in Iran); On Registration of Branches and
Representative Offices of Foreign Companies in Iran, IRANO-BRITISH CHAMBER COM. INDUS.
& MINES, http://www.ibchamber.org/en/useful-information/laws-and-regulations/on-registr
ation-of-branches-and-representative-offices-of-foreign-companies-in-iran/ (last visited Mar.
25, 2016) (detailing additional rules on the registration of foreign branches).
653. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 3(b)
(defining FIPPA’s non-equity investment option); see also Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A
Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 9-10.
654. See supra note 644 (discussing FIPPA’s definition of “foreign investor”); see also
Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 9.
655. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 3(b).
Civil Partnerships involve contractually based (non-equity) partnerships under Iran’s Civil
Code. SEE QANUNI MADANI [CIVIL CODE] Tehran 1314 [1935], arts. 571–606 (Iran). Buybacks entail “long-term investment agreements providing the exchange of goods or services
between parties usually with no monetary exchange.” McCary, supra note 119, at 302. For
example, a foreign oil company might provide exploration and drilling services in exchange
for a specified percentage of the oil produced. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 375; Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101. Finally,
BOTs involve “construction projects in which a sponsoring foreign investor or consortium of
investors and lenders supervises the construction and operation of an infrastructure facility…
for a determined length of time, and subsequently transfers ownership and control of the
facility to the host government.” SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 291.
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investment in industries reserved to the State sector under Article 44
of the Constitution.656 Indeed, buy-backs in particular have been used
extensively by past investors seeking returns from the State’s energy
sector.657 Under Article 3(b), the Iranian government is not permitted
to guarantee the returns and profitability of such contracts.658
Article 8 of FIPPA entitles international investors to national
treatment protection, providing that foreign investments “shall enjoy
the same rights, protections and facilities available to domestic
investments in a non-discriminatory manner.”659 Article 9 deals with
expropriation and nationalization protections, entitling investors to
compensation.660 More specifically, Article 9 prohibits expropriation
“unless for the public interest, through a legal process, in a non
discriminatory manner, and against payment of appropriate
compensation based on the real value of that investment immediately
before the expropriation.”661 Investors should be mindful that claims
for compensation must be filed within one year of the date of
expropriation, and that “appropriate compensation” may not mean full
protection, or the actual value of the property taken.662 At the same
time, FIPPA includes no language on regulatory takings, or what level
of loss might trigger compensation.663 Articles 11 through 18 all deal
656. See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 44 (dividing the Iranian economy between
different legal categories).
657. See McCary, supra note 119, at 302-04 (highlighting the importance of buy-backs
within Iran’s oil sector). Historically, foreign firms have received approximately 15 to 20
percent of the oil produced from such contracted projects. Id. at 302. However, buy-back
contracts involve many downsides to foreign investors, and are thus highly criticized. See id. at
305 (explaining buy-back sensitivities to fluctuations in oil price); MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 375 (discussing buy-back
flaws generally); id. at 400 (explaining the high upfront capital costs borne by buy-back
investors). In light of the realized need to attract foreign investment, Iran has recently amended
its buy-back system. See supra note 480 and accompanying text.
658. Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 3(b) (“the
return of principal and profit . . . does not rely on any guarantee by the government or banks or
government companies.”).
659. Id. art. 8. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 391-92 (explaining the
importance of national treatment protection).
660. See infra notes 661-62 and accompanying text.
661. Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 9.
662. See id. art. 9 n.1 (stating the one year statute of limitations); Atai, Investor
Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 12 (noting that appropriate
likely means less than full).
663. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at
11 (“[FIPPA] excludes protection against constructive, creeping, indirect, de facto and
‘measures equivalent and tantamount’ to expropriation. Therefore, the foreign investor is not
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with the admission, importation, and repatriation of non-Iranian
capital, generally providing liberal standards for investors to collect
their returns in full after satisfying their tax obligations.664 Finally,
Article 19 provides rules related to dispute resolution.665 Disputes are
referred first to negotiations between the parties, and then to Iran’s
national courts. However, if the dispute falls within the scope of a
Bilateral Investment Treaty between Iran and the investor’s home
State, then the BIT will control dispute resolution procedures.666
Although Article 19 provides no language related to arbitration
contracted between the parties, for the same reasons discussed above,
it is unlikely that Iran could quash a valid arbitration clause agreed at
the contractual level.667
2. International Investment Law
In addition to Iran’s national layer of investment law, the Islamic
Republic is also subject to a range of agreements and obligations
drafted at the international level.668 Through the course of the
sanctions regime Iran has concluded over 50 BITs with various
governments, hailing from both the developed and developing
world.669 Treatification efforts were central to Iran’s economic
strategy throughout the Reform Era, and could gain popularity once

entitled to claim compensation for regulatory expropriation.”). However, compensation will
likely be afforded if changes in national law erode the profitability of non-equity projects
under Article 3(b). See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002,
art. 17 n.2, 17(b).
664. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, arts. 11–
18; Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 11
(establishing FIPPA’s liberal capital controls).
665. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 19
(containing FIPPA’s dispute resolution provisions).
666. See id. (“[disputes]… which can not be settled through negotiations, shall be
examined by domestic courts of law, unless another mode of settlement of disputes has been
agreed upon within a law on bilateral investment agreement with the government of the
Foreign Investor.”).
667. See supra note 634 and accompanying text (explaining Iran’s obligations under the
New York Convention).
668. See infra notes 669-81 and accompanying text.
669. See Atai, Iranian Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 127, at 398; Ghodoosi,
supra note 28, at 1733 (noting Iran’s prevalent BIT signing). By comparison, according to the
Department of State, the United States has signed 47 BITs as of 2015. See United States
Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/
117402.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
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more upon the lifting of multilateral sanctions.670 Pursuant to Article
77 of the Constitution, Iran is a dualist country on the subject of treaty
agreements, requiring treaty ratification by Iran’s Majles in order for
international agreements to become domestically binding.671 The
nation adopted its first model BIT in 2002, which is comprised of 15
articles and a short preamble.672 Notably, Iran’s model BIT contains
provisions related to the encouragement and admission of investment,
most favored nation provisions, expropriation protections, repatriation
and transfer provisions, and dispute resolution agreements.673 Unlike
under FIPPA at the national level, Iran’s model BIT provides direct
reference to arbitration proceedings.674 Article 13 lays out arbitration
procedures for disputes related to interpretation of the BIT itself,
while Article 12 details arbitration obligations stemming from actual
investment disputes.675 Article 12(5) of Iran’s model BIT provides
default procedures for the selection of arbitrators, and Article 12(6)
defaults to the UNCITRAL rules.676
At the multilateral level, Iran has demonstrated a scattered
participation in different international investment treaties.677 The
country’s signing of the Convention on the Recognition of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) in 2001 is a milestone for
670. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (noting the explosion of BITs during
Iran’s Reform Era).
671. See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 77 (“International treaties, protocols, contracts,
and agreements must be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.”); see also
Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1755.
672. See Iran Model BIT, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2861 (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Iran Model
BIT]; see also Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 13
(discussing the model BIT’s origins); Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1758-61 (explaining the
model BIT’s structure). Investors should realize, however, that Iran’s Model Bit is just that: a
model. It has no binding authority by itself, and BITs actually negotiated with other states
could deviate significantly from the protections the Model envisions.
673. See Iran Model BIT, supra note 672, arts. 2-3 (encouragement and admission of
investment); id. arts. 4-5, 7 (most favored nation provision); id. art. 6 (expropriation
protections); id. art. 8 (repatriation and transfer provisions); id. arts. 12-13 (dispute resolution
procedures).
674. See infra notes 675-76 and accompanying text.
675. See Iran Model BIT, supra note 672, arts. 12-13 (containing the Model BIT’s
dispute resolution stipulations).
676. See id. art. 12(5)-(6) (further establishing the Model BIT’s dispute resolution
procedures). For the UNCITRAL Rules, see G.A. Res. 31/98, United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law Arbitration Rules (Dec. 15, 1976).
677. See infra notes 678-81 and accompanying text.
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international investors doing business in Iran, obligating domestic
courts to enforce valid arbitration awards issued by non-Iranian
tribunals.678 Iran is also a member of the World Bank Group, the IMF,
and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”).679
Although not a member of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (‟ICSID”), the government has concluded
numerous BITs that list ICSID as an approved method of dispute
resolution.680 Iran is not a member of the World Trade Organization,
and is the largest economy in the world not within the WTO.681
Taken as a whole, the JCPOA represents a landmark shift for
international investment in Iran. The end of multilateral sanctions
opens the nation’s doors to the international capital that will be
crucial in order for Iran to emerge from hardship and reach its
economic potential.682 This presents numerous potentially lucrative
investment opportunities across various industry sectors.683 While not
without risks, Iranian investment law at the national and international
level has come a long way in protecting investors and moving away

678. See Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConv
ention_status.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) (noting Iran’s ratification of the New York
Convention); Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1749 (explaining the significance of Iran’s New
York Convention ratification).
679. See Member Countries, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/
leadership/members (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) (documenting Iran’s World Bank
membership); Islamic Republic of Iran and the IMF, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.
org/external/country/IRN/index.htm (last updated Mar. 21, 2016) (establishing Iran’s IMF
membership); MIGA Member Countries (181), MULTILATERAL INV. GUARANTEE AGENCY,
http://www.miga.org/who-we-are/member-countries/ (last updated Aug. 26, 2015)
(recognizing Iran’s membership within MIGA).
680. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1763. Specifically, Iran’s BITs with Austria,
France, Italy, Greece, and Korea all list ICSID among other methods for arbitration. Id.; see,
e.g., Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between the
Government of the Republic of Austria and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Austria-Iran, art. 11(2)(d), Feb. 15, 2001, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/193 (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) (listing
ICSID as an approved means of dispute resolution).
681. See generally Danial Arjomandy, Iranian Membership in the World Trade
Organization: An Unclear Future, 47 IRANIAN STUD. 933 (2014); Allison Carnegie, Here’s
What Will Happen if Iran Joins the WTO, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2015, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/24/heres-what-will-happen-if-iran-joinsthe-wto/ (articulating Iran’s status as the world’s largest non-WTO member).
682. See supra Part II.A (discussing the JCPOA).
683. See supra Part II.B (explaining the JCPOA’s footnote six issue).
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from the restrictive provisions of Iran’s constitution.684 As a broad
class of stakeholders with their own goals and interests, international
investors are posed to rank among the JCPOA’s primary
beneficiaries.685
However, the ultimate survival of the JCPOA will also depend
on the deal’s impact on other stake-holding parties, including parties
with traditionally diametrical interests such as the governments of the
United States and Iran.686 As such, international investment’s role in
post-sanctions Iran cannot be isolated from the interests and goals of
these sovereign parties.687 Furthermore, because investment entails an
ongoing package of business relationships, aligned interests,
economic incentives, and wealth transfers, investment itself might be
seen as a catalyst that either advances or weakens the positions of
these other stakeholders.688 For Iran, it seems intuitive that increased
investment will benefit the government of the Islamic Republic.689
But whether this implies a zero-sum blow to the United States and
Iran’s other traditional adversaries depends in part on how investment
is put to work there, and what is done with its results.690 Under
footnote six of Annex II of the JCPOA, the United States is uniquely
situated amongst the rest of the world, in the restrictions remaining in
place for US investors.691 How this might impact the United States’
own foreign policy interests is the focus of the final Part of this
Note.692
III. IMPLICATIONS ON US FOREIGN POLICY
The United States has an interest in future developments
involving the Islamic Republic of Iran.693 How Iran behaves has the
684. See supra Part II.C (exploring investment opportunities in post-sanctions Iran);
supra notes 620-81 and accompanying text.
685. See supra Part II.B (assessing investment law applicable to Iran).
686. See generally supra Part I.A (illustrating the different interests that have emerged
through the history of investment in Iran).
687. See generally supra Part I.A.
688. See infra Parts III.A-C. (exploring engagement).
689. See supra Part II.B (surveying emerging investment opportunities in Iran).
690. See infra Part III (assessing potential implications of increased investment to Iran).
691. See supra Part II.A.2 (identifying the envisioned discrimination against US
investment under the JCPOA.
692. See infra Part III (surveying the potential impact of US-Iran investment on US
foreign policy interests).
693. See generally infra Part III.D (illustrating various ways Iran’s future will interesect
with US foreign policy interests).
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ability to either advance or impair various US foreign policy interests,
and following the JCPOA, international investment will comprise an
important component of the rationale that governs the Islamic
Republic’s behavior.694 The final Part of this Note advocates for a US
investment-based engagement strategy toward Iran as the best means
of informing Iran’s post-sanctions rationale, thereby securing a broad
array of US foreign policy advancements going forward.695
As discussed above, post-sanctions opportunities will attract
profit-seeking international investors to the Islamic Republic of
Iran.696 However, under footnote six of Annex II of the JCPOA, most
US-based investors will be left on the sidelines while other
international players enter this competitive space.697 Until OFAC and
other relevant administrative bodies revise the restrictions reflected in
footnote six, most US international investors will remain precluded
from seizing the JCPOA’s wide range of new opportunities.698
On the one hand, the Obama Administration’s logic behind
footnote six likely results in part from the tangled web of statutory
and administrative authority that comprised the four-decade sanctions
regime.699 In this sense, the United States executive branch must
cautiously ensure that it unwinds sanctions in a manner that does not
exceed its constitutional authority, while simultaneously ensuring it
does not invite US investors to openly conduct unlawful deals in
Iran.700 From this perspective, some short-term over-caution is
prudent.701 On the other hand, one might explain the approach in
footnote six as characteristic of the same decades-long trend in USIran relations, which tends to focus exclusively on downside risks
without any serious appraisal of upside opportunities.702 In this light,
footnote six represents the same trapped line of pre-JCPOA thinking,
incorporating fallacies that underlie much of the sanctions regime:
conducting foreign policy toward Iran solely out of Washington’s
694. See generally infra Part III.D.
695. See infra notes 696-1085 and accompanying text (surveying US foreign policy
issues that would benefit from increased US investment in Iran).
696. See supra Part II.B (identifying the broad investment opportunities that will attract
foreign capital).
697. See supra Part II.A.2 (summarizing the JCPOA’s footnote six issue).
698. See supra Part II.A.2.
699. See supra Part I.B.1 (tracing an abridged development of the US sanctions regime).
700. See supra Part I.B.1.
701. See supra Part I.B.1.
702. See supra note 346 (highlighting the limited perspective of US sanctioning logic).
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fears, without recognizing the shortcomings of isolation as a means of
eliciting cooperation.703 The fact that OFAC has the power to grant
exemption licenses to US foreign subsidiaries, but refuses to
distribute this power to US investors more broadly, indicates that
Washington is still trapped in this exact state of mind.704
There are, of course, moral arguments and legitimate policy
reasons for keeping US investors from freely exporting capital to
Iran.705 From terrorist financing concerns to the regime’s
reprehensible human rights record, there is no shortage of reminders
that international investment in Iran is likely to reach some of the
“bad guys” currently entrenched among the Iranian investment
landscape.706 However the United States government decides to move
forward in implementing the JCPOA, individual policymakers—from
within OFAC on up—will be forced to contend with these serious
moral hesitations.707 But setting morality aside for a moment and
approaching this problem through the harsh lens of realpolitik, it
becomes clear that if the United States is truly focused solely on the
downside in its dealings with Iran, then the opportunity costs of
restricting investment under footnote six might be greater than our
moral blinders allow at first glance.708
703. See supra note 346; see also Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1765-66; Suzanne Nossel,
It’s Time to Kill the Feel-Good Myth of Sanctions, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 9, 2015), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/09/its-time-to-kill-the-feel-good-myth-of-sanctions-russia-iran/
(questioning the efficacy of isolating coercion as a foreign policy tactic).
704. See supra notes 439-44 and accompanying text (examining OFAC’s limited
licensing under the JCPOA).
705. See infra note 706 and accompanying text.
706. See Felicia Schwartz, U.S. Says Iran’s Support of Terrorism ‘Undiminished’, WALL
STREET J., June 19, 2015, 6:45 PM, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-report-finds-35-rise-inglobal-terror-attacks-in-2014-1434720328 (noting U.S. concerns over Iran’s connections to
terrorism); Shaheed, supra note 173 (reporting on the human rights situation in Iran).
707. See generally Schwartz, supra note 706; Shaheed, supra note 173.
708. Often colloquially used in a manner synonymous with pure Machiavellianism,
realpolitik actually refers to a specific methodological approach to international affairs, first
theorized in the mid-nineteenth-century by German journalist August Ludwig von Rochau.
History and Foreign Policy scholar John Bew provides a helpful, crude definition: “According
to Rochau, successful statecraft depended on an appreciation of the historical circumstances in
which the statesman operated. Just as important, however, was the ability to anticipate, and
adjust oneself to, the changing conditions of modernity. Ideas were important in politics . . .
but their importance was to be judged by their political force rather than their purity or
elegance.” JOHN BEW, REALPOLITIK: A HISTORY 6 (2016). See generally I LUDWIG VON
ROCHAU, GRUNDSÄTZE DER REALPOLITIK, ANGEWENDET AUF DIE STAATLICHEN ZUSTÄNDE
DEUTSCHLANDS [FOUNDATIONS OF REALPOLITIK, APPLIED TO THE CURRENT STATE OF
GERMANY] (Karl Göpel ed., 1859).

956

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:839

An alternative strategy, based on a more nuanced balancing of
potential risks and rewards, would be for the United States to deal
with Iran within the severely underutilized framework of
engagement.709 A broad strategy that reached its apex in the USSoviet détente of the Cold War, engagement entails “a foreign policy
strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to
achieve its objectives.”710 In practice, engagement strategies today are
largely centered on “facilitated entry into the global economic arena
and the institutions that govern it,” whereby international investment
plays an obvious role.711 If the United States could craft a strategic
engagement platform targeting Iran, rather than the universal
restrictions imposed on US investors under footnote six, the unique
investment landscape of post-sanctions Iran would provide a powerful
array of ready investors and profit-seeking capital at Washington’s
disposal.712 Capitalizing on these pre-existing market forces could
demonstrate a potent means of influencing Iranian behavior and even
improving US-Iran relations over time.713
Engagement always poses certain risks, and in the case of Iran
these risks should be weighed seriously.714 Washington would need to
caution that such a strategy would not amount to naked appeasement,
nor result in moral hazards that might inspire rogue nation behavior
elsewhere in the world.715 But these risks could be mitigated by the

709. See Richard N. Haass & Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Introduction, in HONEY AND
VINEGAR: INCENTIVES, SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 94, at 1 (explaining
engagement as a means of foreign policy); James Dobbins, Engaging Iran, in THE IRAN
PRIMER, supra note 12, at 203-05 (overviewing US engagement within the context of Iran).
710. Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 1; see also EDWARD
MCWHINNEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DÉTENTE: ARMS CONTROL, EUROPEAN
SECURITY, AND EAST-WEST COOPERATION ix (1978); Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction,
supra, at 8-9 (noting the engagement strategy’s prominence during the Cold War).
711. Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 11; see also SALACUSE, supra
note 10, at 10 (“The identity of who owns and controls a country’s enterprises has important
political implications because assets and enterprises endow their owners with both political
and economic power.”).
712. See infra Parts III.C–D.
713. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 22 (emphasizing international investment’s ability
to foster improved relations between states); Sam Sasan Shoamanesh, How and Why to
Promote US-Iran Rapprochement, MIT INT’L REV. (June 1, 2009), http://web.mit.edu/mitir/
2009/online/us-iran.pdf (assessing the potential benefits of US engagement toward Iran).
714. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 4.
715. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 4; MIROSLAV NINCIC,
THE LOGIC OF POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT 40-42 (2011) (summarizing arguments surrounding the
dangers of appeasement).
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wide variety of tactics available within the engagement toolbox.716
For example, the United States could strategically employ some
composition of both conditional and unconditional engagement
policies.717 The former, which involve a “narrow . . . tit-for-tat
process,” would contractually premise certain incentives upon
specific Iranian behavior.718 Under such a policy, key Iranian
concessions could be strategically highlighted and specifically
sought.719 In contrast, unconditional engagement policies would
demand no prerequisite Iranian action for the United States to begin
seeking greater influence there.720
Foreign policy scholars Richard N. Haass and Meghan L.
O’Sullivan identify two branches of unconditional engagement,
consisting of reciprocal or nonreciprocal incentive platforms.721
Reciprocal unconditional engagement would generally amount to
broad goodwill gestures offered by the United States, which, if unmet,
would be abandoned for their failure to yield meaningful positive
results.722 Nonreciprocal unconditional engagement, on the other
hand, would mobilize broad long-term incentives in the absence of
any formal expectations of positive counteraction.723 These incentives
would be left on the table for individual Iranian actors including
members of civil society, even if little change can be expected from
the government.724 While international investment often plays a major
role in each of these engagement categories, it need not be the only or
even the primary means of employing engagement.725 “Funding
nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances .
. . and promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other
716. See infra notes 718-27 and accompanying text.
717. See infra notes 718-20 and accompanying text.
718. Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 5; see also Raymond Tanter
& Meghan O’Sullivan, Sanctions and U.S. Foreign Policy, WASH. INST. NEAR E. POL’Y (Mar.
13,
2001),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/sanctions-and-u.s.foreign-policy (further explaining conditional engagement).
719. See supra note 718 and accompanying text.
720. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 3; see also ROBERT S.
LITWAK, REGIME CHANGE: U.S. STRATEGY THROUGH THE PRISM OF 9/11 116–17 (2007)
(expounding on the idea of unconditional engagement).
721. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 4 (summarizing reciprocal
and nonreciprocal unconditional engagement).
722. See id. (discussing reciprocal unconditional engagement).
723. See id. (detailing nonreciprocal unconditional engagement).
724. See id.; LITWAK, supra note 720, at 117 (theorizing on unconditional engagement’s
interplay with a target-nation’s civil society).
725. See infra notes 726-27 and accompanying text.
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nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the
incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural
engagement.”726 By strategically and cautiously assembling some
combination of these above tactics, the United States could develop
an Iran policy attuned to both engagement’s inherent, and Iran’s
specific, risk profiles.727
Considering recent developments, a US-Iran engagement
strategy would hardly entail some radical foray into uncharted
territory.728 In fact, footnote six issues aside, various commentators
have classified the JCPOA itself as a form of constructive
engagement: a regrettable term associated with US President
Reagan’s controversially lenient policies towards apartheid South
Africa, which were tangled in all the usual foreign policy knots of the
Cold War.729 Lexicon issues aside, the actual substance of
engagement within the JCPOA represents a fertile starting point from
which a broader US-Iran engagement strategy might grow.730 By
lifting or licensing around the technical restrictions faced by US
investors under footnote six, the United States government could
choose to continue in the spirit of the JCPOA, and use engagement
with Iran as a means to achieve an array of US foreign policy goals.731

726. Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 6.
727. Although consistently outdated, various policy proposals using some combination
of the incentive packages discussed supra have been produced in the past. See, e.g.,
Shoamanesh, supra note 713; Suzanne Maloney & Ray Takeyh, Engage Iran, DEMOCRACY
(Fall 2007), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/6/engage-iran/.
728. See infra notes 729-31 and accompanying text.
729. See, e.g., Rouhani Statement at the General Assembly, supra note 2; James Goodby
& Kenneth Weisbrode, A Middle East, Whole and Free, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 3,
2015),
http://www.usnews.com/
opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/09/03/iran-deal-can-be-the-first-step-toward-a-peaceful-freemiddle-east (characterizing the JCPOA as a form of “constructive engagement”); see also
Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 1; Sanford J. Ungar & Peter Vale, South
Africa: Why Constructive Engagement Failed, FOREIGN AFF. (Winter 1985-1986),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/1985-12-01/south-africa-whyconstructive-engagement-failed (highlighting the shortcomings of Constructive Engagement in
South Africa, against the backdrop of the wider Cold War).
730. See generally supra Part II.A (overviewing the JCPOA).
731. See infra Part III.D (considering how to steer investment in Iran toward various US
foreign policy interests).
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Engagement Generally: The Post-WWII European Engagement
Model

In at least the last century, the most commonly cited and
successfully executed engagement strategy is the expansive series of
international incentive networks adopted in the aftermath of World
War II.732 The horrors of global war and total economic destruction,
particularly amongst countries in war-ravished Europe, momentarily
provided a rare alignment of international peace-seeking priorities
that has not occurred since.733 In this light, the entire corpus of
contemporary international law is heavily steeped in the logic of
engagement.734 The United Nations, in its organization of the world
into sovereign and equal States, is one obvious construct aimed at
fostering the principles of dialogue and cooperation in the place of
coercive isolation.735 Likewise, the Bretton Woods Institutions, set up
to reconstruct Europe and eventually the rest of the world in the wake
of World War II, explicitly prioritized international economic
integration as one of the primary preventative means of combating
national militarism and the outbreak of conflict between States.736
732. See OLAV STOKKE, THE UN AND DEVELOPMENT: FROM AID TO COOPERATION
xvii-xviii (2009) (noting the link between peace and security and economic integration,
especially following World War II); see also NINCIC, supra note 715, at 75 (discussing the
logic of the United States’ post-War Marshall Plan).
733. See Rama Mani, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Conflict Prevention, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 300 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds.,
2007) (“In the aftermath of the Second World War and the Holocaust, the founders of the
United Nations focused on reorienting international affairs away from aggression and
unilateralism toward cooperation and multilateralism.”); cf. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Whereas disregard and contempt for human
rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and
freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common
people. . . .”).
734. See supra note 733 and accompanying text.
735. See U.N. Charter art. 1 (introducing the purposes of the United Nations); see also
STOKKE, supra note 732, at 41 (“Both the United Nations and the League of Nations were
created with the primary objective of securing and maintaining peace after wars that had
originated in Europe but had come to involve most of the world. . . .”); ALISON DUXBURY,
THE PARTICIPATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE ROLE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 60–63 (2011) (summarizing the initial goals of the UN).
736. See BOB REINALDA, ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:
FROM 1815 TO THE PRESENT DAY 279–80 (2009) (“[Bretton Woods’] purpose was to provide
a new, stable and predictable international monetary regime. . . . The US expected that a
decrease in trade tariffs, combined with this monetary regime, would lessen the economic
nationalism of the interwar period.”); see also The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944, U.S.
DEP’T STATE, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/98681.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
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These economic engagement strategies were matched by remarkable
national policies of engagement, such as the US Marshall Plan, which
devoted unprecedented appropriations to the post-War reconstruction
and economic development of Europe.737 This widespread
engagement can also be witnessed in the post-war proliferation of
international treaties, from international human rights covenants to
investment treaties and dispute resolution agreements.738
As a whole, these global engagement efforts comprise an
outstanding success story.739 Although not without shortcomings, the
postwar international system has proven resilient in preventing
massive armed conflicts and the types of large and destabilizing wars
that cripple regional and/or the global economy.740 When economic
integration is achieved most successfully, such as among the
European Union nations, the idea of war between States today seems
farfetched.741 This is remarkable, considering that less than a century
ago it was the conflicts between these exact States that launched
globe-spanning destruction.742 Sixty years of economic engagement
between EU Member States has nurtured an astonishing alignment of
national interests and common policy objectives.743 Furthermore, the
wealth-building capacity of economic engagement has, across the

2016) (“[The Great Depression and World War II] led international leaders to conclude that
economic cooperation was the only way to achieve both peace and prosperity, at home and
abroad.”).
737. See NINCIC, supra note 715, at 75-78; STOKKE, supra note 732, at 42 (providing an
overview of the Marshall Plan). While the Marshall Plan was undoubtedly inspired out of
national US interests in containing the spread of Soviet communism, the point here is that such
goals were pursued (and eventually obtained) in Europe through powerful positive incentives,
as opposed to intimidation or pressure. See NINCIC, supra note 715, at 75. .
738. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 338-41; LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1320 (1990) (examining post-World War II treatification).
739. See infra notes 740-48 and accompanying text.
740. See Steven Pinker, Violence Vanquished, WALL STREET J., Sept. 24, 2011,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180 (elucidating on the global decline in
world violence).
741. See generally John S. Duffield, Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The
Contributions of Regional Security Regimes, 20 REV. INT’L STUD. 369 (Oct. 1994); Peace in
Our Time, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2004, http://www.economist.com/node/3194365 (assessing
peace in Europe since World War II).
742. See supra note 741 and accompanying text.
743. See Duffield, supra note 741; REINALDA, supra note 736, at 406-35 (summarizing
the process of Europe’s post-World War II integration).
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world, resulted in inspiring leaps in global living standards.744 The
postwar international system has also provided a foundational forum
for States to pursue and negotiate extended engagement policies.745
One might seriously question how differently the world could have
fared through the Cold War, had it not been for the nuclear nonproliferation efforts and arms control treaties born out of the
institutional engagement platforms within the UN and elsewhere.746
As alluded to above, the US-Soviet détente of the 1970s might
represent the most important bilateral engagement policy, which
resulted in positive consequences that rippled throughout the world.747
Since the close of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council
has also provided an effective (if structurally flawed) means of
curbing the behavior of individual bad actors.748 Broadly, all of this
background bodes well for an investment-based US engagement
platform targeting Iran.749
Yet despite these successes of the postwar international system,
it is important to also recognize the limitations in transferring their
lessons to any alternative fact pattern.750 As mentioned, these global
engagement policies were born out of an unreplicated alignment of
global priorities and international interests, specific to the aftermath
of World War II’s large-scale destruction.751 Furthermore, the total
victory over fascism at the end of the War provided an imperial
means of imposing this international system, and literally forcing
engagement policies from States that might have otherwise remained
744. See Daniel Griswold, The Blessings and Challenges of Globalization, CATO INST.
(Sept. 1, 2000), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/blessings-challenges-globalizati
on (noting globalization’s impact on rising standards of living); STOKKE, supra note 732, at
40–41 (explaining the importance of the UN as an international platform for development
goals).
745. See infra notes 746-47 and accompanying text.
746. See REINALDA, supra note 736, at 373-87; Disarmament Treaties Timeline, U.N.
OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF., http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/timeline/ (last visited
Mar. 27, 2016) (providing an overview of the UN’s role in peaceful coexistence and nuclear
arms control throughout the Cold War).
747. See supra note 710 and accompanying text (mentioning engagement in the form of
US-Soviet détente).
748. See Mani, supra note 733, at 308-09; Martin Sieff, Why the UN Security Council
Still Matters, GLOBALIST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.theglobalist.com/un-security-councilstill-matters/ (noting the effectiveness of the Security Council, despite its criticisms).
749. Cf. supra notes 732-48 and accompanying text (noting the promise of the postwar
engagement model).
750. See infra notes 751-54 and accompanying text.
751. See supra note 733 and accompanying text.
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noncompliant.752 From this it stands to reason that post-World War II
engagement, while ideal, might not provide the best model for
twenty-first century engagement policymaking concerning Iran.753
Fortunately, more recent history provides an insightful alternative
model: Europe’s Critical Dialogue with Iran throughout the 1990s.754
B.

Engaging Iran: Europe’s Model of Critical Dialogue

While the unique circumstances that inspired engagement at the
end of World War II provide an imperfect lens for developing USIran engagement policies, the European experience of engaging Iran
though the 1990s contains more direct lessons for US
policymakers.755 For approximately a decade following 1992,
European States implemented a variety of engagement policies aimed
at positively inducing changes in Iranian behavior, under the umbrella
label of Critical Dialogue.756 Like the postwar global engagement
policies discussed above, Critical Dialogue was also born out of
particular facts and circumstances that merit the attention of
policymakers.757 First, the strategy was grounded in the expansive
pre-existing European trade relationships with Iran, which following
the Iran-Iraq War were posed to grow significantly as Iran
transitioned to a peacetime economy.758 Then, like now, Europe also
had a more immediate interest in the regional stability of the Middle
East, which made influence through trade there a sensible strategy.759
752. See REINALDA, supra note 736, at 269-346 (running through the role of US
hegemony on the post-World War II international system); Dan Reiter, How War Will End in
Afghanistan—Even If Conflict Does Not, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 6, 2009), http://foreignpolicy.
com/2009/10/06/how-war-will-end-in-afghanistan-even-if-conflict-does-not/ (discussing the
significance of World War II’s total victory).
753. See supra note 752 and accompanying text.
754. See infra Part III.B.
755. Compare Part III.A (considering post-War War II engagement), with Part III.B
(explaining Europe’s Critical Dialogue with Iran through the 1990s).
756. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 33-50; Patrick Clawson, Europe’s ‘Critical
Dialogue’ with Iran: Pressure for Change, WASH. INST. NEAR E. POL’Y (Apr. 9, 1997), http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/europes-critical-dialogue-with-iranpressure-for-change (summarizing Critical Dialogue).
757. See infra notes 758-64 and accompanying text.
758. See Reissner, supra note 94. at 35-36; Walter Posch, Iran and the European Union,
in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 190-91 (mentioning the economic foundations of
Europe’s stance on Iran).
759. While reckless isolation policies grounded in narrow special interests might have
been permissible across the Atlantic, Europe’s close proximity to the wars, terrorist
movements, and refugee crises that sprung from Middle East instability demanded an approach
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In 1992, at the start of Critical Dialogue, it was also relevant that
the United States was largely silent on the issue of Iran. President
Clinton’s policy of Dual Containment had not come into existence
until 1993, and this silence provided Europe the freedom to initiate
policies without attracting criticism from its North American ally.760
Third, Iran’s domestic political climate was particularly suited to
policies of engagement with Europe.761 The reconstruction years
under President Rafsanjani positioned the nation in a search for
international capital, European hostages in Lebanon had just been
freed with Iranian cooperation, and the reform platform pursued later
under President Khatami gave Critical Dialogue advocates a renewed
surge of optimism that their strategy was actually working.762 Finally,
the last major factor was Europe’s own investment climate throughout
the 1990s.763 Intra-European engagement and economic integration
via the EU had created new wealth and surplus capital seeking new
horizons for productive use, and given all the above, Iran seemed an
ideal destination for this foreign investment.764
to Iran grounded in realism. See Ellie Geranmayeh, Europe’s Edge: By Engaging with Iran,
Europe Can Assert Its Power, FOREIGN AFF. (July 19, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/western-europe/2015-07-19/europes-edge (“[Europe] is closer to the Middle East, and
is more vulnerable to conflicts on its doorstep, from refugee inflows, to internal radicalization,
to Islamophobic backlash.”); Leon Hadar, Europe’s Mission in the Middle East, AM.
CONSERVATIVE (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/europesmission-in-the-middle-east/ (comparing US and European interests in the Middle East). The
current Syrian refugee crisis and the Paris terrorist attacks of November 13, 2015 emphasize
just how exposed Europe is to Middle East turmoil. See generally Paris Attacks: What
Happened on the Night, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe34818994; Eleanor Steafel et al., Paris Terror Attack: Everything We Know on Saturday
Afternoon, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/france/11995246/Paris-shooting-What-we-know-so-far.html (summarizing the Paris
terror attacks); see also Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts, BBC
NEWS (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911; Heather Horn, Can
the Welfare State Survive the Refugee Crisis?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/02/welfare-state-refugees-europe/463272/
(overviewing the current refugee crisis’ impact on Europe).
760. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (noting the beginning of Dual
Containment).
761. See infra note 762 and accompanying text.
762. See supra note 95; Reissner, supra note 94, at 37 (discussing the goodwill following
Iran’s role in releasing European hostages held in Lebanon); see also supra Part I.A.3
(overviewing the Reconstruction and Reform periods of Iranian history); Geranmayeh,
Europe’s Edge, supra note 759 (asserting the influence of the Rafsanjani and Khatami eras on
Iran-European relations).
763. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 36; Posch, supra note 758, at 190-91 (observing the
role of Europe’s investment climate in the adoption of Critical Dialogue).
764. See supra note 763 and accompanying text.
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However, as history and the multilateral spread of the sanctions
regime demonstrate, these policies ultimately failed to achieve
meaningful political changes in Iran.765 In short, Critical Dialogue did
not work.766 International affairs scholar Johannes Reissner identifies
five main reasons for this failure, which should raise red flags for
future policymakers.767 These factors resulted in a hollow engagement
policy, which in time became seen as an “immoral cover for
maintaining lucrative commercial relations with Iran that ignored
Iranian behavior concerning human rights, terrorism, the Arab-Israeli
peace process, and weapons of mass destruction.”768 These straying
policies thus devolved into a one-sided platform, “too obviously in
the interest of the European side to be considered by Iran as an
incentive.”769 In this sense, the failure of Critical Dialogue mirrors a
common pitfall of international investment more generally, where
both investors and investor home States forget that investment implies
a partnership or at least common interest with investor host States.770
Following the failures of Critical Dialogue at the policy level,
European investors were eventually made losers as well, being
ultimately forced to exit Iran with the rise of multilateral sanctions.771
These failures, however, provide instructive lessons for future
policymakers, also noted by Reissner.772 These include: Critical
Dialogue’s failure to manifest an actual strategy, as opposed to a
765. See supra Parts I.A-B (dealing with the history and legal framework throughout the
sanctions regime).
766. See infra notes 767-71 and accompanying text.
767. These include: the failure to appreciate Iran’s internal political divisions; the failure
to overcome economic challenges and Europe’s own economic self-interest; the failure to
meaningfully use European economic leverage to alter Iran’s behavior; the failure of European
States at the national level to coordinate policies with other European States; and the failure to
bring Washington onboard, thereby bridging the rift in policies between Europe and the United
States. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 37–42 (identifying the reasons Critical Dialogue failed).
768. Id. at 34.
769. Id. at 39.
770. See, e.g., SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 359 (“Lawyers, arbitrators, government
officials, and corporate executives sometimes view investment treaties solely as being about
foreign investors and foreign investment. That view may lead to distortions in understanding
and interpreting investment treaty texts.”); cf. Leyla Davarnejad, Strengthening the Social
Dimension of International Investment Agreements by Integrating Codes of Conduct for
Multinational Enterprises 2-3, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (Mar. 27, 2008), http://
www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40352144.pdf (advocating for socially conscious
international investment).
771. See supra notes 176, 296 and accompanying text (addressing Europe’s eventual
arrival at sanctions targeting Iran).
772. See infra note 773 and accompanying text.
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common political stance shared by individual European States; its
extensive delay to meet the expectations of reform-minded Iranians;
its failure to engage with Iranian civil society, preferring to deal
exclusively with the Iranian government; its lack of specific
guidelines, which provided no tangible positive or negative
incentives; and finally, its failure to connect the dots and convey its
importance to Europe’s own populations, who came to see
engagement with Iran as an artificially polarized choice between
being for multinational corporations or for human rights.773
Ultimately, these lessons provide some insights regarding how
the United States might structure its own engagement policies toward
Iran on the back of the JCPOA.774 Any US engagement policy
seeking to move past the restrictions of footnote six of the JCPOA
needs to steer clear of these pitfalls.775 Unfortunately, it is a product
of history that these insights must be indirectly inherited, since the
United States played no constructive role in Europe’s Critical
Dialogue.776 During the Khatami years in particular, such US absence
is commonly cited as a historic missed opportunity.777 But none of
this should be taken to mean that Europe’s engagement efforts were
entirely futile. On the contrary, engagement may sometimes be
viewed as playing the strategic long-game, making tactical moves in
the present that “strive to maintain momentum” for better relations in
the future.778 Nobody possesses a realistic assessment of how Critical
Dialogue might have impacted Iran’s social fabric or the political and
economic forces that comprise the Islamic Republic.779 While one
might question whether any of the momentum of Critical Dialogue
could have possibly survived the long Ahmadinejad years, it is no
small development that President Rouhani was elected on a platform
773. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 42-45 (highlighting Critical Dialogue’s perceived
dichotomy between business and human rights); Posch, supra note 758, at 190 (“The main
complaint was that the diplomatic dialogue was cheap cover for booming European business
relations with the oil-rich Islamic Republic.”).
774. See infra notes 776-83 and accompanying text.
775. See supra notes 773-74 and accompanying text.
776. See supra Part I.A.3 (providing a history of Iran-US relations through the
Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies).
777. See Mousavian, How to Engage Iran, supra note 142; Takeyh, Time for Détente
With Iran, supra note 357 (observing the missed opportunity for US-Iran engagement
throughout the Reform Era).
778. Richard N. Haass & Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Conclusion, in HONEY AND VINEGAR:
INCENTIVES, SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 94, at 187.
779. See supra note 778 and accompanying text.
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promising a return to the internationalism of Iran through the
1990s.780 If the United States neglected a historical opening the first
time around with Khatami, then perhaps Rouhani and the JCPOA
provide a second shot at that missed opportunity.781 If so, US foreign
investment will be a crucial component of seizing it and recalibrating
Washington’s relationship with Tehran.782
C. Engagement Today: Can the United States Engage with Iran?
One of the critical arguments often raised against a US policy of
engagement toward Iran is that, in its current form, the Islamic
Republic is simply too irrational or theocratically zealous for any
engagement policy to result in meaningful change.783 A similar
criticism often raises moral objections to engagement, out of Iran’s
regional conduct, which in places like post-2003 Iraq has directly cost
US lives.784 Such behavior is problematic, but it is hardly irrational or
preclusive to successful engagement between the US and Iran. In fact,
this sort of behavior is not unusual to situations that strategically call
for increased engagement.785 International relations theorist Stephen
M. Walt and others commonly cite Kennedy and Johnson-era
Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s bombastic criticism of US-Chinese
engagement, in comparisons to the pervasive contemporary rhetoric

780. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 492-93; Suzanne Maloney, Prudence And Hope Prevail: Iran Election Reflects Desire
For Change, Brookings Inst. (June 16, 2013), http://www.
brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2013/06/15-rouhani-iran-president (characterizing
Rouhani’s 2013 election campaign).
781. See supra Part I.A.3 (exploring Iran’s Reform Era).
782. See generally infra Part III.D (surveying how international investment could be
used to bring Iran within the fold of US foreign policy).
783. See Jennifer Rubin, An irrational regime, WASH. POST, May 26, 2015, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2015/05/26/an-irrational-regime/ (“ . . .
President Obama’s notion that a revolutionary Islamic, virulently anti-Semitic regime can
nevertheless be rational or is “moderating” is wrong-headed and dangerous.”); MALONEY,
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 452 (quoting
President Clinton’s Reform Era arguments against US-Iran engagement).
784. See Jeffrey Goldberg, Iran Killing American Troops in Iraq and Afghanistan,
ATLANTIC (July 6, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/irankilling-american-troops-in-iraq-and-afghanistan/241486/; Richard Kemp & Chris DriverWilliams, Killing Americans and their Allies: Iran’s Continuing War against the U.S. and the
West, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUBLIC AFF. (Mar. 2015), http://jcpa.org/killing-americans-alliesirans-war/ (condemning Iran’s conduct in the region).
785. See infra notes 786-89 and accompanying text.
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lobbed at Tehran.786 History showed such commentary to be severely
misguided, as Nixon and Kissinger’s later efforts at engagement with
China helped wind down the Vietnam War, even at a time when
China was providing direct military support to the Viet Cong.787
Advocates of US-Soviet détente faced similar outcries.788 Whether or
not some of the fear-mongering criticisms in the Iranian case amount
to mobilization by Islamophobia, they are at the very least a
problematic basis upon which to formulate sound US policy.789
This is not to say that Iranian State practices are anything less
than reprehensible.790 The Islamic Republic’s support for civiliantargeting terrorist groups, its draconian crackdown on internal dissent,
and its blatant violations of international human rights norms are each
grossly unpalatable.791 But from a realist’s perspective, it would be
786. Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs in 1966,
Secretary Rusk declared: “Peking’s present state of mind is a combination of aggressive
arrogance and obsessions of its own making. . . . I would be inclined . . . to advance the view
that a country whose behavior is as violent, irascible, unyielding, and hostile as that of
Communist China is led by leaders whose view of the world and of life itself is unreal. . . .
They seem to be immune to agreement or persuasion by anyone, including their own allies.”
Quoted in Stephen M. Walt, Is Iran the Next China?, FOREIGN POL'Y (Oct. 7, 2013), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/07/is-iran-the-next-china/; see also MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra
note 26, at 73 (further contextualizing Rusk’s comments).
787. See Takeyh, Time for Détente With Iran, supra note 357. See generally Moments in
U.S. Diplomatic History: Nixon Goes to China, ASSOCIATION FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. &
TRAINING, http://adst.org/2013/02/nixon-goes-to-china/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016)
(overviewing President Nixon’s engagement with Communist China).
788. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 294; Détente and Arms Control,
1969-1979, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, https://history.state.gov/milestones/19691976/detente (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (acknowledging US-Soviet cooperation on key
strategic issues, even while war raged in Vietnam).
789. See Hugh Gusterson, A Double Standard on Nuclear Weapons?, MIT CTR. INT’L
STUD. (Apr. 2006), http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/gusterson_audit.pdf; Robert Naiman, The U.S.
and Iran are talking. Why is the New York Times peddling Iran Islamophobia?, Daily Kos
(Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/4/19/1084743/-The-U-S-and-Iran-aretalking-Why-is-the-New-York-Times-peddling-Iran-Islamophobia (identifying common
Orientalist tropes within some criticisms of US-Iran engagement).
790. See infra note 791 and accompanying text.
791. See Ryan Mauro, Fact Sheet, Iranian Support for Terrorism, CLARION PROJECT
NATIONAL SECURITY, http://www.clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/Iranian-Support-ForTerrorism.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview,
Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (terrorism);
Stephanie Nebehay, Rouhani has not stopped Iran suppressing human rights: U.N. envoy,
REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-un-rights-idUSBREA2D175
20140314; Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iran steps up campaign against activists and lawyers,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/06/iran-humanrights-activists-lawyers (suppressing civil and political rights); Annual Report: Iran
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foolish for the United States to deny that Iran is capable of behavioral
change, and equally foolish to fail recognizing that both Iran and the
world have changed in various ways since the era of Critical
Dialogue.792 The election of President Rouhani provides some
indication of Iranian distaste toward the confrontational foreign
policies and wasteful economic policies intensified under
Ahmadinejad.793 The fact that Iranians have gone down this path,
experienced its undesirable consequences, and managed to
collectively correct their direction cannot be a bad thing from the
perspective of future engagement.794 Although Rouhani is unlikely to
prove a human rights champion anytime soon, his political
momentum post-JCPOA provides an interesting window through
which to examine Iran’s internal developments. 795 Concerning the
potential efficacy of international investment as a tool of engagement,
the official Iranian attitude on capitalism provides a more promising
evolution. Compare President Khatami’s 1997 comments, “we
definitely do not want capitalism. But we respect the value of
capital,”796 to Supreme Leader Khamenei’s more recent declaration:
The mere possession of capital and its investment in the progress
of the country is not a bad thing. It is an admired thing. It is not
contemptible at all. What is contemptible is that capital and
capitalism form the basis of all the major decisions made in the
2015/2016, AMNESTY INT’L. (2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-andnorth-africa/iran/report-iran/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); World Report 2015: Iran Events of
2014, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (2015), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/countrychapters/iran (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
792. See infra notes 793-811 and accompanying text.
793. See supra Part I.A.4 (outlining the Ahmadinejad presidency); cf. supra note 600 and
accompanying text (examining the most recent moderate gains, in Iran’s 2016 elections).
794. Compare supra Part I.A.4, with Part I.A.5 (contrasting the presidencies of
Ahmadinejad and Rouhani).
795. See Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Rouhani’s credibility under scrutiny at UN as Iran’s
hardliners block reforms, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/sep/23/rouhani-credibility-scrutiny-united-nations-iran-hardliners-block-reforms;
Nicholas Vinocur, Iranian dissidents warn human rights worse under Rouhani, POLITICO
(Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.politico.eu/article/iranian-dissidents-human-rights-worse-rouhani/
(pointing out the continuation of Iran’s past human rights practices under Rouhani); see also
Alireza Nader, Post Deal, Can Rouhani Deliver on Promises of Reform?, AL-MONITOR (July
24, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/rouhani-iran-reform-nucleardeal.html (evaluating Rouhani’s political capital in the aftermath of the JCPOA). In this sense,
the outcome of Iran’s February 2016 elections should also be read positively. See supra note
600 and accompanying text.
796. MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28,
at 263.
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country and drag everything towards themselves… This is
contemptible capitalism. But if some people have capital and
they use it to help the country develop – and of course they will
also make some profit in this process – then that act [investment]
is good, and the profit made is halal.797

Such a development looks especially encouraging for a future
engagement policy heavily grounded in foreign investment.798
Stepping away from Iran, international law has also undergone
drastic changes since the era of Critical Dialogue.799 The early
twenty-first century has been marked by a proliferation of
international investment treaties, and a clarification of international
customs and principles related to both international investment and
dispute resolution procedures.800 Khamenei’s comments aside, these
factors indicate that future international investment in Iran would
likely be far more institutionally protected than throughout most of
Europe’s Critical Dialogue.801 Other developments in the business
world, like the explosion of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”)
principles, provide additional tools that could be utilized for the
purpose of bringing investment-induced change to Iran.802 Likewise,
the rise of innovative international human rights mechanisms, such as
the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council and the
Universal Periodic Review (“UPR”), offer an additional means of

797. Id. at 500.
798. See infra Part III.D.
799. See infra note 800-04 and accompanying text.
800. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 345 (“In 2001 alone, a total of 97 countries
concluded some 158 BITs, a numerical record for any single year since the BIT movement
began in 1959. The cumulative result of this effort has been the creation of an increasingly
dense BIT network linking over 179 different countries by the end of 2011.”). Concerning
Iran, some 29 BITs have been signed since 2001, consisting of agreements with some of
Europe’s largest economies. See International Investment Agreements Navigator: Islamic
Republic of Iran, INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/
CountryBits/98#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (listing Iran’s BITs); see also Recent
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), UNITED NATIONS CONF. TRADE &
DEV., 2 (Apr. 2014), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf
(noting the proliferation of investor-state arbitration in recent years).
801. See supra notes 779-800 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part II.D.
802. See Alexander Chernev & Sean Blair, Doing Well by Doing Good: The Benevolent
Halo of Corporate Social Responsibility, 41 J. CONSUMER RES. 1412, 1412 (2015); Larry Catá
Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the
Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 101, 111-15 (2008)
(establishing the rise of CSR mechanisms).
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gradually influencing Iran’s internal behavior.803 Taking these
developments as a unified whole, there is reason to believe that the
United States could now utilize engagement strategies toward Iran
more effectively than at any time prior in history.804
Finally, the ultimate strategic blunder for the United States
would be failure to recognize that the United States too has changed
since the era of Critical Dialogue.805 The US role in the Middle East,
along with US interests there, have undergone serious transformations
in the past twenty years.806 From 9/11 and the rise of international
terrorism, to the US experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, to the
complete collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, to the Arab
Spring and subsequent civil wars, to the ascent of ISIS and increased
Chinese-Russian great power posturing, no region of the world has
moved as fast in past decades as the landmass stretching from
Pakistan to the Maghreb.807 With these various developments, US
interests have also evolved.808 While Iran has played a prime
adversary in US thinking on the Middle East since 1979, today
Washington’s actual interests in the region are largely
indistinguishable from those in the immediate aftermath of the Shah’s
ousting.809 After decades spent trapped in unceasing sanctions inertia,
803. See generally Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, OHCHR, http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2016); Ted
Piccone, Why are Human Rights Special Procedures so Special?, BROOKINGS, 59-61 (20112012), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2011/9/human-rightspiccone/09_human_rights_piccone.pdf (introducing the UN’s Special Procedures); see also
Dr. Elvira Domínguez-Redondo, The Universal Periodic Review – Is There Life Beyond
Naming and Shaming in Human Rights Implementation?, 4 NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 673
(2012); John Carey, The U.N. Human Rights Council: What Would Eleanor Roosevelt Say?,
15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 459, 460-61 (2009) (discussing the UPR process).
804. See supra notes 800-03 and accompanying text.
805. See infra notes 806-11 and accompanying text.
806. See Adam Garfinkle, Redefining U.S. Interests in the Middle East, FOREIGN POL’Y
RES. INST. (Oct. 9, 2008), http://blogs.harvard.edu/mesh/files/2008/10/interests_garfinkle.pdf;
Stephen M. Walt, U.S. Middle East Strategy: Back to Balancing, FOREIGN POL'Y (Nov. 21,
2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/21/u-s-middle-east-strategy-back-to-balancing/
(tracing the evolution of US interests in the Middle East).
807. See Walt, U.S. Middle East Strategy, supra note 806 (“The Greater Middle East is
in the midst of a profound upheaval whose future course is still uncertain and that is unlikely
to be resolved anytime soon.”). See generally International Relations Theory and a Changing
Middle East, PROJECT MIDDLE E. POL. SCI. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://pomeps.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/09/POMEPS_Studies_16_IR_Web1.pdf (exploring the Middle East’s rapid
changes from the perspective of international relations).
808. See infra notes 809-11 and accompanying text.
809. See supra Part I.A (providing a history of US-Iran relations).

2016]

POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN

971

the JCPOA now frees Washington to take stock and honestly evaluate
where the United States stands on the region generally, and on Iran in
particular.810 In doing so through the lens of engagement, there are
many reasons to believe that US interests in the region will be best
served through an investment-rich engagement strategy that is
mutually beneficial to both the United States and Iran.811
D. Steering Engagement Toward US Foreign Policy Interests
A broad and comprehensive US-Iran engagement strategy would
have a positive impact on a variety of Washington’s Iran-specific and
wider Middle East foreign policy interests.812 In order to explore how
these developments might potentially manifest, the following
provides a survey of Washington’s largest and most commonly cited
regional foreign policy interests, and how international investment
and other engagement tools might be used to achieve positive results
within each of them.813 While these opportunities exist at present only
as status quo opportunity costs, a liberalizing of OFAC’s footnote six
guidance and the encouragement of US investment to Iran could
provide a means of transforming them into reality.814
1. Limiting Iran’s Nuclear Capacity & Regional Non-Proliferation
The primary impetus for the JCPOA was to curb Iran’s nuclear
development program.815 Fears of a nuclear-armed Iran concerned not
only the behavior of the Islamic Republic, but also the regional
response to such a development.816 The logic, often reduced to catch
phrases like “an arms race in the Middle East,” was that if Iran
acquired a bomb, then its regional rivals like Saudi Arabia would be
pressed to develop their own nuclear weapons programs, thereby
proliferating nuclear arsenals in one of the world’s most volatile
regions.817 As discussed above, the JCPOA limits Iran’s nuclear
810. See supra Part I.B (summarizing the sanctions regime); supra Part II.A
(overviewing the JCPOA).
811. See infra Part III.D.
812. See infra notes 815-1085 and accompanying text.
813. See infra Part III.D.
814. See supra note 230 (noting OFAC’s license-granting authority); infra Part III.D
(asserting how increased investment in Iran may be used to secure US foreign policy interests).
815. See supra Part II.A.1 (overviewing the JCPOA).
816. See infra note 817.
817. See, e.g., Seth Mandel, The Iran Deal Ensures a Mideast Arms Race – Nukes and
All, N.Y. POST, Aug. 21, 2015, http://nypost.com/2015/08/21/the-iran-deal-ensures-a-mideast-
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development program by placing severe restrictions and oversight
mechanisms over their development process.818 While the
effectiveness of these provisions has been widely debated, a more
interesting question for the purposes of this Note is how engagement
and increased international investment to Iran might influence Iran’s
nuclear development logic.819 The JCPOA aside, engagement by itself
is likely to result in greater Iranian compliance with IAEA regulations
and other international standards.820 One reason for this is that
engagement naturally implies increased leverage over Iranian
actions.821 The more Iran’s economy comes to depend on foreign
capital, the more it will seek to safeguard this capital, acting in a way
that ensures its continued integration within the international
economy.822 In this regard, the JCPOA’s snapback provisions are only
as effective as the magnitude of engagement.823 The more Iran has to
lose in terms of international investment and trading partners, the
greater the fear of sanctions will become in the Islamic Republic.824
At the same time, a reinterpretation of footnote six to allow US
investment to flow to Iran would make it more difficult for Iran to
ever argue that the United States has violated its terms of the deal.825
arms-race-nukes-and-all/ (arguing that the JCPOA will result in a Middle East arms race);
Tobin Harshaw, Iran Deal Didn’t Trigger the Middle East Arms Race, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-08-06/iran-deal-didn-t-triggerthe-middle-east-arms-race (rejecting the JCPOA’s role in a Middle East arms race).
818. See JCPOA, supra note 185, at Annex I (containing the agreement’s nuclear
development restrictions).
819. See infra notes 820-824 and accompanying text.
820. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 165 (articulating the
connection between economic engagement and compliance); NINCIC, supra note 715, at 80-82
(establishing the impact of commercial activity on constructing key interests within a target
society).
821. See Lorber & Rosenberg, supra note 339 (addressing the “dollar diplomacy” of the
JCPOA); David M. Anderson & David G. Alpher, We gain more than we lose in the Iran
nuclear deal, BALTIMORE SUN (Dec. 24, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-1224/news/bs-ed-iran-leverage-20131223_1_leverage-iran-nuclear-deal-great-deal (“In the case
at hand, increasing resource leverage doesn’t just ease the pressing nuclear issue but builds the
networks that will be necessary to eventually shift the relationship with Iran to a peace footing.
Increasing resource leverage builds relationships, reduces overall threat and reluctance to
negotiate and in so doing creates an amplifying effect.”).
822. See supra note 821 and accompanying text (noting that increased economic
engagement leads to increased leverage).
823. See supra notes 422-23 and accompanying text (snapbacks); see also supra notes
821-22 and accompanying text (leverage).
824. See supra notes 821-23 and accompanying text.
825. See Lorber & Rosenberg, supra note 339 (suggesting the importance of
demonstrated goodwill, in terms of building future coalitions). Even in the event of a breach
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A show of US goodwill in the form of increased US investment to
Iran would make it all the more domestically unpopular for any
individual Iranian hardliner to renege on the JCPOA.826 Likewise, if
the JCPOA were to fail and the United States were ever forced to
rebuild an international coalition aimed at containing Iran, this
goodwill could prove important in securing the cooperation of
Washington’s allies.827
Considering that the United States and Israel have made it
explicitly clear that they will not accept a nuclear-armed Iran, and that
all options are on the table to prevent Tehran from acquiring a bomb,
there are also many reasons to believe that some form of détente will
be a far more effective bargaining tactic than resorts to threats and
military action.828 Many analysts raise compelling arguments that
threatening Iran is counterproductive, in that it convinces the
government that it actually needs a nuclear arsenal.829 Between the
United States’ unrivaled military power, and Israel’s own nuclear
weapons capabilities, the use of threatening rhetoric convinces the
Islamic Republic that the possession of nuclear weapons is vital to
deterring US or Israeli military action, and is thus a legitimate interest
to Iran’s national security.830 By this logic, the presence of a rich layer
of international investment in Iran would not only serve as a “carrot,”
but the threat of yanking FDI from Iran would provide the United
States and its allies a more credible “stick” to influence Iranian
behavior, short of counterproductive threats.831

and the triggering of the JCPOA’s snapbacks, renewing a coalition against Iran is likely to
require a great deal of international political capital. See generally Rubin, James Baker is
Wrong, supra note 595 (attacking the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism).
826. See supra note 825 and accompanying text (asserting the political importance of
good faith compliance with the JCPOA).
827. See supra notes 825-26 and accompanying text.
828. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 285; Stephen M. Walt, On Iran, Try
Backscratching, Not Blackmail, FOREIGN POL'Y (Feb. 22, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/
2013/02/22/on-iran-try-backscratching-not-blackmail/ (critiquing military threats as a form of
nuclear non-proliferation leverage).
829. See Walt, On Iran, Try Backscratching, supra note 828; MEARSHEIMER & WALT,
supra note 26, at 285 (arguing the role of US and Israeli military threats within Iran’s nuclear
logic).
830. See supra note 829 and accompanying text.
831. See supra notes 829-830 and accompanying text.
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2. Encouraging Reform Within the Islamic Republic and/or Regime
Change
Another often-cited US goal in Iran is to see transformative
changes to the Islamic Republic itself.832 In reality, this goal exists as
a sort of conglomerated shortcut to various other US regional
interests, such as the state of human rights for ordinary Iranians,
counterterrorism efforts, regional cooperation, and so on.833 The idea
is that a more moderate government in Tehran would prove easier to
work with on these various issues.834 At its most extreme, this goal
manifests in calls for outright regime change.835 However, whether
one hopes for gradual changes to the Islamic Republic, or an abrupt
regime change, there are reasons to believe that both goals will be
best served by US engagement and increased investment.836 A
peaceful transition away from Iran’s theocratic state is not beyond the
realm of possibility.837 One of the usual products of international
investment is the formation of narrow alliances with local elites,
which, through the normal conduct of business, come to share
common interests.838 In Iran, such alliances could prove a meaningful
way of infiltrating Tehran’s government and influencing its shape and

832. See, e.g., John Hannah, It’s Time to Pursue Regime Change in Iran, FOREIGN POL'Y
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/05/its-time-to-pursue-regime-change-in-iran/;
Jamie M. Fly & Gary Schmitt, The Case For Regime Change in Iran, FOREIGN AFF. (Jan. 17,
2012), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-01-17/case-regime-change-iran
(proposing Washington’s interests in fostering regime change in Iran).
833. Cf. Michael Gerson, To gain leverage in Iran, the U.S. Needs to Go Green, WASH.
POST, Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
12/01/AR2009120103283.html; James A. Lyons, Regime Change Needs to be Endgame in
Iran, WASH. POST, July 20, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/20/regimechange-needsto-be-endgame-for-iran/.
834. See Gerson, supra note 833.
835. See, e.g., supra note 832.
836. See infra notes 837-90.
837. CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 115 (“There are possibilities for a peaceful
transition to a post mullocracy, though these tendencies are unlikely to be fostered should there
be a military confrontation with the West, since in Iran, as elsewhere, the ‘nationalist card’
may easily trump all others.”); Ray Takeyh, How to Squeeze Iran on the Nuclear Issue, WASH.
POST, Nov. 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/11/AR
2010111106147.html (“By linking its diplomacy to human rights behavior, the United States
could mitigate Iran’s nuclear ambitions and pave the way for a peaceful transition from clerical
autocracy to a more responsible and humane government.”).
838. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 55; NINCIC, supra note 715, at 80-82 (analyzing
the common interests formed by investment and similar commercial activity).
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its functions.839 The issue here, of course, is whether these sorts of
alliances (and the post-sanctions inflow of FDI generally) will
entrench the current regime, or lead to new stakeholders that erode the
government’s current monopoly of authority.840 Naturally, who owns
Iran’s resources is important, as such ownership carries political
weight in the country.841 Unfortunately, under the status quo, much of
the Iranian economy is run by State-owned or semi-State-owned
enterprises, making it difficult for investment to reach or create
alternative stakeholders.842 It is also safe to assume that current elites
will be watching international investment closely, in order to
safeguard their control of the national economy.843 However, all
things held constant, international investment tends to give rise to an
increasingly developed host-State private sector.844 In Iran, such a
development could have a positive impact on the country’s overall
governance.845
One of the chief criticisms of the sanctions regime was that the
traditional US negotiating style “failed to provide Iranian moderates
with an alternative narrative to use against hardliners like Ayatollah

839. Cf. supra note 838 and accompanying text (noting general political consequences of
international investment).
840. See Robert Jarvis, Turn Down for What? The Iran Deal and What Will Follow,
FOREIGN AFF. (July 15, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-07-15/turndown-what; Laurence Norman, Iran’s Economy Stands to Get Boost If Nuclear Deal Reached,
WALL STREET J., Apr. 2, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-economy-stands-to-getboost-if-nuclear-deal-reached-1428019653 (presenting the debate on whether the JCPOA will
entrench the regime or foster moderation).
841. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 10; NINCIC, supra note 715, at 80-81 (noting the
link between economic empowerment and political power).
842. See supra notes 635-41 and accompanying text (dealing with privatization in Iran).
843. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note 778, at 164 (addressing the
resistance of established elites); cf. supra notes 359-64 and accompanying text (examining the
IRGC’s presence in Iran’s economy). Indeed, IRGC opposition to the JCPOA demonstrates
this exact trend. See David Patrikarakos, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Loved the Sanctions,
DAILY BEAST (Jul. 16, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/16/iran-srevolutionary-guards-loved-the-sanctions.html; Mahan Abedin, Iran Hardliners Mobilise
Against Nuclear Deal, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Jul. 25, 2015), http://www.middleeasteye.net/
columns/iran-hardliners-mobilise-against-nuclear-deal-601933816.
844. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 112-14 (exploring why states turn to
privatization); Seyed Reza Miraskari et al., Analyzing Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment on
Private Sector in Economic Growth of Iran, 4 INT’L J. ACADEMIC RES. BUSINESS & SOC. SCI.
223, 235 (2014) (examining the impact of FDI on Iran’s private sector).
845. Cf. supra note 844 and accompanying text (noting the general trend toward
increased privatization, as a result of international investment).
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Khamenei.”846 Such an approach always failed to recognize the
political strategy of Iranian moderates, who, having their hands
structurally tied by the Supreme Leader, always attempted to
gradually reform the system without overthrowing it or challenging
its legitimacy.847 Like Khatami and Rafsanjani before him, President
Rouhani is now shifting Iranian politics toward the system’s moderate
center.848 However, his success in this endeavor will require the help
of international investment and demonstrated improvements in Iran’s
standard of living.849 International investment provides a powerful
means of incentivizing specific stakeholders, though different
packages of incentives.850 By crafting a smart engagement policy, the
United States could seize on Iran’s current political situation and
actually empower moderate pragmatists.851
One of the primary failures of Europe’s Critical Dialogue was its
exclusive focus on government-to-government incentive platforms,
without seeking to influence key segments of Iran’s social fabric.852
At the same time, the failure to monitor internal Iranian political
developments precluded Europe from identifying key targets of
increased engagement.853 But things have changed since the 1990s.854
846. Stephen M. Walt, Our Myopic Approach to Iran, FOREIGN POL'Y (Mar. 26, 2013),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/26/our-myopic-approach-to-iran/.
847. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 18; MALONEY, IRAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 260-62 (clarifying the
methodologies of Iran’s reform movement under Khatami).
848. See Mohsen Milani, Rouhani’s Foreign Policy: How to Work with Iran’s Pragmatic
New President, FOREIGN AFF. (June 25, 2013), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/
2013-06-25/rouhanis-foreign-policy; Sayed Hossein Mousavian, The Rise of the Iranian
Moderates, AL-MONITOR (July 5, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/
rise-iranian-moderates.html (presenting the moderation of the Rouhani administration). Here
too, the recent February 2016 elections evidence that Rouhani’s strategy is working. See supra
note 600.
849. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 18; Ganji, supra note 600
(assessing Rouhani’s prospects for bringing meaningful change to Iran).
850. Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note 778, at 168; NINCIC, supra note 715,
at 80-81 (emphasizing the ability for economic engagement to reach specific stakeholders).
851. See Takeyh, Time for Détente With Iran, supra note 357 (positing Rouhani’s
potential of sidelining Iranian hardliners); Ganji, supra note 600 (suggesting Rouhani’s need to
demonstrate tangible improvements to Iranian livelihoods, following the JCPOA).
852. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 43 (identifying Critical Dialogue’s failure to reach
Iranian civil society); cf. Posch, supra note 758, at 191 (illustrating the state-to-state focus of
Critical Dialogue).
853. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 45 (pointing out Critical Dialogue’s failure to
monitor Iran’s internal politics); see also Michael Rubin, Europe’s Critical Dialogue with
Iran: An Assessment, WASH. INST. NEAR E. POL’Y (Jan. 10, 2000), http://www.washington
institute.org/policy-analysis/view/europes-critical-dialogue-with-iran-an-assessment

2016]

POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN

977

As was made explicitly clear in the short-lived rise of the Green
Movement, today the international community has come to recognize
that there are important divisions within Iranian society.855 There is no
reason to believe that continuing to isolate the Iranian regime
demands international isolation of Iran’s population.856 More
specifically, the world has noticed that a struggling middle class
exists in Iran, and it is these Iranian stakeholders that the United
States should seek to empower.857 Indeed, according to some analysts,
the future of Iran will largely boil down to how this middle class fares
in Iranian society.858
Iran’s Bezaari—its urban commercial class—has played a
meaningful historical role in the nation’s political currents.859 As
opposed to its traditional reliance on urban marketplaces, today’s
Bezaari is highly connected with the global economy.860 Naturally,
international sanctions and economic mismanagement created severe
frustrations within the Bezaari during the height of the sanctions
regime.861 Yet, these frustrations never manifested into outright
political mobilization.862 Notably, the Bezaari’s absence from the
2009-10 Green Movement protests partly explains why that
movement failed to take flight.863 This failure to mobilize the Bezaari
(identifying Critical Dialogue’s failure to seriously address Iranian domestic reform and
political stability).
854. See infra notes 855-78 and accompanying text.
855. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (discussing Iran’s Green
Movement).
856. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note 778, at 173-74 (positing the
fallacy of isolating Iran’s population); cf. Bill Spindle, Iran’s Legions of Weary Young People
Push Against the Old Ways, WALL STREET J., July 7, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iranslegions-of-weary-young-people-push-against-the-old-ways-1436323115 (showing Iranian
youth’s distaste with international isolation).
857. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 46; Marais, supra note 449, at 12 (noting the
potential of Iran’s middle class).
858. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 46; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 115
(establishing the Iranian middle class’ importance to the future of Iran).
859. See Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 108; FISK, supra note 45, at 110
(illustrating the political importance of Iran’s Bazaari).
860. See Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 108 (identifying the ties of Iran’s Bazaari
to world markets); cf. A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324, at 129-141 (assessing the impact of
sanctions on Iran’s Bazaari and wider middle class).
861. See A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324, at 129-141; Harris, The Bazaar, supra
note 50, at 109 (exploring how sanctions have harmed Iran’s Bazaari).
862. Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 109.
863. See id.; Kevan Harris, Iran: Why Workers Aren’t Joining the Protests, TIME, Feb.
22, 2011, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2053157,00.html (pointing out the
rift between the Bazaari and Iran’s youth during the Green Revolution).
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is a result of ongoing political cleavages, which have made this
segment of Iranian society extremely difficult to publically
mobilize.864 While the Bezaari should not be rendered exactly
synonymous with Iran’s wider middle class, which today extends well
beyond the traditional marketplace, its shared economic interests with
the middle class generally provides insight into how a US engagement
strategy might identify key destinations of US trade and investment
capital.865 Where negative incentives like sanctions tend to get
drowned out in political divisions, the positive inducements of trade
and investment might be used to broadly inspire middle class support
for moderate government policies, effectively pressuring the regime
from below.866 In his coverage of Iran’s 1979 Revolution, journalist
and historian Robert Fisk notes, “while the physical power behind the
revolution lay in those colossal street demonstrations by the urban
poor and Islamic revivalists, it was the middle class from the bazaar .
. . that provided economic backing for Khomeini’s return. It was this
merchant class and its alliance with the mullahs that emerged as the
critical combination of secular and religious opposition.”867 Given
international investment’s potential alignment with host country
private sectors, a US engagement policy could be crafted to
specifically target these powerful agents of change in Iran.868 In doing
so, international investment and economic integration more broadly
might undermine the alliance so crucial to the Islamic Republic’s
survival since 1979.869
Another strategic Iranian target of US engagement would be the
nation’s large youth population.870 As explained above, there are
some existing sympathies between the West and Iran’s youth,
stemming in large part from cultural overlap and consumerist

864. See Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 109; Arang Keshavarzian, Back to the
Future: Bazaar Strikes, Three Decades after the Revolution, MIDDLE E. INST. (Jan. 29, 2009),
http://www.mei.edu/content/back-future-bazaar-strikes-three-decades-after-revolution (noting
the political divisions within Iran’s modern Bazaar).
865. See infra notes 866-69.
866. See NINCIC, supra note 715, at 80-82; Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note
778, at 165 (articulating engagement’s ability to influence target-state politics).
867. FISK, supra note 45, at 110.
868. See supra note 838 and accompanying text.
869. Cf. supra note 838 and accompanying text (noting general political consequences of
international investment).
870. See Memarian & Nesvaderani, supra note 576, at 49-50; Spindle, supra note 856
(characterizing Iran’s youth).
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preferences.871 During the sanctions era, Iran’s youth openly called
for better relations with the rest of the world.872 The youth population
is also a key vulnerability for the government in Tehran, which faces
serious challenges in meeting this segment’s growing socioeconomic
needs.873 Although increased FDI to Iran might have the unintended
consequence of partially insulating the regime from these
vulnerabilities, such investment could occur in a manner that actually
strengthens the youth within Iranian society, making the government
more vulnerable to their future demands.874 Iranian youth face the
highest rate of unemployment in the country today.875 By targeting the
flow of international investment in ways that provide young Iranians
with jobs, the United States could create common interests between
Iranian youth and the global economy.876 Furthermore, by revising
Washington’s guidance on footnote six and allowing development,
the United States could empower Iran’s youth and “promot[e]
positive changes in Iran.”877 Put another way, “[if] we really believe
in the transformative power of markets, Hollywood, hip-hop, the
Internet, democracy, and free speech, let’s turn ‘em loose on Tehran.
If your goal is a more moderate Iran, that approach is likely to work a
lot better than ostracism, covert action, and repeated threats of
military force, which merely galvanize Iranian nationalism and help
justify continued repression by hardliners.”878
Of course, even in targeting these key segments of Iranian
society, the problem that a large percent of the national economy is
held in the hands of regime loyalists still remains.879 In particular, the
IRGC’s expansive hold of the private sector following President
871. See Houshyar & Sarmadi, supra note 539; Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50, at
110 (identifying Western sympathies among Iran’s youth).
872. See McGrath Goodman, supra note 330, at 15; Spindle, supra note 856 (noting the
youth’s open resistance to regime hardliners).
873. See Memarian & Nesvaderani, supra note 576, at 49; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note
41, at 315 (discussing the regime challenges of meeting the expectations of Iran’s youth).
874. See infra notes 875-78.
875. See supra note 576 and accompanying text (looking at youth unemployment in
Iran).
876. Theoretically, emerging technologies that are most likely to employ recent
graduates, such as the renewable energy sector, could provide the best means of channeling
international investment toward Iran’s youth. Cf. supra notes 558-67 and accompanying text
(discussing the potential of a renewable energy industry in Iran).
877. Lorber & Rosenberg, supra note 339.
878. Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117.
879. See supra notes 359-64 and accompanying text (exploring the role of the IRGC in
the Iranian economy).
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Ahmadinejad’s privatization decrees is especially troubling.880 No
matter how strategically specialized the United States’ incentive
platforms, a downside of engagement is that any improvement in
Iran’s economy is likely to put money in the pockets of the IRGC.881
However, without belittling this risk, one should at least recognize
that the mainstream US conception of the IRGC is commonly
misguided.882 First, the IRGC does not possess broad public support
in Iran, and its concentrated hold of the private sector has been highly
controversial.883 In fact, during the Ahmadinejad years, future
President Rouhani was a crucial critic of its growing grip on the
private sector.884 From this, it is likely that future privatization under
Rouhani will seek to dilute the economic power of the IRGC.885 At
the same time, the IRGC itself is not a monolithic establishment.886
While most guardsmen have some form of existing or past ties to the
military, they are in fact “ordinary people,” comprised of a wide
variety of individual motivations and interests.887 Furthermore,
despite their broad ties to Khamenei, internal divisions do exist within
the IRGC.888 It is not beyond reason that the ordinary self-interests
and profit motives of capitalism may exacerbate these divisions, were
Iran’s private sector to grow alongside capital inflows to Iran’s

880. See supra notes 359-64 and accompanying text.
881. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 165 and 168 (conceding
the impossibility of an entirely targeted engagement platform); see also Elliott Abrams et al.,
supra note 161; Babak Dehghanpisheh & Yeganeh Torbati, Firms Linked to Revolutionary
Guards to Win Sanctions Relief Under Iran Deal, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.
reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-sanctions-idUSL5N10I3N320150810 (revealing that some
firms linked to the IRGC will benefit from the JCPOA).
882. See infra notes 883-90 and accompanying text.
883. See WEHREY ET AL, supra note 362; Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, supra note
360 (exploring the widely held middle class perception that, before his death, Khomeini
actually banned the IRGC.)
884. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 285 (citing Rouhani’s criticism of the IRGC’s role in the economy before being elected);
cf. Arash Karami, Rouhani Criticizes Consolidation of Power in Government, AL-MONITOR
(Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/rouhani-criticizesrevolutionary-guard-power.html# (offering more recent Rouhani criticisms of the IRGC).
885. See Karami, Rouhani Criticizes Consolidation of Power in Government, supra note
884; Mehdi Khalaji, President Rouhani and the IRGC, WASH. INST. NEAR E. POL’Y (Jan. 8,
2014), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/president-rouhani-and-theirgc (assessing Rouhani’s contentious relationship with the IRGC).
886. See Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, supra note 360, at 61; WEHREY ET AL, supra
note 362, at 81 (pointing out an unexpected degree of factionalism within the IRGC).
887. Sadakova, supra note 158.
888. See supra note 886.
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broader economy.889 Were further splinterings to occur, such a
development would represent a remarkable achievement of US
foreign policy. However remote the likelihood of this actually
happening, the larger purpose of a US engagement strategy would be
to empower alternative stakeholders in Iran, capable of bringing
positive changes to Tehran’s political establishment. Empowering
such agents of change should not be precluded on account of the
regime accruing some unintentional benefits.890
3. Enhancing Regional Counterterrorism
Another key US foreign policy interest, both in the Middle East
and globally, is the need to combat terrorism and prevent the growth
of terrorist movements targeting the United States and its allies.891
Iran’s continued support for movements like Hezbollah, Hamas, and
Islamic Jihad is in opposition to Washington’s counterterrorism
efforts.892 However reprehensible, Tehran’s support for these terrorist
organizations is not irrational, nor entirely born of religious or
ideological zealotry.893 In the same way that Iran’s nuclear ambitions
might be explained by their seeking a meaningful deterrent to US or
Israeli military action, maintaining their influence with groups

889. See WEHREY ET AL, supra note 362, at 93 (“[The IRGC’s] vested and increasing
interests in the country’s economy make it an increasingly conservative force rather than a
radical one.”); cf. Meir Javedanfar, Leaked Video May Signal Cracks in Iranian Leadership,
AL-MONITOR (Jun. 4, 2014), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/iran-irgc2009-elections-violations-leaked-video-reformists.html# (hypothesizing emerging cracks
within the IRGC).
890. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 172; Takeyh, Time for
Détente With Iran, supra note 357 (asserting the benefits of engaging Iran, despite some
potential gains to Iran’s hardliners).
891. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, WHITE HOUSE (June 2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf; Linda Robinson,
The Future of Counterterrorism: Fewer Drones, More Partnerships, WASH. POST , Oct. 18,
2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-future-of-counterterrorism-fewer-dronesmore-partnerships/2013/10/18/47e49f02-35cc-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html.
892. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Counterterrosim, Chapter 3: State Sponsors of
Terrorism Overview, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2016); Robert Baer, Who’s a Terrorist?, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/tehran/axis/terror.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).
893. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 283-84 and 294; Walt, Accentuate
the Positive, supra note 117 (analyzing Iran’s motives for supporting regional terrorist
movements). Indeed, if Iran’s Twelver Shi’ite ideology is the primary lens to understand
Tehran’s behavior, the regime’s support for Sunni Palestinian movements such as Hamas is
confounding.
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situated along the borders of Israel traces a similar reasoning.894 In the
event of a US or Israeli strike on Iran, it makes sense for the Islamic
Republic to seek influence over movements capable of inflicting
direct damage on Washington’s closest regional ally.895 This
Machiavellian logic aside, the United States should not stand for
Iran’s continued support of violent non-State actors that seek to harm
noncombatants.896 Yet contrary to much JCPOA criticism, enhanced
engagement between Washington and Tehran could be the best means
of curtailing Iran’s support for regional terrorist movements.897
For example, the incentive of massive international investment
could provide a reason for Tehran to question its ongoing support for
terrorist movements.898 Up until the present, supporting such terrorists
has been a relatively cheap way of harassing US regional interests,
and Iran has had little reason to question such policies.899 This
calculus would look very different if the risk of precluding investment
made Iran’s actions far more expensive.900 Similarly, the United
States has a strategic interest in co-opting Iran’s influence over these
terrorist movements.901 In the 1980s, Iran’s cooperation was vital to
the safe release of Western hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon,
and future US-Iran cooperation could have a constructive influence
894. Cf. supra notes 828-31 and accompanying text (citing Iran’s security interests in a
nuclear weapons program).
895. Cf. supra notes 828-31 and accompanying text.
896. See supra note 892.
897. See, e.g., Jonathan Schanzer & Mark Dubowitz, It Just Got Easier for Iran to Fund
Terrorism, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jul. 17, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/17/it-just-goteasier-for-iran-to-fund-terrorism-swift-bank/; James Phillips, The Iran Nuclear Deal: What the
Next President Should Do, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2015/10/the-iran-nuclear-deal-what-the-next-president-should-do (stipulating
that the JCPOA will empower regional terrorism). But see infra notes 898-914 (arguing that, to
the contrary, broad engagement following the JCPOA may provide the best means of reigning
in Iran’s support for regional terrorist movements).
898. See Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117 (noting that under the status quo,
Iran has no reason to meaningfully question its support for regional terrorist movements);
Takeyh, Time for Détente With Iran supra, note 357 (further arguing that under the status quo,
Iran has nothing to lose by supporting movements targeting Israel).
899. FACT SHEET IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, CLARION PROJECT, https://www.
clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/Iranian-Support-For-Terrorism.pdf (last visited Apr. 11,
2016); Marisa Sullivan, Middle East Security Report 19: Hezbollah In Syria, INST. ON THE
STUDY OF WAR (Apr. 2014), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hezbollah_
Sullivan_FINAL.pdf.
900. See supra note 898. Cf. supra notes 819-24 and accompanying text (illustrating the
leverage created by international investment, within the context of Iran’s nuclear program).
901. See infra notes 902-05.
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on Lebanon’s political stability.902 Likewise, in the event of any
resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Iran’s sway over
Hamas and Islamic Jihad could prove vital to concluding that
decades-long conflict.903 Israel’s own past negotiations with Hamas
indicate that these movements are not incommensurable with the
negotiating table, and Iranian cooperation could result in a more
pliant negotiating position of Israel’s enemies.904 In the absence of
peace talks, such influence could be similarly used to heal the rift
between Fatah and Hamas, which has been partially responsible for
both a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and the complete paralysis of
Palestinian development within the West Bank: trends that foster
regional extremism.905
Finally, as repugnant as Iran’s support for terrorism may be, it
would behoove US policymakers to recognize that the movements
receiving Iranian funding and arms supplies are hardly the same breed
of Wahhabi extremists bent on striking the United States.906 While
902. See supra note 95; Mousavian, How to Engage Iran, supra note 142 (exploring
Iran’s role in releasing Western hostages in Lebanon); see also Takeyh, Time for Détente With
Iran, supra note 357; MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 303 (contending that Iran’s
influence could be used to reign in movements like Hezbollah).
903. See Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117; Shlomi Eldar, Without Hamas,
Israelis and Palestinians Can Find Peace, AL-MONITOR (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/hamas-gaza-peace-oslo-accords-terror-palestinians.html#
(looking at how Hamas has complicated the Israeli-Palestinian peace process).
904. See Daniel Sobelman, Israel and Hamas Appear to Be Advancing Towards Ending
the Siege on the Gaza Strip, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/daniel-sobelman/israel-hamas-gaza_b_8037888.html; Uri Savir, Israel, Hamas Negotiate,
but Truce Still Far Off, AL-MONITOR (Jun. 30, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2015/06/israel-hamas-truce-negotiations-egypt-netanyahu.html (discussing IsraelHamas negotiations); see also Takeyh, Time for Détente With Iran, supra note 357; Yoav
Zeitun, IDF Intelligence: Deal Could Help Rein in Iran’s Terrorist Activities, YNET NEWS
(Jul. 17, 2015), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4691689,00.html (presenting the
argument that engaging Iran could help tame movements like Hezbollah).
905. See Ahmad Melhem, The Deepening Rift Between Fatah, Hamas, AL-MONITOR
(Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/palestine-hamas-fatahplo-accusations.html#; Adnan Abu Amer, Gaza Bombings Deepen Hamas-Fatah Rift, ALMONITOR (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/gazaexplosions-hamas-fatah-division.html# (exploring the Fatah-Hamas rift). Within the West
Bank, fears of a Hamas victory have prevented elections within the Palestinian Authority. See
Khaled Abu Toameh, Palestinians Need Reforms, Not Elections, GATESTONE INST. (May 4,
2015), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5686/palestinians-reforms.
906. Although a comprehensive and nuanced treatment of Wahhabism and Islamic
extremism is beyond the scope of this Note, as a general matter Wahhabism refers to a specific
conservative sect of Sunni Islam that originated among 18th century Najdi Bedouins, in
rejection of the tomb and shrine worship that adherents perceived to amount to polytheism. At
its core, Wahhabism advocates a return to Tawhid, the principle of Islamic monotheism. In
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nothing justifies the intentional targeting of civilians, it is worth
noting that Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad all conceive
themselves as legitimate resistance movements combating Israeli
occupation.907 The same cannot be said for movements like Al Qaeda
and ISIS.908 Noting the rise of groups like Al Qaeda, shortly before
his death, Ayatollah Khomeini himself decried “‘the anti-Koranic
ideas propagating the baseless and superstitious cult of

doing so, it rejects a host of worldly institutions as impure additions to Islam (bid’ah), from
secular music and dance to the contemporary nation-state. Originally a narrow and parochial
school of Islam, Wahhabism gained fortuitous significance with its adoption by Mohammed
Ibn Saud in 1733, whose ancestors would later establish the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after
World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As the monarchy’s oil wealth, the threat
of pan-Arab nationalism, the threat of communism, and other political developments all
evolved over the course of the 20th century, strains of Saudi Wahhabism were cross-pollinated
with other Salafist political writings, such as those of Sayyed Qutb, whose own scholarship
was deeply informed by his personal experiences in the United States and in Egyptian prisons.
The combination of Wahhabi puritanism and Qutb’s jihadist-takfiri calls to redeem the Ummah
(Islamic community) from modern vices (more specifically, Jahiliyya, or the Ummah’s current
state of godless ignorance) directly provided an intellectual foundation for movements like Al
Qaeda, and more recently, ISIS. See generally ROBERT LACEY, INSIDE THE KINGDOM: KINGS,
CLERICS, MODERNISTS, TERRORISTS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAUDI ARABIA 10-11 (2009);
LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11 (2006);
Yousaf Butt, How Saudi Wahhabism is the Fountainhead of Islamic Terrorism, WORLD POST
(Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-yousaf-butt-/saudi-wahhabism-islamterrorism_b_6501916.html; Trevor Stanley, Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and
Salafism, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION (Jul. 15, 2005), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/
tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=528#.VoR4lhorJ-U; Samer Abboud, The Only Way to
Take on ISIS is to Take on Wahhabi Doctrine, MONDOWEISS (Nov. 23, 2015), http://
mondoweiss.net/2015/11/isis-wahhabi-doctrine.
907. See Profile: Hamas Palestinian movement, BBC NEWS (Jul. 11, 2014), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13331522; Borzou Daragahi, Lebanon’s Hezbollah savors
increasing legitimacy, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/13/
world/fg-lebanon-hezbollah13; Islamic Jihad Urges Factions to Escalate Resistance After
Arson Attack, MA’AN NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.maannews.com/Content.
aspx?id=766804 (revealing how these organizations conceive of themselves). The point is not
that such differentiation morally exonerates these groups’ tactics, but that from a perspective
of accurate US threat assessment, the threat posed by terrorist organizations supported by Iran
pail in comparison to the threats posed by groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS. See Daniel
Benjamin, Is Iran About to Unleash a Wave of Terrorism Against the United States?, FOREIGN
POL'Y (Aug. 13, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/13/is-iran-about-to-unleash-a-waveof-terrorism-against-the-united-states-iran-hezbollah-assad/ (“Since the 1996 attack, a small
number of Americans have been caught up and killed in Iranian-backed terror attacks directed
against Israelis, but specifically American targets have not been struck.”).
908. Tom Quiggan, Understanding al-Qaeda’s Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work,
TERRORISM RESEARCH INITIATIVE (2009), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.
php/pot/article/view/67/html;
http://www.protect.expert/ideology-al-qaeda-prof-matthewogilvie/.
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Wahhabism’.”909 The amount of blood and treasure Iran has recently
spent combating Sunni insurgents like ISIS and Al-Nusra Front (and
defending Bashar al-Assad) in Syria and Iraq indicates that the
Islamic Republic’s position on Wahhabi terrorism has not strayed too
far from the days of Khomeini.910 In this light, Iran is committed to an
all too familiar war against terrorism, when it comes to the terrorists
actually seeking to target the United States and its most strategically
valuable allies in Europe.911 Engagement could lead to positive
breakthroughs in this arena.912 While the United States cannot
realistically abandon its ally Israel to groups like Hezbollah and
Hamas, it should at least nuance its designation of Iran as a State
sponsor of terrorism, and realistically explore whether the positive
incentives of engagement might be used to reign in the terrorist
movements that make their home in South Lebanon and the Occupied
Territories.913 In fact, if Iran were to alter its conduct and allow the
United States to lift it from lists of designated sponsors of terrorism,
many of the administrative-legislative knots that restrict the lifting of
sanctions could theoretically be circumvented.914

909. FISK, supra note 45, at 125. That said, these comments should not be taken out of
the political context of Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia. See supra notes 369-72 and
accompanying text (discussing Iran-Saudi tensions).
910. See Will Fulton et al., Iranian Strategy in Syria, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF
WAR (May 2013), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria1MAY.pdf; Eli Lake, Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Assad, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 9,
2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-09/iran-spends-billions-to-prop-upassad (assessing the costs of Iran’s operations in Syria). While countering Wahhabi terrorism
is unquestionably less important to Iran than retaining their geostrategic influence in Syria, the
ultimate result is still an alignment of US and Iranian interests.
911. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 63 (“We may believe that all
terrorist acts are morally wrong, but from the perspective of U.S. strategic interests, not all
terrorists are alike.”); Thomas F. Lynch III, Sunni and Shi’a Terrorism: Differences that
Matter, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. (Dec. 29, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/research/
papers/2008/12/29-terrorism-lynch (juxtaposing trends within Sunni and Shi’a terrorism).
912. See supra notes 891-911.
913. At least on a rhetorical level, Iran has offered to stop supporting these groups in the
past. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 303; David Coghlan, Timing Iran:
Broaching the U.S.-Iran Divide Would Have Been Easier Ten Years Ago, GEO. J. INT’L AFF.
(Nov. 20, 2013) (noting Khatami’s offers to cease terrorist funding in exchange for US
concessions).
914. However such a development would only apply to US terrorism-based sanctions,
and not sanctions pertaining to human rights, ballistic missiles proliferation, and so on. See
supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
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4. Protecting Traditional US Allies: Saudi Arabia & Israel
Overlapping with the United States’ counterterrorism interests,
perhaps the most sensitive criticisms of the JCPOA have concerned
what the deal means for the United States’ traditional Middle East
allies.915 Any massive flow of US capital to Iran would likely amplify
such criticisms.916 Even when sanctioning Iran had run contrary to the
United States’ direct interests, Washington’s ties with Israel and the
Sunni Gulf States (most notably Saudi Arabia) were perceived to have
merited a continuation of the sanctions regime.917 Considering the
intractable divisions between these two camps, it is unsurprising that
Washington’s Middle East policies have at times been incoherent.918
This, ironically, has helped fuel the rise of Iran, especially since the
US removal of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party from Iraq in 2003.919
Both Israel and Saudi Arabia do have legitimate reasons to be
concerned about Iran’s rise to Middle East dominance: Iran boasts the
most sizeable armed forces of any State in the region, and its
geostrategic location provides many natural military advantages.920
Furthermore, for the Gulf States especially, Iran’s ability to foster
cross-border alliances with sizable pockets of Shi'a believers is a

915. See, e.g., Teresa Welsh, Iran Nuclear Deal Makes Middle East Allies Nervous, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jul. 14, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/14/
iran-nuclear-deal-makes-middle-east-allies-nervous; Sam Dagher, Iran Deal Worries Mideast
Neighbors, WALL STREET J., July 15, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-deal-worriesmideast-neighbors-1436900286.
916. Cf. supra note 915 and accompanying text (citing the uneasiness of traditional US
allies with the JCPOA, which would likely intensify in any future improvement of US-Iran
relations).
917. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 255; MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 282
(arguing that foreign interests propelled the US sanctions regime, even when it ran contrary to
US interests).
918. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 299; Gideon Rachman, America’s
Middle East Alliances are Cracking, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2013), https://next.ft.com/content/
5f907980-0a8b-11e3-aeab-00144feabdc0 (noting the often problematic incoherencies of
Washington’s alliances with both Israel and Saudi Arabia).
919. See Molavi, supra note 149, at 161 (citing Saudi disapproval for US policies that
have empowered Iran); Conor Friedersdorf, How Foreign-Policy Hawks Empowered Iran,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/howforeign-policy-hawks-empowered-iran/384500/ (demonstrating how the US invasion of Iraq in
2003 strengthened Iran).
920. See Wright, The Challenge of Iran, supra note 353, at 6; Ben Piven, Iran and
Israel: Comparing military machines, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features/2012/03/2012326131343853636.html (assessing Iran’s military strengths).
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notable cause for concern.921 However, allowing Washington’s allies
to dictate the official US position on Iran over the past four decades
has undercut the United States’ own foreign policy interests.922 The
problem is that Washington’s one-sided approach to the region has
prevented the establishment of any sustainable semblance of a
regional balance of power.923 At the same time, this blind devotion to
Washington’s regional allies has tied the United States’ hands and
kept Washington from playing regional powers against one-another,
at times when it would have been in the United States’ best interests
to do so.924
a. Ensuring the Interests of Saudi Arabia
The United States’ ties with Saudi Arabia extend back to the
Kingdom’s first oil concession granted to Standard Oil of California
in the spring of 1933.925 Today, however, Saudi Arabia’s relationship
with Iran has managed to destabilize much of the entire Middle East
region, which has caused serious problems for the United States’
interests there.926 From Iraq and Syria to Yemen, many of the region’s
most fever-pitched conflicts are commonly cited as proxy wars
between Iran and Saudi Arabia.927 Overall, these Saudi-Iranian
tensions are often described exclusively in religious terminology,
even to the extent that today’s Middle East is habitually compared to
Europe’s seventeenth century Catholic-Protestant Thirty Years’

921. See Molavi, supra note 149, at 161; The Shia Crescendo, ECONOMIST, Mar. 28,
2015, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21647367-shia-militias-areproliferating-middle-east-shia-crescendo (noting the sectarian reach of Iran and Gulf fears of a
rising Shia Crescent).
922. See infra notes 923-24 and accompanying text.
923. See Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117 (calling for Washington to use
the Iran Deal as a means of establishing a more sustainable balance of power in the Middle
East); Mohsen M. Milani, Iranian Politics After the Deal: Why it is Time for Optimism,
FOREIGN AFF. (July 15, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-0715/iranian-politics-after-deal (proposing a more balanced US approach toward Saudi Arabia).
924. See supra note 923 and accompanying text.
925. See LACEY, supra note 906, at 68; Newsteam Staff, CFR Backgrounders: U.S.Saudi Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/saudiarabia/us-saudi-relations/p36524 (documenting the origin of US-Saudi relations).
926. See supra notes 369-72 (discussing today’s regionally destabilizing Saudi-Iranian
rivalry).
927. Molavi, supra note 149, at 161; Takeyh, Time for Détente With Iran, supra note
357 (articulating upon Iran’s ongoing proxy war with Saudi Arabia).
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War.928 However, such an analysis ignores the fact that, during Iran’s
Reform Era, the Islamic Republic and the House of Saud were
perfectly capable of dealing amicably toward one another.929 In fact,
despite religious tensions that might have existed at the time,
President Rafsanjani viewed Iran’s Sunni Gulf neighbors as a
lucrative economic and investment opportunity, and an important
destination for Iranian investing capital.930 To this day, the Sunni
Emirate of Dubai remains an important offshore Iranian commercial
hub, and as a general matter, analysts and policymakers should not
forget that Sunnis and Shi’ites managed to live in relative peace for
entire centuries of Ottoman rule, and throughout most of the region’s
history.931
In reality, much of the Saudi-Iranian conflict today stems from
the regionally destabilizing US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the
divergent oil policies between Iran and Saudi Arabia.932 While US
sanctions targeting Iran’s petroleum sector had disincentivized any
harmonization of oil policies between these two rivals, today, the
recognition that regional tensions require urgent mitigation could
infer a US need to get tough on its Saudi ally, encouraging it to
928. See Richard N. Haass, The New Thirty Years’ War, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (July 21, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/new-thirty-yearswar/p33267; Sarwar Kashmeri, Leave the Middle East Be, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
(Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/world/middleeast/syria-saudi-arabiairan-peace-talks.html?_r=0 (comparing today’s Middle East to the Thirty Years’ War).
929. See Molavi, supra note 149, at 159; Kim Ghattas, The Blood Feud That Drives the
Middle East, FOREIGN POL'Y (Nov. 13, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/13/the-bloodfeud-that-drives-the-middle-east-saudi-arabia-iran/ (noting past cooperation between Saudi
Arabia and Iran, particularly between Desert Storm and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003).
930. See Molavi, supra note 149, at 160 (considering Rafsanjani’s approach to Saudi
Arabia); cf. Abdulrahman al-Rashed, Rafsanjani and his Views on Cooperation with Saudi
Arabia, AL ARABIYA NEWS (May 3, 2014), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middleeast/2014/05/03/Rafsanjani-and-his-views-on-cooperation-with-Saudi-Arabia.html (observing
Rafsanjani’s more recent calls for Iranian cooperation with Saudi Arabia).
931. See Molavi, supra note 149, at 161; Karim Sadjadpour, The Battle of Dubai: The
United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran Cold War, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE
(July 2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dubai_iran.pdf at 21-22 (pointing out Iran’s
commercial ties with Dubai); see also Shireen Hunter, Sunni-Shia Tensions are More About
Politics, Power and Privilege than Theology, GEORGETOWN U. SCH. OF FOREIGN SERV.,
https://acmcu.georgetown.edu/sunni-shia-tensions (last visited July 11, 2016); Murtaza
Hussain, The Myth of the 1,400 Year Sunni-Shia War, AL JAZEERA (July 9, 2013), http://www.
aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/07/2013719220768151.html (recognizing the role of
contemporary politics in today’s Sunni-Shia tensions).
932. See Molavi, supra note 149, at 161; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 385, 479 (exploring the origins of today’s SaudiIranian hostility).
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negotiate toward more reasonable oil politics.933 Such harmonized oil
policies could represent a first step toward broader, perhaps even USbrokered, Saudi-Iranian cooperation.934 Although controversial,
numerous commentators have noted that today, Iran likely represents
a more strategic ally than Washington’s traditional Gulf partners.935
This very perception has likely contributed to Saudi Arabia’s
complete refusal to cooperate with Tehran on regional issues.936
However, as the recent upswing of terrorist attacks inside Saudi
Arabia might imply, such a strategy is likely undermining the
Kingdom’s own national security interests, whether they realize it or
not.937
On this last point, a word should be noted on the Saudi
relationship with Wahhabi extremism.938 The blunt truth is that
Islamic terrorism, as the world has come to experience it, would not
exist today without the unique role Saudi Arabia has played.939 The
933. See Milani, Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off, supra note 371; Madawi AlRasheed, Tough Choices Ahead for US-Saudi Relationship, AL-MONITOR (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/abdullah-us-saudi-relations.html#
(inferring a shift in US-Saudi relations).
934. In fact, falling oil prices in early 2016 have already forced some degree of limited
compromise. See Ian Black & Terry Macalister, Plunging Oil Price Brings Saudi Arabia and
Iran Together In Alliance Of Enemies, GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.theguardian.
com/business/2016/feb/20/oil-price-plunging-saudi-arabia-iran-alliance-enemies; Summer
Said & Benoit Faucon, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar, Venezuela Agree to Freeze Oil Output,
WALL STREET J., Feb. 16, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-russia-qatar-venezuelaagree-to-freeze-oil-output-at-januarys-levels-1455615900.
935. See, e.g., Milani, Iranian Politics After the Deal, supra note 923; Michael
Axworthy, Is it Time to Make Iran our Friend and Saudi Arabia our Enemy?, GUARDIAN (Jan.
28, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/28/iran-saudi-arabia-middleeast-stability-peace (declaring Iran to be a more strategic ally to the United States than Saudi
Arabia).
936. Jennifer Williams, Why Saudi Leaders Keep Making Bad Decisions: They’re
Scared, VOX (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2016/1/7/10725896/saudi-insecurity-iran;
Kenneth Pollack, Fear and Loathing in Saudi Arabia, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 7, 2016), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/07/fear-and-loathing-in-saudi-arabia/.
937. See The Associated Press, Timeline: Al-Qaeda and ISIS Attacks in Saudi Arabia,
AL ARABIYA NEWS (Aug. 6, 2015), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/11/
30/Iraq-tells-civilians-of-ISIS-held-Ramadi-to-leave.html; Lizzie Dearden, Isis Takes Aim at
Saudi Arabia with Series of Gory Propaganda Videos in Revenge for New ‘Islamic Alliance’,
INDEPENDENT (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isistakes-aim-at-saudi-arabia-with-series-of-gory-propaganda-videos-in-revenge-for-new-islamica6778876.html (addressing the intensification of Sunni terrorism against Saudi Arabia); see
also Milani, Iranian Politics After the Deal, supra note 923 (“Such a tactical [US-Iran]
cooperation should worry moderate Sunnis far less than ISIS does.)
938. See infra notes 939-44 and accompanying text.
939. See supra note 906 (summarizing the origins of Wahhabi extremism).
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eighteenth-century alliance between Abdul Wahhab and Ibn Saud
remains at the heart of the Kingdom today, and even as the United
States’ closest Arab ally, the House of Saud still perceives it in the
national interest to cultivate radical Wahhabism and export its
teachings into neighboring territories.940 In addition to spreading these
extremist doctrines, various swaths of Saudi society continue to
provide clerical and financial support to Wahhabist militant
movements.941 Despite its close relations with Washington, Saudi
Arabia has yet to meaningfully address this concern.942 Worse, Saudi
Arabia has demonstrated it has little control over such movements
once they develop and metastasize, often turning against their own
patrons and seeking to liberate the Hedjaz from the Kingdom’s
wealthy, pro-United States monarchy.943 Such passive tolerance of
Wahhabi extremism is surprising, until one considers Saudi Arabia’s
own perception of its relationship with Washington over past decades:
that “as long as the United States remained dependent on imported oil
and was antagonistic toward Iran, Riyadh could count on
Washington’s unconditional support to pursue its regional
ambitions.”944
940. See LACEY, supra note 906, at 11; Alastair Crooke, You Can’t Understand ISIS If
You Don’t Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, WORLD POST (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html
(explaining Saudi Arabia’s ties to Wahhabism); see also BUTT, supra note 906; Owen Jones,
To Really Combat Terror, End Support for Saudi Arabia, GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2014), http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/31/combat-terror-end-support-saudi-arabiadictatorships-fundamentalism (emphasizing the role of Saudi Arabia in the proliferation of
Wahhabism).
941. See Milani, Iranian Politics After the Deal, supra note 923; BUTT, supra note 906
(noting the role of Saudi private channels in materially supporting groups like ISIS).
942. See Telegram from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Kuwait Department of
Treasury et al., Terrorist Finance: Action Request for Senior Level Engagement (Dec. 30,
20019,
13:28),
in
Public
Library
of
US
Diplomacy,
WIKILEAKS,
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE131801_a.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2016)
(“While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) takes seriously the threat of terrorism within
Saudi Arabia, it has been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist
financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority. . . . donors in Saudi Arabia
constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide.”);
Wikileaks: Saudis ‘Chief Funders of Sunni Militants’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2010),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11923176.
943. See Steven Stalinsky, Muslim Reformers Condemn Saudi Wahhabism, NATIONAL
REV. (June 28, 2004), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/211297/speaking-out-stevenstalinsky (illustrating Saudi Arabia’s lack of control over sponsored Wahhabi movements); cf.
supra note 739 and accompanying text (examining the upswing of Wahhabi terrorism against
Saudi Arabia).
944. Milani, Iranian Politics After the Deal, supra note 923.
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The Saudi carte blanche has existed for too long now in
Washington.945 Saudi Arabia should be held accountable for its
regional conduct, in the same way that a revised US relation with Iran
would still hold Tehran accountable for its actions.946 By taking a
more evenhanded approach to the region, Washington could seek to
influence more sensible and cooperative regional politics, that take
seriously the interests and concerns of all parties involved.947
Furthermore, if US passivity toward Saudi misconduct is in fact a
result of the United States’ reliance on Saudi oil, then engagement
and increased international investment with OPEC’s second-largest
producer might prove a sensible “stick” to shore up Riyadh’s
behavior.948 Again, by more evenly balancing US interaction with
regional power bases, Washington can play powers upon each other
to further US policy interests.949 In fact, such a shift might already be
naturally evident.950 US imports from Saudi Arabia have fallen a
shocking sixty-six percent in the period from 1973 to 2014, and other
rifts in the US-Saudi relationship are equally manifest.951 While
Washington should remain cautious not to needlessly alienate the

945. See supra notes 933-44 and accompanying text.
946. On the contrary, current US cooperation with Saudi Arabia in Yemen demonstrates
just how one-sided the relationship has become. Joint US-Saudi Arabian efforts to combat
Iranian-backed Houthi Rebels have resulted in much of Yemen now being effectively
controlled by Al Qaeda. See Nancy A. Youssef, The U.S.-Backed War in Yemen Is
Strengthening al Qaeda, THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2015/08/25/the-u-s-backed-war-in-yemen-is-strengthening-al-qaeda.html; Yemen’s AlQaeda Branch now in Control of Several Aden Neighborhoods, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Oct. 22,
2015), http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemens-al-qaeda-branch-now-control-severaladen-neighbourhoods-1633114488.
947. See supra notes 923-24.
948. Compare Matt Schiavenza, Why the U.S. Is Stuck With Saudi Arabia, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/why-the-us-is-stuckwith-saudi-arabia/384805/, with supra notes 466-89.
949. See Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117; Milani, Iranian Politics After the
Deal, supra note 923 (suggesting the beneficial prospects of a more even-handed US Middle
East policy).
950. See infra note 951 and accompanying text.
951. See McGrath Goodman, supra note 330, at 15; Herman Franssen, Obama and
Declining U.S. Dependence on Imported Oil and Gas, MIDDLE E. INST. (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.mei.edu/content/article/obama-and-declining-us-dependence-imported-oil-and-gas
(noting the decline of Saudi imports to the United States). That said, this trend is primarily
driven by the rise in US domestic energy production, which has offset the need for Saudi oil.
See id. For other US-Saudi tensions, see LACEY, supra note 906, at 292-302.
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Kingdom and other Gulf allies, the US should at least reassess Saudi
Arabia’s input in guiding Washington’s Iran policies.952
b. Ensuring the Interests of Israel
A more difficult challenge of US engagement with Iran concerns
Washington’s “special relationship” with the State of Israel.953 Since
the mid-Cold War, Israel has undoubtedly played the role of the
United States’ closest ally in the Middle East, and the ties between
Washington and the Jewish State have proven resilient.954 In fact,
perhaps the largest rift the special relationship has ever encountered
was the controversy surrounding the JCPOA itself, which placed
President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu in a rare position of
public contest.955 Although both the US legislature and the executive
branch were always careful to pay homage to the special relationship,
the fact that the JCPOA was adopted at all atop Israel’s protests is a
marked deviation from Washington’s standard operating procedure in
the region.956 To turn now and liberalize US investment in Iran would
certainly be controversial.957
Many factors however suggest that it is actually in Israel’s longterm interests for the United States to sensibly engage with Iran.958
Nuclear weapons or not, Iran boasts a population of approximately
952. See supra notes 925-51 and accompanying text (providing reasons to reassess the
US-Saudi relationship).
953. See generally Douglas Little, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United
States and Israel, 25 INT’L J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD. 563 (Nov. 1993); Mitchell G. Bard &
Daniel Piples, How Special Is the U.S.-Israel Relationship?, 4 MIDDLE E. Q. 41 (1997)
(overviewing the US-Israel special relationship).
954. See generally MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26; Daniel Feith, The Costs of
U.S. Aid to Israel, HARVARD ISRAEL REV. (2006), http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hireview/
content.php?type=article&issue=spring04/&name=feith.
955. Roberts and Siddiqui, Does Obama’s Iran deal Victory Mark Turning Point in USIsrael Relations?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/
03/obama-iran-deal-victory-turning-point-us-israel-relations; Adam Entous, Spy vs. Spy: Inside
the Fraying U.S.-Israel Ties, WALL STREET J., Oct. 22, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
spy-vs-spy-inside-the-fraying-u-s-israel-ties-1445562074.
956. Teresa Welsh, Obama: Iran Deal Won’t Break Bond between U.S. and Israel, U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/
28/obama-iran-deal-wont-break-bond-between-us-and-israel; Jessica Schulberg, In Last-Ditch
Ploy, Mitch McConnell Ties Iran Deal To Recognition of Israel, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 16,
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/senate-iran-nuclear-deal-vote_us_55f88337e4b0d
6492d6350b4. See generally MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26.
957. Cf. supra notes 954-57 and accompanying text (considering the controversy that the
JCPOA caused between the United States and Israel).
958. See infra notes 959-87 and accompanying text.
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seventy-eight million, and recent reports from Israel’s own
intelligence community suggest that the Islamic Republic is rapidly
closing in on Israel’s levels of military technology.959 While Israel has
consistently blocked US efforts at détente with Iran in the past, it
might be time for the Jewish State to seriously consider the upsides of
easing tensions with the Islamic Republic. 960 In fact, Israel would
accrue many benefits from a US engagement policy toward Iran.961
As discussed above, Iran’s influence over various terrorist movements
along Israel’s borders could prove a sensible means of (privately, if
not publically) securing enhanced security for the State of Israel,
effectively reigning in the conduct of these groups to resemble
something closer to Palestinian/Lebanese political parties, as opposed
to openly militarist movements.962 Likewise, having the Iranians on
board any future Israeli-Palestinian peace deal would be a sensible
way of avoiding Israel’s past experiences that partially yielded the
attrition of the Oslo Accords.963 If Israel’s own voice carries little
weight in the political corridors of Tehran, the increased weight of
Washington’s voice there could help secure Israel’s interests.964
Furthermore, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, the special
relationship between Israel and the United States has itself
occasionally undermined US foreign policy interests.965 Foremost, it
is unsurprising that sixty years of Washington’s pro-Israel policies
have resulted in problematic anti-US sentiments, shared by both
regional regimes and regional population bases.966 This has not only
959. See Iran Overview, supra note 449; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra
note 12, at 95 (estimating Iran’s population); see also Barak Ravid, Iran Closing Technology
Gap with Israel, Military Intelligence Chief Warns, HAARETZ (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.683442 (citing concerns within Israeli
intelligence regarding the rapid technological advancement of Iran’s military).
960. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 8; Trita Parsi, Can Washington
Separate Its Iran Policy From Israel?, NAT’L INTEREST (Dec. 2, 2015), http://nationalinterest.
org/feature/can-washington-separate-its-iran-policy-israel-14485 (exploring Israel’s historic
role in US Iran policy).
961. See infra notes 962-87 and accompanying text.
962. See supra notes 892-99 and accompanying text (addressing Iran’s support for
Palestinian/Lebanese terrorist movements).
963. See supra notes 903-04 and accompanying text (considering the importance of Iran
to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process).
964. See supra notes 959-63 and accompanying text.
965. See infra notes 965-87 and accompanying text.
966. See generally Lenore G. Martin, Assessing the Impact of U.S.-Israeli Relations on
the Arab World, STRATEGIC STUD. INST. (2003), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/report/2003/ssi_martin.pdf; MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 64 (exploring
the impact of US-Israeli relations on other Middle East stakeholders); see also The Posture of
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undermined US security cooperation with local governments, but has
also placed the United States in the direct crosshairs of Sunni-Arab
terrorist organizations.967 Groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS strategically
use the special relationship as a powerful means of recruiting
supporters and combatants to their causes.968 Public rhetoric aside,
while the plight of the Palestinians has been largely forgotten by the
region’s Arab governments, this injustice remains emotionally potent
among regional populations and Islamic communities across the
world.969 If the United States is serious about eroding support for
these terrorist movements, then, at least in the long-term, some
semblance of a more nuanced Israel policy is certainly in order.970 In
the case of Iran specifically, the issue of Palestine has proved a
consistent means for the Islamic Republic to undermine US interests
in the region.971 Throughout the sanctions regime, mass domestic
U.S. Central Command: Hearing Before the S. Armed Services Comm., 111th Cong. (2010)
(statement of General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army Commander of U.S. Central Command)
[hereinafter Petraeus] (“The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors
present distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests in [CENTCOM’s Area-ofResponsibility (“AOR”)]. Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale
armed confrontations. The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of
U.S. favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and
depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and peoples in the AOR and weakens the
legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and other militant
groups exploit that anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran influence in the
Arab world through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas.”).
967. See supra note 966.
968. See Petraeus, supra note 966; MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 64; Samar
Batrawi, What ISIS Talks About When It Talks About Palestine, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2015-10-28/what-isis-talks-about-when-it-talksabout-palestine (identifying the opportunistic power of Israel’s ongoing occupation for
purposes of terrorist recruitment).
969. See Ziad Abu-Amr, The Significance of Jerusalem: A Muslim Perspective, 2
PALESTINE-ISRAEL J. (1995), http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=646; Frank Newport, Gallup
Poll of the Islamic World, GALLUP (Feb. 26, 2002), http://www.gallup.com/poll/5380/galluppoll-islamic-world.aspx (reporting on widely held Islamic conceptions of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict).
970. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 60-61; U.S. General: IsraelPalestinian Conflict Foments anti-U.S. Sentiment, HAARETZ (March 17, 2010), http://www.
haaretz.com/news/u-s-general-israel-palestinian-conflict-foments-anti-u-s-sentiment-1.264910.
971. See Majid Rafizadeh, Does Iran Genuinely Support Hamas and the Palestinians?,
AL ARABIYA NEWS (July 25, 2014), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/
2014/07/25/Does-the-Islamic-Republic-genuinely-support-Hamas-for-the-Palestinian-cause.html; F. Gregory Gause III, The Return of the Old Middle East: How to Win at Balance-ofPower Politics, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 12, 2009), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
middle-east/2009-03-12/return-old-middle-east (exploring Iran’s logic for supporting
Palestinian terrorist organizations).
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opinion on Palestine also checked Arab governments from ever
forming a meaningful alliance or synchronized effort against the rise
of their Iranian rival.972 As long as Iran was popularly perceived as
the only regional power looking out for oppressed Palestinians, Arab
governments risked alienating their own populations in raising too
much noise about Iran’s troubling conduct.973
Beyond the Palestinian issue, Israel’s past actions have revealed
other large rifts in the overlap between Israeli and US regional policy
interests.974 The Knesset’s encouragement for the removal of Saddam
Hussein from Iraq in 2003 helped contribute to one of the largest US
strategic blunders of the past century, and many credible
policymakers see the JCPOA as the only thing currently standing
between a repeat of history and the same mistakes being made in
regards to Iran.975 Furthermore, from the 1954 “Lavon Affair” to
more recent unauthorized military technology transfers to US
adversaries like China, the State of Israel has often demonstrated little
regard for Washington’s policy interests when conducting its own
affairs.976 This, of course, is perfectly reasonable. In a global system
of sovereign and equal nations, there is nothing surprising nor
reprehensible in a nation-State’s pursuit of its own foreign policy

972. MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 283 (arguing that Iran’s support for
Palestinians has undermined the ability of Arab states to meaningfully stand up to Iran); cf.
Rafizadeh, supra note 971 (quoting an Iranian newspaper that writes, “The Islamic Republic of
Iran is the only country in which a consensus on the Palestinian issue exists between the
regime and its people.”).
973. See supra note 972 and accompanying text; see also Kareem Fahim, Palestinians
Find Show of Support Lacking From Arab Leaders Amid Offensive, N.Y. Times, July 19,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/world/middleeast/palestinians-find-show-ofsupport-lacking-from-arab-nations-amid-offensive.html?_r=0. Theoretically, this was likely
amplified after the Arab Spring, precisely at the peak of the sanctions regime. See supra Part
I.B (tracing the gradual development of the sanctions regime).
974. See infra notes 975-87 and accompanying text.
975. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 229-62; Israel’s Intelligence Failure
& The Iraq War, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Dec. 11, 2003), http://
carnegieendowment.org/2003/12/11/israel-s-intelligence-failure-iraq-war; Suzanne Nossel,
This Is What Will Happen if Congress Blows Up the Iran Nuclear Deal, FOREIGN POL'Y (July
30, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/30/congress-iran-nuclear-deal-obama-veto-kerrymccain/; Trita Parsi, Iran talks: Do we want a deal or a war? CNN (Nov. 6, 2013), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/11/06/opinion/parsi-iran-talks/.
976. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 75-76; Scott McConnell, The
Special Relationship with Israel: Is It Worth the Costs?, 17 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 67 (2010)
(considering often overlooked periods of self-interest within the US-Israeli special
relationship).
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interests at the expense of the interests of others.977 But in the case of
Israel and the United States, nothing prevents this logic from being
equally applied in the opposite direction.978 From a normative
standpoint, protests from the Knesset are hardly a reason for the
United States to abandon the foreign policy opportunities posed by
engaging Iran.979
All of the above has led some US policymakers, and even
notable Israeli policymakers, to question whether the State of Israel
has transformed from a strategic asset of the United States to a
strategic liability.980 However one answers this question, it is unlikely
that, at least in the short-term, Washington will cease to perceive of
itself as strategically and even morally committed to the defense of
the Jewish State.981 In regards to Iran, there are certainly red flags to
consider.982 President Ahmadinejad’s bombastic threats against Israel,
along with his revolting displays of Holocaust denial, lend
considerable credibility to Israel’s concern over the rise of Iran.983
However, the entire purpose of a US-Iran engagement strategy would
be to prevent figures like Ahmadinejad from taking the helm of the
Islamic Republic.984 Whereas isolation and the economy of resistance

977. Robert “Robin” H. Dorff, Some Basic Concepts and Approaches in the Study of
International Relations, AIR U. (2004), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/armyusawc/strategy2004/01dorff.pdf; Rajesh Sampath, The Idea of the Nation-State as an Obstacle
to the Right to Global Development, 3 IAFOR J. OF ARTS AND HUMAN. 17 (2015), http://
iafor.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/3-The-Idea-of-the-Nation-State-as-an-Obstacle-to-theRight-to-Global-Development-.pdf.
978. Sampath, supra note 977.
979. See supra note 977.
980. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 5; Petraeus, supra note 966;
Jonathan Lis, Mossad Chief: Israel Gradually Becoming Burden on U.S., HAARETZ (Jan. 6,
2010), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/mossad-chief-israel-gradually-becoming-burdenon-u-s-1.293540 (questioning Israel’s strategic value to the United States).
981. Michal Lando, Kissinger: US Public still committed to Israel, JERUSALEM POST
(Mar. 30, 2008), http://www.jpost.com/International/Kissinger-US-public-still-committed-toIsrael; Kristina Wong, Pentagon chief says the US commitment to Israel is ‘ironclad’, THE
HILL (July 29, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/249600-pentagon-chief-says-usremains-committed-to-israel-amid-iran-deal; Amos Harel, When It Comes to Obama and
Israel, Military Aid Is One Thing, Disagreements Are Another, HAARETZ (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.685135.
982. See infra note 983 and accompanying text.
983. See Bakhash, supra note 98, at 19; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 325-26 (recalling Ahmadinejad’s routine anti-Semitism).
984. See infra notes 985-87 and accompanying text. While the Islamic Republic is
structured so that the Supreme Leader ultimately has control over the President, the results of
Iran’s February 2016 elections bode well for engagement’s ability to empower moderates

2016]

POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN

997

have historically resulted in populist and nationalist rallying behind
Iranian hardliners, an investment-focused US engagement strategy
would provide a powerful way of assembling incentives to empower
Iranian moderates, much more open to a manageable, if indirect,
relationship with Israel.985 While one might question the authenticity
of their underlying sentiment, the “Happy Rosh Hashanah” messages
emanating out of President Rouhani’s Twitter account certainly stand
in stark contrast to the lambasts of his immediate predecessor.986 If
increased US investment in Iran has the ability of propagating these
sentiments, then whether it is appreciated or not, Israel stands to
benefit from US-Iran engagement initiatives.987
5. International Cooperation & Collective Security Across Today’s
Middle East Conflicts
Increased engagement with Iran would also likely have a
dramatic impact on wider US security interests. Considering the
Islamic Republic’s reach in the region, as well as the Middle East’s
current prevalence of sectarian crises, many US policymakers have
noted the need to enhance US-Iranian concerted security measures,
even declaring that “cooperation has never been more important.”988
In fact, President Obama himself has echoed these sentiments.989
Whether one likes it or not, Iran’s influence makes it an
“indispensible partner” in stabilizing Iraq.990 Likewise, the Iranians
and the United States are natural partners in stabilizing Afghanistan
within all levels of government and throughout wider society. See supra note 600 and
accompanying text.
985. See supra notes 352-64 (discussing how sanctions empowered Iran’s hardliners);
see also supra note 600 and accompanying text (recalling widespread moderate gains in Iran’s
February 2016 elections).
986. See Tanya Basu, Iran’s President Wishes Jews a Happy Rosh Hashana, TIME, Sept.
13, 2015, http://time.com/4032762/iran-tweet-rosh-hashana/; Eliza Collins, Iranian president
tweets Rosh Hashanah greeting, POLITICO (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/
2015/09/iran-president-hassan-rouhani-tweet-jews-new-year-213603 (reporting on the
Rouhani Rosh Hashanah tweet).
987. Bernard Avishai, How the Nuclear Deal Can Benefit Both Iran and Israel,
HAARETZ (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.677786; Ron BenYishai, Benefits of US-Iran Reconciliation, YNET NEWS (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.
ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4445381,00.html.
988. Geranmayeh, Europe's Edge, supra note 759.
989. See id.; Jessica Schulberg, Obama: No End To War In Syria Without ‘Buy-In’ From
Iran, HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/15/obamairan-deal_n_7802768.html (highlighting Obama’s realism concerning Iran).
990. Takeyh, Time for Détente With Iran, supra note 357.
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and stemming narcotics trafficking throughout Central Asia.991
Further arenas of cooperation could involve bringing an end to the
Syrian Civil War, sorting out a compromise between warring factions
in Yemen, and, as discussed above, combatting extremism and
terrorism throughout the whole region.992
Given the particular brutality of the current conflict in Syria,
Iran’s interests there merit highlighted attention. As Iran’s only
recognized Arab ally and an important geostrategic corridor to the
Levant and Mediterranean Sea, Syria is crucially important to Iran.993
The Islamic Republic has a direct interest in retaining its influence in
Damascus, and the Alawi offshoot of Shi’ism practiced by Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad and much of the Syrian government
provides further impetus for Iran’s pro-regime strategies there.994
Although Washington’s demands for al-Assad to step down have
fluctuated, Iranian influence could prove vital in negotiating his
eventual exit, while retaining the cooperation of powerful Alawi elites
in Syria’s post-conflict transition.995 One of the central flaws of the
United States’ experience in Iraq was the post-Saddam policy of deBaathification—a process that alienated that nation’s military-trained
and well armed traditional Sunni power wielders, and eventually
fueled their return to combat under the black flags of ISIS.996 Whether
991. See Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117; Mir H. Sadat & James P.
Hughnes, U.S.-Iran Engagement Through Afghanistan, 17 MIDDLE E. POL’Y. 31, (2010)
(noting US-Iran shared interests in Afghanistan).
992. See Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117; Seyed Hossein Mousavian, After
Nuclear Deal, What’s Next for Iran?, AL-MONITOR (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2015/04/iran-nuclear-sanctions-deal-us-iraq-syria-is.html (examining the
scope of potential US-Iran regional cooperation).
993. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 354; Fulton et al., supra note 910 (defining Iran’s interests in Syria).
994. See Fulton et al., supra note 910, at 9. But see Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran:
Alliance Cooperation in a Changing Regional Environment, 4 ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERI 31, 39
(2013) (clarifying that Iran’s support for Syria’s Alawites is more political than theocratic).
995. Compare Colleeen McCain Nelson, Obama Says Syrian Leader Bashar al-Assad
Must Go, WALL STREET J., Nov. 19, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-says-syrianleader-bashar-al-assad-must-go-1447925671, with Taresa Welsh, Obama Backs Off Demand
for Assad to Step Down, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.usnews.
com/news/articles/2015-12-18/obama-backs-off-demand-for-assad-to-step-down (revealing the
evolution of the Obama administration’s position on Assad).
996. See John Hay, The Deciders, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE (Oct. 27, 2015), http://
www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-deciders/; Shane Harris, The Re-Baathification
of Iraq, FOREIGN POL'Y (Aug. 21, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/21/the-rebaathification-of-iraq/ (elucidating the direct relationship between de-Baathification policies
and Iraq’s current turmoil).
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President al-Assad stays or goes, a similar process of
comprehensively gutting the regime from Syria’s post-conflict
political landscape would likely yield a similar Alawi backlash.997 In
this sense, Iranian cooperation could play a major role in convincing
Syria’s Alawites that they will share in the prosperity and security of
any brokered end to hostilities.998
Furthermore, despite the differences between Washington and
Tehran concerning al-Assad, both nations share an equally
compelling interest in defeating ISIS.999 Unlike the United States,
where over a decade of failed wars in the Middle East have nearly
eradicated political support for renewed military intervention, the
Iranians have proven themselves willing and capable of taking on
ISIS.1000 The Iranian military is probably the most capable regional
force, behind Israel.1001 The Iranians have also expended significant
blood and resources in their own fight against ISIS: a fight that has
inflicted detrimental casualties on their allies in Hezbollah, and efforts
they continued to fund even through the debilitating economic turmoil
of the worst sanctions years.1002 If the United States is serious about
“degrading and destroying” the Islamic State, then its most effective
partner for doing so could very well be the Islamic Republic.1003

997. Cf. supra note 996 (providing lessons via the experience of de-Baathification in
Iraq).
998. Massoumeh Torfeh, The US Had no Choice but to Involve Iran in Syria Talks, AL
JAZEERA (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/10/choice-involveiran-syria-talks-isil-russia-151028123305678.html; Alessandria Masi, Why Iran’s Influence In
Syria Is Likely To Outlive President Bashar Assad’s Rule, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://www.ibtimes.com/why-irans-influence-syria-likely-outlive-president-bashar-assads-rule1763257; Ellie Geranmayeh, Iran Hedges its Bets in Syria, AL-MONITOR (Nov. 20, 2015),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/iran-syria-strategy-hedging-nationaldefense-force.html.
999. See infra notes 1000-02 and accompanying text.
1000. See Dina Esfandiary & Ariane Tabatabai, Iran’s ISIS Policy, 91 INT’L AFF. 1, 5-10
(2015); Mohamad Bazzi, Iran Will do What it Takes to Fight ISIS, CNN (Jan. 3, 2015), http://
www.cnn.com/2015/01/03/opinion/bazzi-iran-iraq/; Ben Fernandes, Failure to Cooperate with
Iran Against ISIS Will Open the Door to Greater Risk, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/09/17/failure-to-cooperate-with-iranagainst-isis-will-open-the-door-to-greater-risk/ (asserting Iran’s commitment to the fight
against ISIS).
1001. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 281; Wright, The Challenge of
Iran, supra note 353, at 1 (pointing out Iran’s military strength).
1002. See supra note 910 and accompanying text (noting the costs of Iran’s operations in
Syria and Iraq).
1003. See supra notes 1000-02 and accompanying text.
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Far from being farfetched or unrealistic, significant security
cooperation between the United States and Iran is not without
precedent.1004 Under President Khatami, Iranians played a sizeable
role in US military efforts both in Afghanistan and Iraq.1005 In 2001,
Iran fought alongside US forces in ousting the Taliban, and went on
to play a major role in supplying and training the Afghan National
Army.1006 Afghanistan’s post-Taliban constitution resembled a
democracy upon Iranian insistence, and on at least one occasion
following the Taliban’s ousting, Iran pledged more aid to Afghan
reconstruction than even the United States.1007 Years later, when the
United States turned its sights on Iraq, the Iranians initially showed up
a second time, helping to curtail a rising insurgency.1008 More
recently, when the tarnished credibility of Iraq’s democratically
elected Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sparked increased sectarian
tensions, Iran joined the United States in asking al-Maliki to step
down from high office, avoiding what could have been an ugly
showdown considering Iran’s patronage of the Shi’ite Prime
Minister.1009 In all of these events, history reveals a surprising
capacity for cooperation when US and Iranian interests overlap.1010
Increased engagement with Iran would not only facilitate this
cooperation, but would likely foster new common interests and areas
of potential cooperation between Tehran and Washington.1011
1004. See infra notes 1005-13 and accompanying text.
1005. See Mousavian, The Rise of the Iranian Moderates, supra note 848; Hadley, supra
note 133, at 142-43 (recalling past US-Iran security cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq).
1006. MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28,
at 459; MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 302-03 (looking at past constructive Iranian
efforts in Afghanistan).
1007. See Dobbins, supra note 709, at 203-04; C. Christine Fair, When It Comes to
Afghanistan, America Should Ditch Pakistan for Iran, NAT’L INTEREST (Sept. 7, 2015), http://
nationalinterest.org/feature/when-it-comes-afghanistan-america-should-ditch-pakistan-iran13788 (showing the extent of Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan following the ousting of the
Taliban).
1008. See Dobbins, supra note 709, at 204; Hadley, supra note 133, at 143 (presenting
Iran’s initial cooperation with the United States in post-2003 Iraq).
1009. See Julian Borger et al., Iran Puts Support Behind Maliki’s Successor as Iraqi
Prime Minister, GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/
iran-supports-successor-nouri-al-maliki-iraq; Policy Analysis Unit, The US and Iran Concur:
Maliki Had to Go, ARAB CTR. RES. & POL’Y STUD. (Aug. 28, 2014), http://english.dohainstitu
te.org/release/fb23c714-097b-45b4-904a-78c3f61192fa (emphasizing Iran’s role in getting
Maliki to step down).
1010. See supra notes 1005-09 and accompanying text.
1011. Roman Muzalevsky, From Frozen Ties to Strategic Engagement: U.S.-Iranian
Relationship in 2030, STRATEGIC STUD. INST. (2015), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
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Ayatollah Khamenei himself has publically stated that the nuclear
negotiations provided a chance of testing the ability for Iran and the
US to discuss other issues.1012 Security cooperation is an important
and especially sensible field for this to occur.1013 In this light,
Washington’s recent invitation to Iran concerning Syria peace talks is
a healthy development.1014
6. Old Friends & Old Enemies: Bolstering Europe and Curtailing
the Regional Influence of Russia and China
A US engagement strategy toward Iran would not be strictly
bilateral.1015 In fact, improved relations between these two countries
would have a positive ripple effect for the United States across the
whole world.1016 Foremost, the United States has its European allies
to consider, who still represent Washington’s most obvious foreign
policy asset.1017 Washington’s stance on Iran has historically differed
from these various allies, and as discussed above, these differences
seriously undercut Europe’s Critical Dialogue policies.1018 But like in
the 1990s, Europe still has too much to gain from investment in Iran,
and the presence of US investment there, while competitive, would
army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1265; Maimuna Ashraf, Iran nuclear deal and future
prospects, FOREIGN POL'Y NEWS (July 30, 2015), http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/07/30/
iran-nuclear-deal-and-future-prospects/.
1012. See Mousavian, The Rise of the Iranian Moderates, supra note 848; Khamenei:
Nuclear Deal Could Allow Ralks ‘On Other Issues’, AL-MONITOR (Apr. 12, 2015), http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/khamenei-iran-deal-engagement-west.html
(citing Khamenei’s comments on the future potential of cooperation with Washington).
1013. See supra notes 988-89 and accompanying text.
1014. See Thomas Erdbrink et al., After a U.S. Shift, Iran Has a Seat at Talks on War in
Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/world/middleeast/
syria-talks-vienna-iran.html; Ian Black, Iran’s Invitation to Syria Talks Marks Significant Shift
for US and Allies, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/
27/irans-invitation-to-syria-talks-marks-significant-shift-for-us-and-allies (explaining the
significance of Iran’s participation in international Syria talks).
1015. See infra notes 1016-41 and accompanying text.
1016. See infra notes 1017-41 and accompanying text.
1017. Joseph S. Nye, Europe Remains America’s Most Powerful Ally, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL (Jun. 10, 2010), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/europe-remainsamericas-most-powerful-ally; Luke Coffey, Keeping America Safe; Why U.S. Bases in Europe
Remain Vital, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/
07/keeping-america-safe-why-us-bases-in-europe-remain-vital (last visited Apr. 11, 2016);
Donna Miles, Europe Remains Strategically Vital, IIP DIGITAL (Mar. 18, 2013), http://
iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2013/03/20130318144377.html#axzz41y42zq2f.
1018. See supra note 767 and accompanying text (listing the reasons Critical Dialogue
failed as a strategy).
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provide at least some sign of security that Washington is not going to
complicate Europe’s long-term operations. In particular, Europe’s
current reliance on Russian natural gas to meet its massive domestic
energy needs would be mitigated, were it to increase imports from
Iran.1019 Although this development is likely to occur whether or not
the US chooses to further engage Iran, any future US action targeting
or limiting Iran’s gas sector would come at the expense of indirectly
harming the United States’ allies. If, in the event of JCPOA
noncompliance, the US were forced to take action against the Islamic
Republic, then doing so after a genuine and good faith effort at
attempting engagement would at least soften the blow inflicted on
Washington’s traditional friend base.1020
At the same time, perhaps a more damning consequence of a
future US failure to engage with Iran concerns Washington’s
traditional adversaries.1021 This cuts at one of the fundamental flaws
of the entire sanctions regime: where the United States and its allies
choose policies of isolation, somebody else is always standing on
deck, ready to seize opportunities.1022 While internally sanctions
against Iran tended to empower hardliner elements like the IRGC, on
the international stage, China and Russia directly benefited from USimposed sanctions against Iran.1023 Throughout the sanctions regime,
Iran “explicitly sought to utilize China as a bulwark against Western
pressure, deliberating privileging Chinese companies with major
deals,” while Beijing was of the mindset that “commercial
arrangements should have no bearing on security issues, and vice
versa.”1024 Sure enough, from 2010 onward, Chinese FDI was the
only significant player left within Iran’s energy sector, with firms like
China National Petroleum Company (“CNPC”) and Sinopec landing
1019. See How Much Europe Depends on Russian Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/03/21/world/europe/how-much-europe-depends-onrussian-energy.html?_r=0 (calculating the extent of Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas);
Steinhauser & Norman, supra note 495 (exploring Iran’s potential of meeting Europe’s gas
needs).
1020. See supra note 826 and accompanying text (anticipating the importance of
goodwill with Washington’s European partners, if the United States ever needs to reimpose
sanctions against Iran); see also Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note 778, at 162.
1021. See infra notes 1022-41 and accompanying text.
1022. See infra notes 1023-31 and accompanying text.
1023. See supra note 366 and accompanying text (discussing Russia and China’s
enrichment under the sanctions regime).
1024. MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28,
at 407.
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major deals there.1025 By consistently ducking under sanctiontriggering thresholds and resorting to US dollar-avoiding buybacks
and bartering, China positioned itself as a powerful competitor in
Iran’s post-sanctions future.1026
Meanwhile, Russia has also gained from the United States’ past
anti-Iran policies.1027 Although for centuries Moscow and Tehran
have shared (and in fact, still do share) a turbulent relationship, US
policies on Iran have provided ample posturing opportunities for
Russian President Vladimir Putin to expand his role in the region. 1028
This is most evident in the Kremlin’s recent intervention in Syria: an
intervention that, while premised on combating ISIS and Sunni
extremists, was debuted with targeted airstrikes on moderate USbacked Syrian rebels.1029 The trouble with Russia’s Syrian
intervention is that it need not be confined to Syria’s borders.1030 If
1025. See id. at 408-10; Chen Aizhu, Exclusive: China Slows Iran Oil Work as U.S.
Energy Ties Warm, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iranoil-idUSTRE69R1L120101028 (detailing Iranian participation in Iran’s oil sector through the
late sanctions regime).
1026. See Michael Lelyveld, China Faces Challenge Dodging US Sanctions Over
Iranian Oil Imports, RADIO FREE ASIA, (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.rfa.org/english/
commentaries/energy_watch/oil-09022013111150.html; Wayne Ma, Sanctions Gap Allows
China to Import Iranian Oil, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324619504579026333611696094 (explaining how China dodged
sanctions against Iran); see also John S. Park, Iran and China, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra
note 12, at 184 (“Gaps left by Western and other Asian firms forced out by sanctions present
Chinese companies with strategic opportunities to enlarge their share of key sectors amid
reduced competition.”).
1027. See infra notes 1028-31 and accompanying text.
1028. See Mark N. Katz, Iran and Russia, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 18689; Alexander A. Pikayev, Why Russia Supported Sanctions Against Iran?, JAMES MARTIN
CTR. NONPROLIFERATION STUD. (June 23, 2010), http://
cns.miis.edu/stories/100623_russia_iran_pikayev.htm (tracing the evolution of Iran’s
relationship with Russia). Though much has been made of Russian-Iranian cooperation and
their shared mistrust of the West, the depth of this friendship is probably limited. See Samuel
Ramani, So Are Russia and Iran Best buddies Now? Um, Maybe Not, WASH. POST (Nov. 12,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/12/so-are-russia-andiran-best-buddies-now-um-maybe-not/; Kambiz Foroohar, Gifts and Praise Can’t Obscure
Limits to Iran-Russia Relations, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-12-18/gifts-and-praise-can-t-obscure-limits-to-iran-russia-relations.
1029. See Nancy A. Youssef, Putin Hits West’s Rebels Instead of ISIS, THE DAILY
BEAST (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/30/putin-orders-u-sjets-out-of-syria.html; Ian Johnston, Russia in Syria: Over 90% of air strikes not targeting Isis,
says US, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/russia-in-syria-us-and-turkey-claim-russian-warplanes-hitting-moderate-syrian-rebelgroups-a6685496.html (critiquing Russia’s conduct in Syria).
1030. See infra note 1031 and accompanying text.
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Iran were to fall entirely into the Russian sphere of influence, then
from Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Moscow will find no shortage of
theaters to severely frustrate US regional interests.1031
Nations like Russia and China represent much larger potential
hazards to Washington than Iran or any other State (or non-State
actor) in the Middle East region.1032 If the United States fails to
engage Iran, it is likely that the Islamic Republic will fall even further
under the influence of these globe-spanning rivals.1033 The head start
in Iran that Russia and China secured through the sanctions regime
places the United States and its allies at a comparative
disadvantage.1034 In its current form, footnote six of the JCPOA
provides little hope of outpacing the growing influence of these rival
States.1035 While troubling in itself, this influence would also cripple
any future multilateral efforts at pressuring or constraining Iran.1036
Russia and China’s permanent-member vetoes in the UN Security
Council could effectively shield Iran from future multilateral action,
were their partnerships with Tehran to grow in the absence of US
competition.1037 This could look very different, however, were the
United States to abandon its commitment to footnote six and facilitate

1031. Russian Cooperation with Iran and Iraq has Broader Consequences Than Saving
Assad, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 15, 2015), http://theconversation.com/russian-cooperationwith-iran-and-iraq-has-broader-consequences-than-saving-assad-49164; Stephen Pitt-Walker,
Russia and Iran: The Implications of a Reactionary Alliance, INT'L POL'Y DIG. (Feb. 14,
2015), http://intpolicydigest.org/2015/02/14/russia-iran-implications-reactionary-alliance/;
1032. See Russia and China Pose Largest Security Threats, Says US military Report,
GUARDIAN (July 1, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/01/russia-china-usmlitary-national-security; Jonathan Adelman, Why Are We Treating Iran as a Great Power?,
WORLD POST (July 6, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-adelman/why-are-wetreating-iran_b_7738946.html (assessing the greatest threats to US security).
1033. Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Europe Risks Losing Iran to China and Russia, BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/europe-risks-losing-iran-to-chinaand-russia-2015-8; The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Waits for Iran, AL ARABIYA
ENGLISH (July 9, 2015), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/07/09
/The-Shanghai-Cooperation-Organization-waits-for-Iran.html.
1034. See supra notes 1021-33 and accompanying text.
1035. See supra notes 1021-33 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.A.2.
1036. See infra note 1037 and accompanying text.
1037. Cf. Neil Macfarquhar, With Rare Double U.N. Veto on Syria, Russia and China
Try to Shield Friend, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/world/
middleeast/with-united-nations-veto-russia-and-china-help-syria.html (Syria); Mark N. Katz,
The Russia and China Factors in Sanctions, THE IRAN PRIMER (Nov, 28, 2011), http://iran
primer.usip.org/blog/2011/nov/28/russia-and-china-factors-sanctions (examining Russia and
China’s conduct through the sanctions regime).
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broad US investment back to Iran.1038 The Conoco episode from the
1990s, as well as Iranian consumerist tastes for US goods, show that
Washington does have many competitive advantages over its rivals,
were it to change course and actually exploit them.1039 In fact, as its
desperation softened with the signing of the interim JPA in 2013, Iran
was quick to cancel a US$2.5 billion development contract to Chinese
firm CNPC.1040 This is a healthy sign for quality-differentiated US
firms, should investment be allowed back to Iran. In time, the awards
of such contracts to US firms could gravitate Tehran away from the
troubling sway of Moscow and Beijing.1041
7. Advancing US Economic Interests
The most obvious benefit of US engagement concerns the sheer
amount of money at stake in post-sanctions Iran. The World Bank
estimates that if all sanctions had been lifted by 2016, real GDP in
Iran would grow by 5.8% in 2016 and 6.7% in 2017.1042 As discussed
above, such a trend would represent a major investment opportunity
for US capital.1043 While such lucrative profit potential alone should
not guide US policy, it would certainly be an added perk of engaging
Iran. Under the sanctions regime, US economic harm was tallied at
billions of dollars annually.1044 Some firms paid billions of dollars in
fines, while US airliners paid millions each year for Iranian air traffic
control services.1045 These sanctions also had a negative effect on
1038. More specifically, this could entail either broad OFAC license granting or the
actual nullification of sanctions. See generally supra Part II.A.2 (presenting the framework of
the JCPOA’s footnote six issue).
1039. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (detailing the Conoco episode);
supra notes 537-44 and accompanying text (emphasizing Iran’s consumer preferences); see
also Mohammad Davari, Why China Loses Out If Sanctions On Iran Are Lifted, BUS. INSIDER
(May 09, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-china-loses-out-if-sanctions-on-iranare-lifted-2014-5 (identifying Iranian concerns with Chinese products and services).
1040. See Benoît Faucon, Iran Cancels $2.5 Billion Contract with Chinese Oil
Company, WALL STREET J., Apr. 29, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023
03939404579531111999051656; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 469 (exploring the Iranian rescission of contracts with China).
1041. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 22-23.
1042. Iran Overview, supra note 449.
1043. See supra Part II.B (considering the investment opportunities in post-sanctions
Iran).
1044. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 10; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 484 (pointing out the US costs of sanctioning Iran).
1045. See supra notes 338-43 and accompanying text (looking at costs absorbed by US
firms stemming from Iran sanctions).
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global free trade, as well as on global oil supplies.1046 None of this
accounts for the opportunity costs involved in isolating Iran: from
Conoco onward, US firms lost billions of dollars in contracts to
European and non-European competitors.1047
Considering the investment opportunities highlighted above in
Part II.B, there is surely money to be made in the Islamic
Republic.1048 The repatriation of profits from US investment activities
in Iran would present a dividend to US companies, thereby
contributing to the US economy.1049 A strong domestic economy
advances all US policy efforts.1050 Furthermore, because engagement
in general tends to foster liberalization, US investment in Iran would
likely give rise to new investment opportunities, creating a multiplier
effect on the economic benefits the US would obtain.1051 “Bottom
line: A better relationship with Iran would be good for the U.S.
economy.”1052 Not only does engagement make foreign policy sense;
it makes economic sense, too.1053
8. Protecting Human Rights in Iran and Abroad
Finally, the state of human rights in Iran is an often-quoted US
foreign policy interest, and one that has occasionally made its way
into the legislative purpose of US-imposed sanctions.1054 Indeed,
while the JCPOA is intended to partially lift sanctions related to
Iran’s nuclear activities, human rights-based sanctions remain in full

1046. See supra note 344 and accompanying text (identifying the impact of sanctions on
global free trade and oil supplies).
1047. See supra note 342 and accompanying text (assessing the extent of lost
opportunities to foreign competitors under the sanctions regime).
1048. See supra Part II.B (exploring post-sanctions investment opportunities in Iran).
1049. See id.
1050. See Peter Morici, A Strong Foreign Policy Requires a Robust Economy, Credible
Military, NEWSMAZ (May 30, 2014), http://www.newsmax.com/Finance/Peter-Morici/ObamaForeign-Policy-Economy-Military/2014/05/30/id/574150/; DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41589, ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
POLICY (2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41589.pdf.
1051. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 357-58 (highlighting the relationship between
foreign investment and liberalization); see also supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text
(examining past liberalization in Iran following President Rafsanjani’s search for FDI inflows).
1052. Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117.
1053. See supra notes 1042-52 and accompanying text.
1054. See, e.g., supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text (noting CISADA’s human
rights provisions).
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effect against the Islamic Republic.1055 The human rights question
poses some of the hardest issues for any future US engagement
strategy.1056 Put simply, the emerging post-sanctions Iranian
investment landscape will likely channel significant revenues to a
regime that has demonstrated no qualms in brutally suppressing
dissent; limiting the expression and freedoms of its nationals; actively
discriminating on the basis of religion, ethnicity, gender, and sexual
orientation; and subjecting its population to a harsh and draconian
judicial system with little semblance of due process.1057 With more
annual per capita executions than any other nation, the stakes of these
human rights violations are immense.1058 Unfortunately, there are no
easy solutions to addressing these issues.1059
International investment has historically held an uneasy
relationship with international human rights.1060 From the Calvo
Doctrine to Dependency Theory, Classical Marxism to today’s antiglobalization movement, various critical vantage points have provided
well-reasoned critiques regarding international capitalism’s impact on
human rights issues.1061 These critiques should not be ignored. In fact,
1055. See supra note 291 and accompanying text (clarifying within the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act that sanctions against Iran for issues other than Iran’s nuclear program
will remain in effect following the implementation of the JCPOA).
1056. See infra notes 1057-85 and accompanying text.
1057. See generally Shaheed, supra note 173; The State of the World’s Human Rights:
Iran, AMNESTY INT’L, 186-191 (2015), https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/AIR15_English.
PDF (overviewing the state of human rights in Iran).
1058. See Colum Lynch, Iran Wins World Record for Most Executions Per Capita,
FOREIGN POL'Y (Oct. 27, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/27/rouhani-zarif-statedepartment-human-rightsiran-wins-world-record-for-most-executions-per-capita/; Edith M.
Lederer, UN Investigator: Executions in Iran Could Top 1,000 in 2015, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Oct. 27, 2015) (establishing Iran’s unrivalled use of capital punishment).
1059. But see infra notes 1063-85 (proposing the potential benefits that US engagement
could have on human rights in Iran).
1060. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 54-55; George K. Foster, Investors,
States, and Stakeholders: Power Asymmetries in International Investment and the Stabilizing
Potential of Investment Treaties, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 361, 355-56 (2013) (introducing
the conflicts between international investment and human rights).
1061. Each of these schools possesses its own historically situated criticisms of
international investment, and a detailed exegesis is beyond the scope here. Crudely, the Calvo
Doctrine refers to 19th and early 20th century, primarily Latin American resistance to
international investor protections that sought to remove dispute jurisdiction beyond a host
state’s national courts. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 310-12, 322-24; Manuel R. GarciaMora, The Calvo Clause in Latin American Constitutions and International Law, 33
MARQUETTE L. REV. 205 (1950). Dependency Theory (or the dependencia school) was a midcentury Latin American critique concerned with global inequality and power asymmetries,
resulting from the disruptive flow of capital from developing periphery states to developed
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if the purpose of US engagement with Iran is to target Iranian civil
society and empower Iranian moderates, such concerns are absolutely
crucial.1062 If conducted properly and with caution, numerous factors
suggest that US investment to Iran could provide a net-positive on
that nation’s human rights situation.1063
First, from a minimal standpoint, the traditional human rights
critiques concerning international investment might be partially
mitigated through the mere economic power of investment to improve
the ordinary Iranian standard of living.1064 Enriching the livelihoods
of the poorest Iranians would benefit human rights.1065 While this
does not exactly address arbitrary detention or the execution of
minors, it is surely better than nothing.1066 Second, and along similar
core states. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 54-55; Guillermo Emiliano Del Toro, Foreign
Direct Investment in Mexico and the 1994 Crisis: A Legal Perspective, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1,
87 (1997). Marxism, following the 19th-century teachings of Karl Marx, broadly considers all
capitalist profits to arise from the exploitation of labor by parties with exclusive ownership
rights over industrial society’s means of production. Marxism was principally internationalized
by Lenin, who considered imperialism to be an inherent stage and logical extension of
capitalism, whereby international finance capitalism is adopted to wring out additional profits
beyond one’s own, already fully-exploited national borders. See generally 1 KARL MARX,
CAPITAL (Penguin Books ed., 1990) (1867); Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of
Capitalism, in THE LENIN ANTHOLOGY 204 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1975) (1917). The antiglobalization movement is a loose collection of disparate ideologies formed in response to the
rise of transnational corporations, critical of everything from corporate pollution to the erosion
of indigenous rights. See generally Tom Mertes, Anti-Globalization Movements: From
Critiques to Alternatives, in THE ROUTLEDGE INT’L HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION STUDIES
77-94 (Bryan S. Turner ed., 2010); DAVID HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE
CRISES OF CAPITALISM 215-60 (2010). While some of these critiques are more relevant to
international investment today than others, each has contributed important developments to the
dialogue between investment and human rights. The larger point here is that such a dialogue is
both diverse and profoundly established.
1062. See supra note 773 and accompanying text (recalling that one of the primary
failures of Critical Dialogue was the perception of prioritizing business above human rights).
1063. See infra notes 1064-85 and accompanying text.
1064. See Behdad Bordbar, Will Nuclear Deal Improve Human Rights in Iran?, ALMONITOR (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/iran-humanrights-nuclear-lausanne.html (citing the consensus among Iranian activists that the JCPOA
would help improve standards of living in Iran); cf. A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 289
(looking at the sanction regime’s impact on socioeconomic rights in Iran).
1065. See generally A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324; Poverty and Human Rights:
Demand Dignity, AMNESTY INT'L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/poverty-andhuman-rights (last visited Apr. 11, 2016). See also U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural
Rights, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/IRN/Co/2 (Jun. 10, 2013).
1066. See U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on
the Second Periodic Report of the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/IRN/Co/2 (Jun.
10, 2013).
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lines, if the long-term US strategy for dealing with Iran boils down to
a choice between engagement and eventual war, then surely human
rights advocates should prefer the former as opposed to the latter.1067
Past US military promises to liberate Afghan women and bring
democracy to Iraq have hardly furthered the overall state of human
rights in either of those countries, and there is no reason to believe
that the same complications would not arise in any military
confrontation with Iran.1068 Third, by aligning incentives and
increasing US economic leverage within the Islamic Republic, the
typical naming-and-shaming mechanisms of human rights law would
likely carry more weight in Iran.1069 Throughout the sanctions era,
Iran had little to lose in failing to comply with the suggestions
provided by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, or other human rights
bodies.1070 Were the potential costs of Iran’s human rights violations
to increase, then, out of raw economic logic, Tehran might more
seriously consider such suggestions.1071 Fourth, although not directly
related to future engagement policies, past sanctions policies have
carried numerous human rights setbacks in their implementation.1072
1067. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, It’s Either Iran Nuclear Deal or ‘Some Form of War,’
Obama Warns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/us/politics/
obama-urges-critics-of-iran-deal-to-ignore-drumbeat-of-war.html?_r=0 (reporting on the
perceived dichotomy between war and the JCPOA); Ishaan Tharoor, These Iranian ProDemocracy Activists Want Congress to Back the Nuclear Deal, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/26/these-iranian-prodemocracy-activists-want-congress-to-back-the-nuclear-deal/ (acknowledging various human
rights activists who prefer international engagement with Iran, as opposed to any viable
alternatives).
1068. Compare Shereena Qazi, UN Report Highlights Afghan Conflict’s Toll on Women,
AL JAZEERA (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/report-highlightsafghan-conflict-toll-women-150805153732522.html (specifying the costs of ongoing conflict
on today’s Afghan women), with Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?
Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others, 104 AMERICAN
ANTHROPOLOGIST 783 (2002) (observing how the war in Afghanistan was rhetorically
premised on protecting the human rights of Afghan women who suffered under the rule of the
Taliban).
1069. Essentially, this logic follows the same reasoning as how increased investment in
Iran might cause the regime to question its practice of funding terrorist movements. By upping
leverage over Iran and making its internal decisions/practices more expensive, the regime
would be forced to at least think about amending its behavior. Cf. supra note 898.
1070. The logic here follows that of Iran’s other problematic practices. Cf. supra note
898 and accompanying text (arguing that sanctions resulted in reduced leverage to force Iran to
rethink its support for regional terrorist movements).
1071. See id.
1072. See supra Part I.C.3.
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The human costs of sanctions discussed above are worth recalling.1073
Furthermore, past prohibitions against trade and the restricted export
of Internet technologies to Iran actually undercut the democratic
ambitions of Iran’s Green Movement.1074 Although Congress later
legislatively corrected these prohibitions, the change came too late to
impact the young Iranian dissenters being crushed by their
government.1075 The episode provides a lesson on the dangerous exante imperfections of any isolation policy.1076 In this sense, the more
buffer space that the United States can build between relapsing into
sanctions, the more likely these human rights costs will be
lessened.1077
Considering the impact of US sanctions on Iranian human rights,
it is no surprise that the JCPOA won wide support among human
rights advocates, both within Iran and worldwide.1078 Among these
stakeholders, the general consensus has been that sanctions hurt
ordinary Iranians.1079 Prominent Iranian lawyer and human rights
activist Shirin Ebadi has welcomed the JCPOA.1080 Likewise, Iranian
1073. See supra Part I.C.3 (assessing the human costs of the sanctions regime).
1074. See generally N. Kashani & M. Sadra, Technology in Green: How Removing
Sanctions Can Encourage Iranian Democracy, FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 26, 2010), https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2010-02-26/technology-green; Anna Yukhananov,
U.S. Loosens Sanctions on Iran for Mobile Gadgets, REUTERS (May 30, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-iran-sanctions-phone-idUKBRE94T0WA20130530
(noting how sanctions unintentionally undermined the Green Movement).
1075. Yukhananov, supra note 1074 (reporting on the relaxation of internet and
telecomm sanctions); Muhammad Sahimi, Victims of Economic Sanctions: The People and the
Green Movement, FRONTLINE (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
tehranbureau/2010/11/victims-of-economic-sanctions-the-people-and-the-green-movement.
html (emphasizing the Green Movement’s opposition to sanctions).
1076. See supra note 1075 and accompanying text.
1077. See supra note 1075 and accompanying text.
1078. See generally Tharoor, These Iranian Pro-Democracy Activists Want Congress to
Back the Nuclear Deal, supra note 1067; 74 Prominent Iranians Urge Congress to Support
Nuclear Deal with Iran, INT'L CAMPAIGN FOR HUM. RIGHTS IN IRAN (Aug. 31, 2015), http://
www.iranhumanrights.org/2015/08/letter-74-iranians-iran-deal (documenting widespread
support for the JCPOA among human rights advocates).
1079. See Tharoor, These Iranian Pro-Democracy Activists Want Congress to Back the
Nuclear Deal, supra note 1067; A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324 (presenting the view
among human rights advocates that sanctions unintentionally weakened human rights in Iran).
1080. See Tharoor, These Iranian Pro-Democracy Activists Want Congress to Back the
Nuclear Deal, supra note 1067; Interview by Amy Goodman with Shirin Ebadi, Iranian Peace
Prize Laureate, the Hauge (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.democracynow.org/2015/4/28/iranian_
nobel_peace_prize_laureate_shirin (asserting Ebadi’s support for the JCPOA); see also Shirin
Ebadi - Biographical, NOBEL PEACE PRIZE, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/2003/ebadi-bio.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (providing a biography on Shirin
Ebadi).
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scholar Forrokh Negahdar has echoed these sentiments, forecasting
that the JCPOA “will likely reign in Iran’s more hard-line groups.”1081
The fact that engagement in the form of the JCPOA has received such
a positive reaction from these direct stakeholders lends support to the
view that future engagement would yield positive outcomes for the
state of human rights in Iran.1082 But the JCPOA, as it currently
stands, is just the first step in that direction.1083 As noted by Iranian
human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh, “When a regime can no longer
use the excuse of having foreign enemies, it can no longer imprison
its own citizens as easily as it can when there is a foreign threat.
However, it is wishful thinking to imagine that this nuclear agreement
will automatically result in better human rights policies in Iran.”1084
While increased US investment to Iran would not provide a silver
bullet against the regime’s human rights abuses, perhaps it can at least
do some of the work suggested by Sotoudeh.1085
CONCLUSION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SOUND US-IRAN
ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY
As demonstrated above, increased US international investment
in Iran could have a meaningful, positive impact upon each of these
US foreign policy issues.1086 In this light, the restrictions faced by US
investors under footnote six of the JCPOA delay these potential
developments.1087 Such a delay is even more precarious, given that
the momentum of US-Iran goodwill in the wake of the JCPOA cannot
last forever. Meanwhile, while the United States waits on the
sidelines, European and other investors are already flocking to Iran
and sealing long-term investment deals, likely to yield various firstmover advantages.1088 Read negatively, the United States’ loss to
1081. See Tharoor, These Iranian Pro-Democracy Activists Want Congress to Back the
Nuclear Deal, supra note 1067 (stating Negahdar’s support for the JCPOA); see also Farrokh
Negahdar, Farrokh Negahdar on Mousavi’s 17th Statement: Relevance, KHORDAAD88 (Jan.
19, 2010), http://khordaad88.com/?p=953 (providing a biography of Farrokh Negadhar).
1082. See supra notes 1078-81.
1083. See infra note 1084 and accompanying text.
1084. Bordbar, supra note 1064.
1085. See supra notes 1055-84 and accompanying text.
1086. See supra Part III.D (surveying the ways US engagement with Iran might be
utilized to advance various US foreign policy interests).
1087. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the footnote six issue).
1088. See supra notes 446-48 and accompanying text (identifying the immediate
attractiveness of Iran’s investment landscape, and international players already laying stakes
there).
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these global first-movers can be seen as increasing foreign influence
in Iran, while US influence there only diminishes.1089 As under the
sanctions regime in the 1990s, the incentives shared by Tehran and
other investor home States is likely to frustrate any future US
multilateral action targeting the Islamic Republic.1090 Read positively,
many of these first-movers (but by no means all of them) are in fact
the United States’ traditional friends in the world.1091 The US and
Europe share numerous policy interests, and from this, if engagement
does work, then indirect US benefits might be facilitated through the
engagement efforts of the EU.1092
However, there are two fundamental problems to this latter
approach.1093 First, such a third-party engagement strategy almost
identically replicates the problematic scenario of the Clinton years,
where divergent US and European approaches to Iran severely
strained the United States’ European relationships.1094 In today’s
demanding world of global counterterrorism cooperation and
competitive alternative markets and trading partners, the United
States is arguably more vulnerable to diminishing its beneficial
relations with Europe than at any time in the 1990s.1095 Over half a
1089. See supra Part III.D.6.
1090. See supra notes 365-68 and accompanying text (examining how US nonparticipation in Iran throughout the sanctions era opened the door to the increasing influence of
others).
1091. See supra notes 1017-20 and accompanying text (exploring European investors’
interest in post-sanctions Iran.)
1092. See Geranmayeh, Europe's Edge, supra note 759; Tarja Cronberg, Europe Matters
in Iran’s Search for its Identity, EUROPE’S WORLD (Aug. 25, 2015), http://europesworld.org/
2015/08/25/europe-matters-irans-search-identity/#.VoXXiBorJ-U; Arshin Adib-Moghaddam,
Europe’s Unique Opportunity to Engage with Iran, EUROPE’S WORLD (July 28, 2015), http://
europesworld.org/2015/07/28/europes-unique-opportunity-engage-iran/#.VoXYEBorJ-U
(suggesting the positive role Europe can play in post-sanctions Iran).
1093. See infra notes 1094-1102.
1094. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (pointing out the strain on USEuropean relations upon the passing of the ILSA).
1095. See generally Charles A. Kupchan, The Fourth Age: The Next Era in Transatlantic
Relations, NAT’L INTERESt 77 (Sept./Oct. 2006), http://www.cfr.org/world/fourth-age-nextera-transatlantic-relations/p11488 (arguing that European and US foreign policy interests are
gradually diverging); Sally McNamara, The EU-U.S. Counterterrorism Relationship: An
Agenda for Cooperation, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2011/03/the-eu-us-counterterrorism-relationship-an-agenda-for-cooperation
(highlighting the important but often conflicted state of US-EU counterterrorism cooperation);
Eric Bradner, Talking Trade Differences, POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.politico.com/
story/2013/10/us-eu-trade-heads-talk-regulatory-differences-097587 (noting regulatory trade
conflicts between Europe and the United States); Razeen Sally, Looking East: The European
Union’s New FTA Negotiations in Asia, EUR. CTR. INT’L POL. ECON. (Mar. 2007), http://ecipe.

2016]

POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN

1013

century of US-European engagement should not be needlessly tested.
Second, the experience of Critical Dialogue suggests that it is unlikely
Europe can shoulder meaningful engagement with Iran left on its
own.1096 As discussed above, the US rift with Europe in the 1990s
concerning Iran seriously undermined Critical Dialogue’s efficacy as
an engagement strategy.1097 Additionally, the EU’s composition as
individual nation-States has not changed since the 1990s.1098 If
anything, in the aftermath of the Euro Crisis, the continent is probably
less cohesive as a network of States than it had been throughout the
Critical Dialogue.1099 The problem again is that a collection of selfserving bilateral agreements with Iran removes any semblance of the
common rationality or design needed to form an actual unified
engagement strategy as opposed to disparate national policies.1100
Worse, in the 1990s, such disparate investment policies devolved into
competitive and nationalistic bare-naked profit chasing.1101 Repeating
this trend today could undermine engagement as a whole, and even
yield a resurgence of the populist Iranian impulses that fostered the
rise of Ahmadinejad.1102
In this sense, the US restrictions exemplified in footnote six of
the JCPOA could be described as exactly the wrong policy.1103 An
outright ban on US investment in Iran, including that conducted by
foreign subsidiaries, would send a clear message to all US-based
investors, and raise something resembling a principled stance against
org/app/uploads/2014/12/looking-east-the-european-union2019s-new-trade-negotiations-inasia-1.pdf (exploring Europe’s growing trade relationships with Asia). That said, recent
Russian adventurism in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, while not a positive development, point
US-EU relations in the opposite direction. See Anne Applebaum, Obama’s Legacy Could Be a
Revitalized NATO, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
anne-applebaum-obamas-legacy-could-be-a-revitalized-nato/2014/08/22/0f43da78-2a22-11e48593-da634b334390_story.html.
1096. See supra Part III.B.
1097. See supra Part III.B (summarizing Europe’s period of Critical Dialogue with Iran).
1098. See infra note 1099 and accompanying text.
1099. See Jose Ignacio Torreblanca & Mark Leonard, The Continent-Wide Rise of
Euroscepticism, EUR. COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (May 2013), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR
79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf; Allister Heath, Europe Could be Torn Apart by the
Wrong Sort of Eurosceptics, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/europe/11391092/Europe-could-be-torn-apart-by-the-wrong-sort-of-Eurosceptics.
html (reviewing the rise of Euroscepticism across the EU).
1100. See supra note 767 and accompanying text.
1101. See supra notes 766-71 and accompanying text (assessing the ultimate failures of
Europe’s Critical Dialogue).
1102. See supra Part I.A.4 (summarizing the Ahmadinejad presidency).
1103. See infra notes 1104-10 and accompanying text.
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Iran’s ongoing troublesome behaviors.1104 While this route would not
seize the foreign policy opportunities highlighted above, it would at
least protect US investors from self-harm in the future, both in terms
of potential capital losses, and in preventing contribution toward
Europe’s problematic and structurally flawed engagement renewal,
which could result in pushing Iran to further recalcitrance.1105 At the
opposite end of the spectrum, a complete liberation of US investors
and the full lifting of sanctions (or broad OFAC general licensing)
would take advantage of the above opportunities, while likely also
inspiring cautious guidance and regulatory oversight aimed at shaping
the way investment in Iran is conducted.1106 Yet, under the status quo,
both of these strategies are rejected in exchange for the exclusive
allowance of US foreign subsidiary investment: investment by its
very nature beyond the US jurisdiction to directly control.1107 It is
dangerously likely that such an approach will result in rogue
corporate profit chasing by US foreign subsidiaries licensed to
operate in Iran, while also significantly undermining any US efforts at
steering international investment toward Washington’s foreign policy
goals.1108 If post-JCPOA US investment in Iran is perceived to be an
activity occurring in the periphery, only by US foreign subsidiaries,
then it is hard to believe that US administrative agencies and other
government regulators will devote serious attention to the way US
capital reaches Iran, or what it does there.1109 This approach is not
only inefficient in its failure to seize ripe foreign policy opportunities,
but it may also be dangerous in its potential to empower the most
hardline elements of the Iranian regime.1110

1104. Contra JCPOA, supra note 185, at Annex II n.6 (committing the US to waive
nuclear sanctions against US-owned, foreign subsidiaries). See generally Part II.A.2.
1105. See supra Part III.D (surveying US foreign policy benefits that would be forsaken
under this strategy).
1106. See supra Part III.D.
1107. See supra Part II.A.2 (exploring the footnote six issue).
1108. Cf. supra note 773 and accompanying text (citing similar failures under Critical
Dialogue).
1109. Cf. supra note 438 and accompanying text (discussing OFAC’s General License
H). Focused primarily on building a firewall between US parent companies and their foreign
subsidiaries transacting with Iran, General License H—as opposed to a case-by-case, specific
licensing regime—shows that, US regulators do not appear strategically concerned with how
legally compliant investment impacts Iran. Considering the opportunities highlighted supra in
Part III.D, this amounts to an unfortunate missed opportunity.
1110. Cf. supra Part III.B.
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In contrast to this current approach, the United States
government—and OFAC in particular—should play an active and
supportive role in guiding US investors back to Iran, in a cautious
manner consistent with United States policy interests.1111 Under a
broad policy of engagement, the United States should work to remove
the remaining barriers to international investment exemplified in
footnote six, and instead utilize the power of incentives to achieve
Washington’s regional foreign policy goals.1112 Furthermore,
Washington’s revised guidance concerning footnote six, and
subsequent investment policies, should be developed with the careful
thinking and creativity that such a rare opportunity merits.1113
Although the details and exact composition of such an
engagement policy are best left to policymakers, the stakes involved
and the potential upsides of a comprehensive US engagement strategy
toward Iran should leave no innovation untapped.1114 For example, the
use of investment codes, such as the MacBride Principles and the
Sullivan Principles, could provide effective binding or nonbinding
methods to channel investment along certain agreed-upon criteria,
consistent with US policy goals.1115 In Iran, such corporate codes of
conduct might discourage investment from certain IRGC-heavy
1111. This could be achieved primarily by issuing specific licenses, on a case-by-case
basis. See supra note 1108; see also supra note 230.
1112. See generally supra Part III.D (listing US foreign policy goals that could be
secured under such an approach).
1113. See infra notes 1114-28 and accompanying text.
1114. See infra notes 1115-28 and accompanying text.
1115. Generally, investment codes operate as binding or non-binding codes of conduct,
aimed at influencing the way investment is conducted. For example, if the US State
Department or Treasury were to draft a set of guidelines related to investment in Iran that
Washington determined would advance Iranian human rights or other US foreign policy
interests, OFAC could then make these principles effectively binding by conditioning license
granting upon their adherence. Alternatively, investment codes could be used to establish less
binding, but nonetheless incentive-packed guidelines, which might, for example, condition a
firm’s access to public pension funds upon their adherence. Historically, the MacBride
Principles offered specified standards related to US investment entering Northern Ireland,
while the Sullivan Principles provided guidelines for businesses with operations in apartheid
South Africa. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 172-173; see also Fr.
Sean McManus, MacBride Principles – Genesis and History, IRISH NAT’L CAUCUS, INC.
(Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.irishnationalcaucus.org/principle/macbride-principles-genesisand-history/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (overviewing the historical implementation of the
MacBride Principles); Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codes for Transnational
Corporations: What Can the Sullivan and MacBride Principles Tell Us?, 19 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 167 (1999) (considering the lessons of the Sullivan and MacBride Principles,
and investment codes broadly).
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industry sectors, or incentivize opening joint ventures with recent
Iranian university graduates (the youth) or members of Iranian civil
society.1116 Whether adopted by formal legislation, agency
rulemaking, or decentralized shareholder resolutions completely
within the private sector, investment codes could help facilitate US
capital to the exact strata of Iranian society that the United States
would like to see empowered there.1117
Another interesting proposition would be to incorporate explicit
human rights provisions into a future US-Iran BIT.1118 While the
sparse human rights-mentioning BITs currently in existence tend to
couch their commitment to human rights within broad “preambulor
wording,” a post-sanctions US BIT with Iran could be the ideal
grounds to deploy actual substantive human rights provisions. 1119 A
drawback to this strategy is that Iranian negotiators might prove
unwilling to sign to such provisions.1120 However, by focusing human
rights-based restrictions upon investors, as opposed to States Parties,
such provisions could achieve meaningful results while appearing less
directly threatening to the Iranian regime.1121 Such language might
condition investment protection upon specified human rights-based
1116. See supra notes 359-64 and accompanying text (IRGC); see also notes 870-78 and
accompanying text (the youth).
1117. The use of agency and private sector action are particularly attractive, given
Congress’ prevailing attitudes concerning Iran. See generally Kristina Peterson, Congressional
Republicans Signal Deep Resistance to Iran Nuclear Deal, WALL STREET J., July 14, 2015,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-deal-faces-u-s-lawmakers-scrutiny-1436868209; David M.
Herszenhorn, The Iran Nuclear Deal: Congress Has Its Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/us/politics/the-iran-nuclear-deal-congress-has-its-say.html?_r=
0.
1118. See generally Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human
Rights, INST. FOR DEV. AND PEACE (INEF) (Mar. 2010), http://www.humanrights-business.
org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_human_rights.pdf; Patrick Dumberry &
Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, A Few Pragmatic Observations on How BITs should be Modified to
Incorporate Human Rights Obligations, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (Jan.
2014), http://droitcivil.uottawa.ca/sites/droitcivil.uottawa.ca/files/a_few_pragmatic_oberva
tion_on_how_bits_should_be_modified_to_incorporate_human_rights_obligations.pdf
(exploring the potential of human rights provisions being formally incorporated into BITs).
1119. Jacob, supra note 1118, at 10 (recognizing the current weakness of preambulor
human rights BIT provisions); see also Davarnejad, supra note 770, at 11-12 (calling for the
formal adoption of human rights clauses in BITs and other international investment
agreements).
1120. In light of Iran’s current human rights violations, it seems unlikely they would be
willing to bind themselves to any instrument that would put them on the hook for such
behavior. Cf. supra notes 1054-59 and accompanying text (examining the human rights
situation in Iran).
1121. Cf. id.
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investment parameters, or rights-based due diligence requirements.1122
The effects of such a provision would begin long before actual
investor-State arbitration by incentivizing US investors to cautiously
choose where to launch their investment operations in Iran, lest they
not receive the BIT’s substantive investment protections.1123 Along
similar lines, the United States could make use of the institutions at its
disposal, such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(“OPIC”).1124 By premising access to political risk insurance in Iran
upon certain investment guidelines, and perhaps even discounting
insurance premiums for specified investment categories, OPIC too
could play a direct role in incentivizing the most appealing forms of
investment in Iran.1125
Further innovations from CSR literature should also be explored
in order to craft sensible US-Iran investment policies.1126 If a common
critique of international sanctions is that they tend to be “blunt
mechanisms, analogous to blowing up an entire airplane with
innocent passengers on board to kill just one terrorist,” then the use of
these CSR innovations could provide a targeted means of
economically incentivizing the same effects of sanctions, while
simultaneously allowing for the various positive influences of
economic engagement. 1127 In this sense, by bringing human rights
concerns directly within the mechanisms of international investment

1122. See Davarnejad, supra note 770, at 11-12 ; Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note
1118, at 15 (examining how human rights restrictions could be implemented within
international investment agreements).
1123. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 1118, at 15.
1124. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 250-51; Who We Are, OPIC, https://
www.opic.gov/who-we-are/overview (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (introducing OPIC’s role in
supporting US investment overseas).
1125. In terms of developing specific principles to guide investment, the United States
could, as a minimum floor, aim to neutrally impose standards that Iran has already obliged
itself to upholding, such as the provisions within the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”). See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
1126. See generally U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights [OHCHR],
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), http://www.ohchr.
org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf; Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR), IISD, https://www.iisd.org/business/issues/sr.aspx (last visited Mar. 16,
2016).
1127. Wolfe, supra note 29, at 12; cf. Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2441 (“In the
words of Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat, employment of sanctions can be ‘like applying a
meat-cleaver where laser surgery would be more appropriate.’”).
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law, future US engagement with Iran could leave a major positive
impression on the future of investment law as a whole.1128
The key limitation to all of this, of course, is whether such a
comprehensive engagement strategy toward Iran is actually politically
feasible.1129 Unfortunately, there are no easy answers here.1130 A
direct bilateral engagement policy would weigh politically heavy on
both the United States and Iran.1131 In the United States, such a radical
change in direction would require massive amounts of political will
and political capital, which, at the very least, are circumstances
unlikely to be realized until a fresh administration takes office in
January 2017.1132 In today’s globalized world, the sheer speed of
international capital could result in a very different Iranian investment
landscape by then.1133 Additionally, this type of engagement policy
would require a meticulous navigation of hypersensitive special
interests, both in Congress and among the general population.1134 It
seems few political platforms would strike US voters as more
repugnant than cozying up with the Islamic Republic.1135 Engagement
advocates would therefore require great skill and nuance in
mobilizing these policies.1136

1128. See supra note 1127 and accompanying text.
1129. See infra notes 1130-52 and accompanying text.
1130. See infra notes 1131-52 and accompanying text.
1131. See Dobbins, supra note 709, at 205; Jonah Shepp, Hawks on Both Sides Are
Trying to Kill the Iran Nuke Deal, SLATE (June 24, 2015, 2:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/the_slatest/2015/06/24/iran_nuke_deal_khamenei_and_iran_hawks_look_to_scuttle_
nuclear_agreement.html (anticipating the politics of further engagement, in both Iran and the
United States).
1132. Cf. supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (noting the controversies surrounding
the JCPOA).
1133. Indeed, since Implementation Day, transactions with Iran are already valued are
valued in the billions. See Jim Boulden, Iranian President Does Big Business in Europe, CNN
(Jan. 26, 2016, 6:58 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/26/news/companies/iran-europedeals-italy-france/; Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iran's Dealmaking with Europe: the Seven Biggest
Contracts, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2016, 9:28 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2016/jan/29/irans-dealmaking-europe-seven-biggest-contracts.
1134. See Herszenhorn, supra note 1117; see also supra Part III.D.4 (examining Saudi
and Israeli interests in US-Iran policy).
1135. Among the US population, opinions on Iran are unsurprisingly unfavorable. Iran,
GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/116236/iran.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2016); Iran,
POLLINGREPORT, http://www.pollingreport.com/iran.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
1136. Cf. supra notes 1131-35 and accompanying text (recognizing the political
challenges of enhanced US-Iran engagement).
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Likewise, there are no promises that engagement will be viewed
as desirable to the clerics and Mujtahids currently running Tehran.1137
President Rouhani’s existing mandate could be quickly eroded by a
failure to achieve improvements in Iran’s standard of living, including
economic improvements.1138 Investment or no investment, Iran’s
economy faces real structural problems.1139 Although Ayatollah
Khamenei appears open to foreign investment, and has no reason to
want to return to the chaos of the Ahmadinejad years, any perceived
lack of goodwill on the world’s part has the potential of seriously
jeopardizing the JCPOA. 1140 Even under ideal international
circumstances, Khamenei is nearly eighty years old, and it is
impossible for the world to know who will one day take his place.1141
For both sides, today’s rare overlap of wide-spanning policy
interests is simply too great not to put serious efforts toward trying to
make engagement work.1142 The ability to cooperate on a wide range
of common policy goals would serve both US and Iranian
interests.1143 Furthermore, in the same way that international
1137. Cf. Gerald F. Seib, Will Iran Hard-Liners Buy Economic Opening?, WALL
STREET J. (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-hard-liners-say-no-thanks-toeconomic-opening-1446481974; Iran Elections: Moderates 'Colluded' with West, Says
Hardliner, BBC (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35683881.
1138. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 18; Ganji, supra note 600
(noting Rouhani’s need to translate the JCPOA into tangible benefits).
1139. See supra Part II.C.1 (outlining commercial risks in Iran).
1140. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note
28, at 362 (“ . . . for the final two years of his second term, Ahmadinejad was effectively
sidelined, reduced to playing a convenient foil for intraélite skirmishing while Khamenei
publicly mused about simply eliminating the presidency altogether…”); see also Thomas
Erdbrink, Ayatollah Khamenei, Backing Iran Negotiators, Endorses Nuclear Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/19/world/middleeast/ayatollah-alikhamenei-of-iran-backs-negotiators-and-doesnt-criticize-nuclear-deal.html?_r=0 (illustrating
Khamenei’s approval of the JCPOA).
1141. Contrast Milani, Iranian Politics After the Deal, supra note 923 (predicting that a
moderate is likely to replace Khamenei), with WEHREY ET AL, supra note 362, at 89
(hypothesizing the likelihood of Khamenei being replaced by elements even more beholden to
the IRGC). On this note, one of the most significant developments of Iran’s February 2016
elections was the resulting majority of moderates seated on the government’s Assembly of
Experts, the bodily designated to elect the next Supreme Leader. See Moderates Win A
Majority Of Seats In Iran's Clerical Assembly, NPR (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/2016/02/29/468521874/moderates-win-a-majority-of-seats-in-iransclerical-assembly; Iran elections: Moderates Win Most Votes for Assembly of Experts Race,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/iran-elections-moderates-winmost-votes-for-assembly-of-experts-race/a-19079351.
1142. See generally supra Part III.D (identifying overlap across various US foreign
policy interests).
1143. See id.
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investment has the power to create new stakeholders among Iran’s
youth and middle class, the opening of Iran to US investment would
also create a new class of commercial stakeholders and engagement
advocates here in the United States, with shared corporate interests,
capable of lobbying for these sensible policies.1144 Whatever its
failures related to Iran throughout the 1990s, few would classify the
US oil lobby as irrelevant in steering Washington’s policies. It is also
not beyond reason that these groups might appreciate the opportunity
to be seen inducing positive change in Iran.1145 After chants of “no
blood for oil” marked the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the mere
prospect of “oil for human rights” has a more pleasant ring to it.1146
By arming themselves with the above benefits that engagement would
bring to US foreign policy interests, these players could play a major
role in constructively shifting the United States political consensus
regarding Iran.1147
Furthermore, the efforts to mobilize a comprehensive US-Iran
engagement strategy would not require starting from scratch.
Throughout the entire sanctions regime, various Track II diplomacy
efforts were carried out in the absence of official relations.1148 These
efforts “generally have taken a long-term approach geared toward
socializing elites with access to and influence on policymakers” and
have aimed at “shap[ing] the policy debate by presenting a more
1144. See supra Part III.D.2 (exploring engagement’s potential to empower alternative
stakeholders in Iran); see also Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 166
(noting the creation of engagement-supporting constituencies within Washington’s Iraq
sanctions regime).
1145. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 173 (suggesting that
international investors are not just financially motivated, but also interested in promoting US
values overseas); David B. Spence, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas
Industry: The Importance of Reputational Risk, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, (2010) (examining
CSR within the oil and gas industry).
1146. See Greg Muttitt & Ali Issa, “No Blood for Oil”: The Unfinished Story of Iraq’s
Oil Law, GLOBAL RES. (July 30, 2012), http://www.globalresearch.ca/no-blood-for-oil-theunfinished-story-of-iraq-s-oil-law/32129; Anti-War Protests Span the Globe, BBC (Mar. 22,
2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2875555.stm (characterizing opposition to the 2003 US
invasion of Iraq).
1147. See supra Part III.D (arguing how engagement could be used to advance US
foreign policy interests).
1148. See Suzanne DiMaggio, Track II Diplomacy, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12,
at 206 (“The term ‘track II diplomacy’ refers to frank, off-the-record interactions, often
between members of adversarial countries outside of official negotiations.”); see also Charles
Homans, Track II Diplomacy: A Short History, FOREIGN POL'Y (June 20, 2011),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/track-ii-diplomacy-a-short-history/ (providing a general
overview of Track II Diplomacy).
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nuanced picture of problems and possible options for cooperative
solutions.”1149 While the results of these efforts have remained largely
confidential, it is known that politically powerful players have often
been involved in them.1150 Although Track II diplomacy is incapable
of mobilizing engagement strategies on its own, it is also worth noting
that, at least during the George W. Bush Administration, various
pockets of both the CIA and the State Department actively supported
détente with Iran.1151 By shoring up these official and unofficial
support channels, these political power blocs could align with private
sector engagement advocates in order to expand Washington’s
perspective on engaging Iran.1152
Engagement policies in general are always initially a gamble for
all parties involved.1153 Yet, with a little bit of political will, early
confidence building measures, and the establishment of mutually
agreed-upon and easily traceable roadmaps, the positive results of
engagement could open the door to self-perpetuating shared benefits
and bring constructive changes within the Islamic Republic.1154 In
2010, US diplomat James Dobbins predicted that, in engaging Iran,
“[a] breakthrough on the nuclear front could expand the room for
dialogue on other issues.”1155 While the JCPOA has certainly
provided a breakthrough on the Iranian nuclear issue, both the United
States and Iran remain in a position where more is now needed. In
seeking to sensibly advance its foreign policy goals within Iran
specifically and the Middle East generally, the United States should
now revise its policies concerning footnote six of the JCPOA,
1149. DiMaggio, supra note 1148, at 208.
1150. See id. (“Over 20 influential Americans participated in one or more of these
meetings; many were former senior government officials.”); see, e.g., Randa M. Slim, The
U.S.-Iran Track II Dialogue (2002-2008): Lessons Learned and Implications for the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund's Grantmaking Strategy, ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND (Aug. 3,
2010), http://www.rbf.org/sites/default/files/attachments/iranreport_0.pdf at 11 (illustrating the
players involved in one past vein of Track II diplomacy between the United States and Iran).
1151. See DiMaggio, supra note 1148, at 208 (asserting the limits of Track II efforts).
See also MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 303; Lauren French, Former Bush
Administration Official to Sell Dems on Iran Deal, POLITICO (July 27, 2015), http://www.
politico.com/story/2015/07/bush-official-nicholas-burns-sell-democrats-iran-deal-120671
(revealing the will for détente shared by past policymakers, outside of their official capacity).
1152. See supra notes 1148-51 and accompanying text.
1153. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note 778, at 169-70; Chester A.
Crocker, Terms of Engagement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
09/14/opinion/14crocker.html (evaluating the risks posed by engagement).
1154. See supra Part III.C.
1155. Dobbins, supra note 709, at 205.
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bringing a formal conclusion to the sanctions regime for US investors
and freeing their capital to get to work in Iran.1156

1156. See supra notes 694-1156 and accompanying text.
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